論主要問題原則—— 以我國氣候變遷因應為例

Abstract

隨著氣候緊急狀態（climate emergency）的來臨，氣候變遷的治理愈發重要。然而，美國司法實務於《West Virginia V. EPA》案中所採用的主要問題原則（Major Questions Doctrine），限制了行政權對氣候變遷進行治理的權限。就此，是否妥當，美國學說上，容有爭議。本文擬先整理美國學說上就主要問題原則的正反見解後，與我國有關行政與立法分權的法律保留原則與授權明確性原則比較，爾後再提出本文見解。 本文認為，美國學說中反對主要問題原則之見解確有見地，然而卻未具體提出行政與立法間應如何分權；而我國學說則有提出行政與立法分權之方式，卻未考量司法權於行政與立法二權互動時扮演的角色。是以，本文綜合二國學說見解並將其細膩化、動態化後，認為就行政與立法分權而言，重要性並非獨立的因素，又功能最適原則應著重是否有「迅速因應性」的要求，以及民主正當性的強弱應是「立法內部議事過程」定之。此外，就司法權的回應而言，其則得善用司法裁判法律效果的多元性，作出最適合個案的裁判；又有別於以往以「判決」終結實體案件的方式，憲法法院也應於大程序（Grand process）的案件中，使用「裁定」終結案件，如此方得降低對行政與立法權的拘束力，避免司法擴權，並能促進憲法對話。 最後，在確立了行政與立法分權的方式後，就氣候變遷因應的治理而言，因為氣候變遷有高度不確定性、大尺度性與急迫必要性，且我國目前三黨不過半、政黨政治激化對立的立法院似乎難以有效傳遞民主正當性的情形下，憲法法院應視氣候變遷治理具體個案情形，作成「行政監管措施有效，立法需即時立法補強」或「行政監管措施2年內無效，立法需即時立法；若無立法，則有效」的決定；又因氣候變遷因應為大程序，故憲法法院應作成裁定終結實體案件。

With the advent of the climate emergency, the governance of climate change has become increasingly important. However, the Major Questions Doctrine, adopted by the U.S. judiciary in the case of West Virginia v. EPA, restricts the executive branch's authority to govern climate change. The appropriateness of this doctrine is debated among U.S. scholars. This paper aims to first organize the pros and cons of the Major Questions Doctrine in U.S. scholarship, then compare it with the principles of legal reservation and authorization clarity in the division of administrative and legislative powers in Taiwan, and finally present the paper's perspective. This paper argues that while the views opposing the Major Questions Doctrine in U.S. scholarship are insightful, they do not concretely propose how to divide powers between the executive and legislative branches. On the other hand, Taiwan's scholarship proposes methods for the division of powers between the executive and legislative branches but does not consider the role of the judiciary in the interaction between the executive and legislative branches. Therefore, after synthesizing and refining the insights from both countries' scholarship, this paper concludes that in terms of the division of powers between the executive and legislative branches, importance is not an independent factor. The principle of optimal functionality should focus on whether there is a need for "rapid response," and the strength of democratic legitimacy should be determined by the "internal legislative process." Additionally, in terms of the judiciary's response, it should make use of the diversity of legal effects in judicial rulings to make the most suitable decision for each case. Unlike the previous approach of ending substantive cases with "judgments," the Constitutional Court should also use "rulings" to conclude cases in grand processes, thereby reducing constraints on the executive and legislative branches, avoiding judicial overreach, and promoting constitutional dialogue. Finally, after establishing the method of dividing powers between the executive and legislative branches, in terms of governance of climate change adaptation, due to the high uncertainty, large scale, and urgent necessity of climate change, and given that our current legislature, characterized by a lack of majority and intensified party politics, seems unable to effectively convey democratic legitimacy, the Constitutional Court should make decisions based on the specific circumstances of climate change governance. These decisions could include "administrative regulatory measures are effective, and legislation must promptly reinforce" or "administrative regulatory measures are ineffective within two years, and legislation must promptly reinforce; if there is no legislation, the measures are effective." Additionally, since climate change adaptation is a grand process, the Constitutional Court should use rulings to conclude substantive cases.