論企業策略結盟的風險控管與交易架構之設計－ 以製藥產業中大型藥廠和新興生技公司間的合作為例

Abstract

隨著全球化浪潮的發展、商業環境的改變，使得企業的經營模式產生了巨大的變化。在今日，企業間長期性合作關係之建立，已成為日趨普遍的商業趨勢，包含策略聯盟在內等各種不同型態之合作關係、交易架構，相較以往無論是在規模和數量上均持續呈現爆炸性地成長。然而，即便企業相互間合作關係之建立已成為其營運策略中重要之一環，但在市場規模和消費者有限的情況下，各企業為了追求成長和獲利的極大化，仍需憑藉本身獨特的能力和優勢，彼此競爭、對抗，使得企業間的關係呈現出一種「既競爭，又合作」的現象。因此，在現今的商業環境中，企業彼此間關係的建構與管理，是所有經營者所應仔細思考、探究的課題。 針對現今商業環境中大量企業間合作關係之產生，本論文希冀透過既有的理論、學說，探討促成企業建立長期間合作關係背後的動機和目的為何？究竟存在哪些因素，會影響到當事人在合作過程中用來降低風險的治理機制安排與交易架構設計？而不同合作態樣的產生，是否可歸因於產業環境的差異和交易特性的不同所致？本論文之研究目的，在於試圖建構出一統一、整合性的觀點，闡述企業合作過程當中所面臨相關的治理議題，希望能夠對於企業間合作關係之建立和維持，提出一個多面向的分析架構，以供企業未來在進行策略結盟時有一得以參考的指標。 除了理論、學說的說明以及抽象分析性架構之提出外，本論文也試圖藉由製藥產業中大型藥廠和生技公司間的合作，以印證既有的理論和分析觀點。由於藥物的研發、製造橫跨了許多不同的學術領域，需求各種專業人士的共同參與；並且藥品的開發通常涉及金額龐大的投資，而且過程漫長，當事人在長期間的合作、互動過程中必須面臨極大的風險和不確定性，因而使得合作關係中的治理問題－安排一個適當的交易架構和管理、控制機制之設計－顯得特別重要。筆者希望能從這些合作關係中，探討藥廠和生技公司間是如何地安排交易架構和設計相關的治理機制，降低合作的風險和失敗的可能性。基本上，在生技製藥產業中最為普遍的管理機制，包含透過股權投資與付款方式、時間和條件，以及對於當事人間控制權的分配、安排，解決在藥廠和生技公司形成的策略聯盟中存在的資訊不對稱、不確定性以及特殊關係投資等問題，提供雙方當事人足夠的誘因共同努力完成合作的目標。 最後，筆者針對本論文初步的研究成果以及關於企業間合作關係未來值得進一步深入研究的方向提出說明，並且以法律人在企業間的策略結盟關係中所應扮演的角色和發揮的功能作一總結。

In recent years, strategic alliances between firms become a ubiquitous phenomenon. Their proliferation has led to a growing stream of research by strategy and organizational scholars who have examined some of the causes and consequences of such partnerships, mostly at the dyadic level. Although the establishment of long-term interfirm relationship has become more and more important, collaborating parties often worry about the uncertainty and opportunistic risk involved in the cooperation. Therefore, the design of transaction structure and appropriate arrangement of governance mechanism is a vital issue in the interfirm collaboration. In this thesis, I try to analyze the reasons and motivations which cause enterprise to choose different types of interfirm cooperation. Then I will proceed to discuss the risk and uncertainty firms may encounter during their long-term interaction. To solve these problems, collaborating parties would adopt some governance mechanisms to mitigate the risk and coordinate their tasks. The association between different types of interfirm alliances and modes of governance mechanisms will also be thoroughly examined in this thesis. Strategic alliances exist in a bewildering variety of forms, ranging from unstructured collaborations, through consortia and joint ventures that superimpose new governance structures on existing firms, to transactions that restructure firm boundaries and asset ownership. In the second chapter, I explain the formation of long-term interfirm alliances from both economic and social perspective, based on Transaction Cost Theory, Resources Based Theory, and Social Network Theory etc. Through these theories, I try to come up with a unified and integrated analytical framework for further research. A notable characteristic of the dramatic growth of strategic alliances in the last two decades has been the increasing diversity of such alliances. The nationalities of partners, their motives and goals in entering alliances, and the formal contractual structures used to organize the partnerships, called the governance structure, have all become increasingly varied. While alliances may be considered a distinct form of governance that is different from markets or hierarchies, there is also considerable variation in the formal structure of alliances themselves. The variety of organizing structures implies that firms face an array of choices in structuring their alliances. In the third chapter, I describe the risk and uncertainty involved in the interfirm collaboration, including information asymmetry, appropriation concerns, and hold- ups resulting from relationship-specific investment. To prevent these opportunistic hazard and manage the relationship between collaborating partners, several kinds of governance mechanisms must be adopted. I will compare the ads and cons of different transaction structures and mechanisms, trying to establish the connection between different types of interfirm collaboration and appropriate modes of governance mechanisms. Following the analysis in the second and third chapter, I take the collaboration between large pharmaceutical firms and young biotechnology corporations for example. Young firms with novel technologies frequently lack the financial resources to effectively introduce a new product and may find it difficult to raise equity or debt due to the information asymmetry surrounding the project. As a result, small, research-intensive firms usually rely on alliances with larger corporations. But the research outcomes of the alliances and the effort that the R&D firms devote to the project are often difficult to specify in an enforceable contract. So many mechanisms have been developed to overcome such risk and uncertainty, like through equity investment, upfront or licensing fees, milestone payments, and option clauses etc. Besides, the allocation of control rights has considerable practical importance. Case studies suggest that the allocation of control rights is a central issue in the negotiation of alliances. The prerogatives of the parties in every stage of the project, from the allocation of research dollars, to decisions about patent litigation against third parties, to marketing strategy, are painstakingly negotiated and carefully delineated in alliance agreements. All these measures are designed to align incentives of both parties and mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior by either party so as to maximize performance of the alliances. To sum up, I conclude that the design of transaction structures and appropriate arrangement of governance mechanisms is worth of more attention in the interfirm collaboration. As long as the risk and uncertainty of the alliances can be carefully handled, strategic alliances between corporations will be more efficient and effective.