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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 王榮麟 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Rong-Lin Wang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 郭建成 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | Jian-Cheng Guo | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-02-22T16:43:36Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-02-23 | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2024-02-22 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2024 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2024-02-12 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Brown, E., 2017. “Blame: Strangers and the Moral Relationship”, Analysis, Volume 77, Issue 1, 10–20.
Coates, D. Justin & Tognazzini, Neal A., 2012. “The Nature and Ethics of Blame”, Philosophy Compass 7 (3), 197-207. ––––––, 2013, “The Contours of Blame”, in D.J. Coates, and N. Tognazzini, eds. Blame: Its Nature and Norms: 3–26. Dworkin, R. ,2011. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of. Harvard University Press. Graham PA. ,2014. “A sketch of a theory of moral blameworthiness”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88(2):388–409. Menges, L., 2017. “The Emotion Account of Blame”, Philosophical Studies, 174: 257-273. ––––––, 2023. “Blaming”, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility, edited by Maximilian Kiener, chapter 24. Nagel, T., 1979. “Moral Luck”. Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press, 24-38. Nelkin, D. K., 2019. “Moral Luck”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-luck/#Aca>. Raz, Joseph.,2009. “Why Interpret ? ”. Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. SASAKI, Taku., 2019. “Blame based on Relation: Critique and Defense of T. Scanlon’s Interpretation of Blame”, 倫理学年報 68, Page:231-244 Scanlon, T. M., 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ––––––, 2008, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ––––––, 2013, “Interpreting Blame”, in D.J. Coates, and N. Tognazzini, eds. Blame: Its Nature and Norms: 84–99. ––––––, 2015, “Forms and Conditions of Responsibility”, in R. Clarke, M. McKenna, and A. M. Smith (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ––––––, 2019, “Learning from Psychopaths”, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5: Themes from the Philosophy of Gary Watson, D. Justin Coates (ed.), Neal A. Tognazzini (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press Sher, G., 2006, In Praise of Blame, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ––––––, 2013, “Wrongdoing and Relationships: The Problem of the Stranger”, in D.J. Coates, and N. Tognazzini, eds. Blame: Its Nature and Norms: 49–65, Oxford: OUP. Smith, A. M., 2013, “Moral Blame and Moral Protest”, in D.J. Coates, and N. Tognazzini, eds. Blame: Its Nature and Norms: 27–48. Strabbing, J. T.,2014. “Reviewed Work(s): Blame: Its Nature and Norms by D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini”, Mind, 579–585. Strawson, Galen, 1994. “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies, 75: 5–24. Strawson, P. F., 2003, “Freedom and Resentment”, in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 72–93. Talbert, M. ,2008. “Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89, 516-535. ––––––, 2019. “The Attributionist Approach to Moral Luck”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):24-41. Vandieken, J., 2022, “Moral friends? The idea of the moral relationship”, European。Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. Williams, Bernard, 1976, “Moral Luck”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume L: 115–35. Reprinted in Statman 1993b, pp. 35–55. Wallace, R. J.,1994, Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ––––––, 2011, “Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments”, in Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 348–372. ––––––, 2014, “Emotions and Relationships: On a Theme from Strawson”, in David Shoemaker (ed.), Neal Tognazzini (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 2: ''Freedom and Resentment'' at 50, Oxford University Press UK, pp. 119–142. Watson, G., 1996. “Two Faces of Responsibility”, Philosophical Topics, 24(2): 227-248. ––––––, 2011. “The Trouble with Psychopaths”, in Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essay on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 307-331. Wolf, S., 2011, “Blame, Italian Style”, in Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essay on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 332–347. | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/91787 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本文之要旨,在於分析、反省Scanlon提出之「關係依賴指責理論」。依據Scanlon對指責的詮釋,指責既非僅是評價,亦非屬於懲罰,而是一種根據關係受損的態度調整。所謂關係的受損,係指他人的態度違反了特定關係之規範;所謂的態度調整,係指改變自己對受指責者的期待或意圖。這套「關係依賴指責理論」不僅為「指責是什麼?」提供了新穎的回答,也為「指責倫理議題(例如:在什麼情況下,指責他人是恰當的?)」提供了細緻的說明。然而,此理論有三個值得反省之問題,第一、「道德關係的破壞」如何能夠使「態度的調整」是適當的? 第二、「態度的調整」能否適切地詮釋「指責」的概念?第三、它能否完善地解決自由相關哲學問題?為了處理這些問題,本文第二章檢視Scanlon的方法論以及探討指責理論需要滿足的指標。在第三章,考察Scanlon的理論建構,在其不足之處予以合理的詮釋或補充之外,並介紹其遭受的批評並試圖回應之。接著,在第四章,探討Scanlon指責理論如何回應以下兩個哲學議題:指責與自由、指責與道德運氣。本文將指出,Scanlon的解方有所不足,並援引一些說法補充之。最後,第五章為結論。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis aims to analyze and reflect on Scanlon''s“Relationship-Dependent Theory.” According to Scanlon''s interpretation of blame, it is not merely an evaluation or punishment, but rather an attitude adjustment based on the impairment to relationships. The term“impairment to relationships”refers to the violation of norms in a specific relationship by the attitudes of others, and“attitude adjustment”refers to changing one''s expectations or intentions towards the blamed. This "Relationship-Dependent Theory”not only provides a novel answer to the question“What is blame?”but also offers detailed explanations for ethical issues related to blame, such as“Under what circumstances is it appropriate to blame others? ”However, the theory raises two reflective questions: first, how can the“impairment to moral relationships”justify the“adjustment of attitudes”? Second, can the“adjustment of attitudes”appropriately interpret the concept of“blame”? Third, can it proficiently address the philosophical questions concerning freedom? To address these issues, the second chapter examines Scanlon''s methodology and discusses the criteria that blame theories need to meet. In the third chapter, Scanlon''s theoretical framework is examined, and reasonable interpretations or supplements are provided for its shortcomings. Criticisms faced by Scanlon''s theory are introduced, and attempts to respond to them are made. Moving on to the fourth chapter, the thesis explores how Scanlon''s theory of blame addresses two philosophical issues: blame and freedom, and blame and moral luck. This thesis points out deficiencies in Scanlon''s solutions and supplements them with certain perspectives. Finally, the fifth chapter serves as a conclusion. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2024-02-22T16:43:36Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
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dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 I
謝辭 II 中文摘要 III 英文摘要 IV 第一章 前言 1 第二章「指責」的理論工作 6 第一節 語意分析或詮釋 6 第二節 令人滿意的指責理論是什麼? 9 第三節 小結 11 第三章 SCANLON的指責詮釋理論 13 第一節 可責性(BLAMEWORTHINESS)與可允許性(PERMISSIBILITY) 13 第二節 關係依賴理論 — 從友誼關係到道德關係 17 第三節 對關係依賴理論的質疑 26 第四節 不發怒的指責 35 第五節 小結 41 第四章 指責與自由的哲學難題 43 第一節 指責須預設什麼樣的自由 44 第二節 精神變態(PSYCHOPATHY)案例之解釋 49 第三節 指責與道德運氣 58 第四節 小結 68 第五章 結論 70 參考文獻 74 | - |
dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
dc.title | 論史坎冷的指責理論 | zh_TW |
dc.title | An analysis of Scanlon''s theory of blame | en |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.date.schoolyear | 112-1 | - |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 張忠宏;王華 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Chung-Hung Chang;Ellie Hua Wang | en |
dc.subject.keyword | 史坎冷,指責,責任,反應態度,道德運氣,精神變態, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Scanlon,blame,responsibility,reactive attitude,moral luck,psychopathy, | en |
dc.relation.page | 76 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202400342 | - |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
dc.date.accepted | 2024-02-14 | - |
dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | - |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學系 | - |
顯示於系所單位: | 哲學系 |
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