制裁作為法律獨立構成理由的方式

Abstract

本文試圖辯護一個命題：制裁是法律獨立構成理由的方式。也就是說，法律的規範性，來自於制裁。這樣的觀點最早可以溯及至約翰．奧斯丁，他將法律義務定義為「主權者的命令」。然而，在哈特出版《法律的概念》之後，制裁理論基本上成為了眾矢之的，本文透過重新註解王一奇的〈理由與提供理由的事實〉一文，重新建構一個新的制裁理論。 本文第一章批評過往的法律理論，將法律規範性的來源奠基在法律追求的理念上。這種方法忽略了法律與法學實際操作的現實，因此本章試圖論證：為何應該、以及如何採取描述性理論，並說明在德沃金的詮釋理論挑戰下，描述性理論仍得以可能的關鍵。第二章借用王一奇的基於差異製造的理由論，指出集體理由與個體理由之間存在無法跨越的三種縫隙，使得集體理由在這個社會當中穩定實踐會出現困難，因此，社會需要制裁來跨越集體理由與個體理由之間的鴻溝，而制裁本身即是個體理由。第三章評論約翰．奧斯丁，指出「主權者的命令」並不是法律獨立構成理由的方式。其中，「主權者」會破壞構成理由的「獨立性」，而「命令」並不會「構成理由」，只能「提供理由」。此外，「獨立性」與「構成理由」是分離命題的必要條件，因此主權者的命令不會是一個法實證主義的主張。第四章指出了法律作為理由的各種形式，逐步分析權威、原則、規則以及共善提供理由的方式，這些方式都將其他理由混淆進了法律理由本身。法律理由必然是一種基於制裁的個體理由，這是一種人性本惡的理由觀。

This thesis seeks to defend a proposition: sanctions are an independent way for laws to constitute reasons. That is to say, the legal normativity comes from sanctions. This point of view can be traced back to John Austin, who defined legal obligation as ‘the command of the sovereign’. However, after H.L.A. Hart published ‘The Concept of Law,’ sanction theory largely became a target for criticism. This article seeks to reconstruct a new sanction theory by re-interpreting Linton Wang’s ‘Reasons and Reason-Giving Fact.’ Chapter 1 criticises past legal theories for basing the source of legal normativity on the ideal pursued by the law, which overlooks the realities of legal operations. This chapter, therefore, seeks to illustrate why and how the descriptive theory should be adopted. Chapter 2 points out, through the Difference-Making-Based Theory of Reasons proposed by Linton Wang, that there exist three gaps between individual reasons and collective reasons, making it challenging for collective reasons to practice stably in society. As a result, society requires sanctions to bridge these gaps between collective and individual reasons, with sanctions themselves constituting individual reasons. Chapter 3 critiques John Austin’s view, arguing that ‘the command of the sovereign’ does not independently constitute legal reasons. The concept of ‘sovereign’ undermines the ‘independence’ of legal reasoning, while ‘command’ can only ‘provide a reason’ rather than ‘constitute a reason.’ Moreover, ‘independence’ and ‘constituting reasons’ are essential for the separation thesis; thus, the sovereign’s command cannot support legal positivism. Chapter 4 explores and analyses one by one the various ways in which laws serve as reasons, including authorities, principles, rules, and the common good. All of these ways confuse other reasons with legal reasons themselves. Legal reasons must be individual reasons based on sanctions, a theory of reasons belonging to the theory of evil human nature.