Hans Kelsen純粹法學理論的法學知識性質

Abstract

凱爾生在1934年出版了其純粹法學理論一版，直到1960年其更新其內容出版了純粹法學二版。在其第一版中凱爾生將規範理解為假設判斷句，以歸責來連結法定要件與法定效果，假設判斷句不涉及任何道德價值與意識型態。然而在第一版中凱爾生並未區分規範與規範陳述。這造成純粹法學所建立的規範知識的性質無法被確定。 純粹法學二版中，凱爾生將規範理解為意志行動的意義，是對於他人行為之意欲，並且在理論層次上區分規範與規範陳述，規範陳述乃是對於規範存有之描述，其功能並不同於規範，而純粹法學之任務即在於提供認識規範之先驗條件，並且對於規範之存在與否進行描述。 最終，凱爾生的純粹法學乃是對於規範性的研究，其不同於日後之法實證主義，原因即在於其不僅主張法律與道德之分離，並且主張法律與事實之分離，這是他不同於牛津學派之處。其將法學之任務設定為描述人類意志設定之規範意義，而純粹法學之作用在於揭示人類如何以理性去認識規範。凱爾生的理論告訴我們乃必須以不同於認識自然實體的方法去認識應然規範，對於規範之認識必定預設基本規範，如此方得認識應然領域之存在。

Hans Kelsen published The Pure Theory of Law first edition in 1930.He didn’t renew the content of this publication until 1960 he wrote the second edition of The Pure Theory of Law. In the first edition he reconstructed the norms as the “hypothetic judgment”, in which the specified legal condition are connected to the legal consequence by function of imputation. The “hypothetic judgment” doesn’t refer to any moral value and ideology. In the first edition, however, he didn’t make the differentiation between the norm and the norm statement. That results in the nature of legal knowledge of pure theory of law hardly to be clarified. In the second edition, Kelsen has made the differentiation between the norm and the norm statement. He interpreted the norm as the meaning of the act of will, which is toward other people’s act. The norm statement is the description of the norm, its function is different from the norm. The task of the pure theory is to provide the transcend presumption of the norm cognition and to describe the being of the norm. Eventually, Kelsen’s pure theory is a research directed to the “normativity”, which is different from the legal positivism. He not only support the separation of legal and moral, but also the separation of legal and facts. The task of jurisprudence is describe the meaning of norm posited by human will. The function of it lies in the exploitation how human being attain the cognition of norm with reason. Kelsen tell us that there is different way and form to know the ought norm. In order to understand the ought, we must presuppose the basic norm.