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標題: | 董事超額薪酬的前置因素與績效影響:家族控制的調節效果 Antecedents and Performance Impact of Director Excess Compensation: The Moderating Role of Family Control |
作者: | 彭郁潔 Yu-Chieh Peng |
指導教授: | 朱文儀 Wenyi Chu |
關鍵字: | 董事超額薪酬,董事會組成,內部董事,社會網絡,家族控制,公司績效, Director Excess Compensation,Board Composition,Inside Directors,Social Network,Family Control,Firm Performance, |
出版年 : | 2024 |
學位: | 博士 |
摘要: | 肥貓現象與董事超額薪酬的議題持續受到關注。所謂董事超額薪酬,是指董事實際薪酬超出其應領薪酬的部分。關於董事超額薪酬與公司績效的關係,過去研究結果呈現不一致的情況,且存在兩種不同看法,分別為激勵觀點及自肥觀點。因此,本研究認為董事超額薪酬對公司績效可能同時存在這兩種不同影響,故整合代理理論與資源依賴理論來進行探討。
此外,過去研究較少探討超額薪酬的前置因素,本研究納入董事會組成結構以及公司網絡位置,並整合友好董事會理論、社會網絡理論與社會比較理論,來探討其對超額薪酬的影響,以及可能存在的非線性中介效果。最後,過往針對超額薪酬的研究,較少考慮家族企業的角色。故本研究也納入社會情感財富觀點,探討家族控制的調節效果,以補足現有研究缺口。 本研究彙整先前研究所提出的應領薪酬決定因素,包含投資機會、公司複雜度、監督需求、公司績效,並加上台灣特有的電子產業因素組成,來估計董事應領薪酬。採用2014年至2021年台灣571家上市櫃公司,總計4,568個觀察值8年期的資料進行實證分析。主要研究結果分為以下三個部份: 首先,本研究發現董事超額薪酬與公司績效呈現倒U型關係,顯示適度的董事超額薪酬具有激勵效果,有助於提升公司績效,但當超額薪酬達到一定程度時,可能降低董事會的監督效果,因而對公司績效產生負向影響。 其次,關於前置因素的影響,研究結果證實內部董事比例對超額薪酬有正向影響,而公司網絡位置的影響則未獲支持。在中介效果部分,「內部董事比例—超額薪酬—公司績效」之間的中介效果獲得支持,但「公司網絡中心性—超額薪酬—公司績效」之間的中介效果則未獲支持。 最後,關於家族企業的調節效果,研究結果顯示,家族控制強化了董事超額薪酬與公司績效之間的倒U型關係,但卻會弱化前置因素(公司內部董事、公司網絡中心性)對董事超額薪酬的正向影響。這表示家族企業的治理方式不但會減緩內外董事合謀的可能性,也比較不傾向提供高激勵性薪酬來吸引具有社會資本或聲望的董事進行監督。 總體而言,本研究從不同面向來實證探討董事超額薪酬,可望為公司治理和董事薪酬提供更完整的學術解釋與實務意涵。 Existing studies on fat-cat companies and director excess compensation has long been an important research issue in the management literature. Director excess compensation refers to the difference between subtracting reasonable compensation and actual compensation of directors. However, prior research findings regarding the relationship between director excess compensation and firm performance remain inconclusive. Two competing perspectives coexist: incentive versus cronyism perspectives. This study argues that director excess compensation may reflect both two divergent effects on firm performance, and aims to integrate agency theory and resource dependence theory to conduct a comprehensive examination. In addition, there has been limited studies explicitly addressing the antecedents of director excess compensation. This study thus considers the impact of board composition (specifically, the percentage of inside directors) and the firm''s network centrality on director excess compensation, by employing the friendly board theory, social network theory, and social comparison theory. In addition, the potential mediating effect of directors'' excess compensation is also examined. Finally, based on the social emotional wealth theory, we also investigate the possible moderating effects of family firms on the overall associations among board compensation, company network centrality, director excess compensation, and firm performance. In the methodology section, this study estimates the subtracting reasonable compensation of directors, with explanatory variables of investment opportunities, firm complexity, need for monitoring, firm performance, and industrial category (i.e., electronics industry). The research sample comprises 571 listed firms in Taiwan, covering the period from 2014 to 2021. The main findings can be summarized in three aspects. First, the empirical results show a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between director excess compensation and firm performance. Specifically, providing directors with moderate excess compensation has a positive incentive effect, leading to improved firm performance. However, when the level of excess compensation surpasses a certain threshold, it could diminish the supervisory effectiveness of the board of directors, thereby exerting a negative impact on firm performance. Second, regarding the antecedents of director excess compensation, the research results confirm a positive effect of inside directors, while the influence of company’s network position is insignificant. In terms of the mediating effect, support is found for the mediation effect of excess compensation on the relationship between inside directors and firm performance. While such mediation is insignificant in the link of company network centrality and firm performance. Finally, regarding the moderating effect of family control, it is found that family control amplifies the negative impact on the inverted U-shaped relationship between directors'' excess compensation and firm performance. Family control also diminishes the impacts of antecedent factors (i.e., inside directors and network centrality) on director excess compensation. This implies that family governance not only diminishes the likelihood of collusion between inside and outside directors, but also renders them less prone to offering high incentive compensation to attract directors with social capital and a reputation for supervision. This study aims to expand the scope of theoretical inquiries into director excess compensation, by examining its overall relationship with board composition, company social network, and family business. Findings of this study are expected to shed new lights on the previous inconsistent findings of corporate governance and excess compensation literature. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/92110 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202400602 |
全文授權: | 同意授權(限校園內公開) |
顯示於系所單位: | 商學研究所 |
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