社會認知:於獨裁者賽局中視為訊息或報酬

Abstract

公平理論已足以與典型的經濟理論形成互補關係。學者在進行如獨裁者賽局、最 後通牒賽局等選擇類型實驗時所發現的異常結果，常可藉由公平理論來獲得解釋。公平理論的成功之處在於揭露了一般人對平均主義有所偏好，然而，公平理論卻未能解釋這種偏好的理由。另外，學者們進行相關實驗時，常為了避免偏誤而將實驗設計得非常精密，但這些精密設計反而造成實驗與現實世界脫節：在現實生活中，金錢必須靠工作賺得，但在許多選擇實驗裡，受試者於初始階段即憑空得到了一筆金錢。這使得受試者在被要求分配手中金錢時，可能僅憑喜好、或僅憑與他人的親殊程度就決定了分配比例。 有鑑於此，我們提出對獨裁者賽局的修改版本：兩名受試者在雙方不直接互動下 合作完成一項工作，並共同分享完成任務後所得到的報酬。我們將受試者伙伴如何履行工作的資訊提供給受試者，並讓受試者決定自己應得之報酬比例。我們希望觀察受試者在接收到不同伙伴工作資訊以及不同程度的社會認知時，對其決定報酬的行為有何影響。

Standard economics theory has been complemented with fairness theories in an attempt to explain the anomalies found in choice type experiments, most of which are done as either dictator games, ultimatum games or tournaments of such games. The distinct success of fairness theories exposed a basic preference for a level of equalitarianism, but it has not revealed the motivation for the preference for fair outcomes. The experiments were carefully designed to avoid framing, but as a result lost some connection to real life situations, in which monetary compensation is only exchanged for the delivery of goods or services. In that case it is possible that the outcome strongly reflects the perceived or assumed kinship of the agents. We present a modified version of a dictator game where two agents get rewarded for performing a collaborative task in and where the “dictator” is responsible for sharing the reward with the other agent. We are interested in how information about the other agents’ performance and social recognition of the dictator interact with the choice behavior of the dictator.