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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳樂知 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Lok-Chi Chan | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 毛世琦 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Shi-Qi Mao | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-01-26T16:25:07Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-01-27 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2024-01-26 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2024-01-02 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | I. 外文部分
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(2007), Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Zahavi, D. (2005), Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 二.論文 Andersen, H. (2014), “The Development of the ‘Specious Present’ and James’ Views on Temporal Experience”, in Arstila, V. and Lloyd, D. (eds.), Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 25-42. --- & Grush, R. (2009), “A Brief History of Time Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 47(2): 277-307. Clark, S. E. (1969), “Retrieval of color information from preperceptual memory”, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 82: 263-266. Crane, T. & French, C. (2021), “The Problem of Perception”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/perception-problem/>. Dainton, B. (2003), “Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher”, Psyche, 9(10). --- (2008a), “Sensing Change”, Philosophical Issues, 18(1): 362-384. --- (2008b), “The Experience of Time and Change”, Philosophy Compass, 3(4): 619–638. --- (2017a), “Temporal Consciousness”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/Win2017/entries/consciousness-temporal/>. --- (2017b), “Husserl, the Brain and Cognitive Science”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/Win2017/entries/consciousness-temporal/husserl-cogsci.html>. --- (2017c), “interpreting Temporal Illusions”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/Win2017/entries/consciousness-temporal/temporal-illusions.html>. --- (2017d), “The Specious Present: Further Issues”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 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(1972), "The cutaneous “rabbit”: A perceptual illusion", Science, 178(4057): 178–179. Gilson, E.Q. & Baddeley, A.D. (1969), "Tactile short-term memory", Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 21(2): 180–184. Grush, R. (2005), “Internal models and the construction of time: Generalizing from state estimation to trajectory estimation to address temporal features of perception, including temporal illusions”, Journal of Neural Engineering, 2(3): S209-18. --- (2006), “How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time”, Synthese, 153(3): 417-450. --- (2016), “On the temporal character of temporal experience, its scale non-invariance, and its small scale structure”, Manuscript. doi:10.21224/P4WC73. Hoerl, C. (1999), “Memory, Amnesia and the Past”, Mind & Language, 14(2): 227-251. --- (2009), “Time and tense in perceptual experience”, Philosophers' Imprint, 9: 1-18. --- (2013), “‘A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession’”, Mind, 122(486): 373–417. Kelly, S.D. (2005), “The Puzzle of Temporal Experience”, in Brook, A. and Akins, K. (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: the philosophy and neuroscience movement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 208–238. Lee, G. (2014), “Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience”, Philosophers' Imprint, 14(3): 1-21. Le Poidevin, R. (2019), “The Experience and Perception of Time”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-experience/>. Longo, G. & Montévil, M. (2011), “Protention and retention in biological systems”, Theory in Biosciences, 130(2): 107–117. Michaelian, K. & Sutton, J. (2017), “Memory”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/>. Nikolić, D. & Häusler, S. & Singer, W. & Maass, W. (2009), “Distributed Fading Memory for Stimulus Properties in the Primary Visual Cortex”, PLOS Biology, 7(12): e1000260. Persuh, M. & Genzer, B. & Melara, R.D. (2012), “Iconic memory requires attention”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6(126): 1-8. Phillips, I. (2008), “Perceiving Temporal Properties”, European Journal of Philosophy, 18(2): 176-202. --- (2011a), “Indiscriminability and the experience of change”, Philosophical Quarterly, 61(245): 808- 827. --- (2011b), “Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn’t Show”, Mind & Language, 26(4): 381–411. --- (2014), “The Temporal Structure of Experience”, in Arstila, V. and Lloyd, D. (eds.), Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 139-152. Plumer, G. (1985), “The Myth of the Specious Present”, Mind, 94(373): 19–35. Pockett, S. (2003), “How long is “now”? Phenomenology and the specious present”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2: 55–68. Pöppel, E. (1997), “The Brain's Way to Create “Nowness””, in Atmanspacher, H. and Ruhnau, E. (eds.), Time, Temporality, Now, Berlin: Springer Berlin Heidelberg: 107–117. Prosser, S. (2017), “Rethinking the Specious Present”, in Phillips, I. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience, London and New York: Routledge: 146-156. Roselli, A. (2018), “How Long is Now? A New Perspective on the Specious Present”, Disputatio, 10(49): 119-140. Shimojo, S. (2014), “Postdiction: Its implications on visual awareness, hindsight, and sense of agency”, Front. Psychol., 5: 196. Siegel, S. (2007), “How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45: 127–142. Sperling, G. (1960), “The information available in brief visual presentations”, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 74(11): 1-29. Turvey, M. T. & Kravetz, S. (1970), “Retrieval from iconic memory with shape as the selectioncriterion”, Perception and Psychophysics, 8: 171-172. Varela, F.J. (1999), “The Specious Present: A Neurophenomenology of Time Consciousness”, in Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B. and Roy, J.-M. (eds.), Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press: 266–314. Von Wright, J. M. (1968), “Selection in visual immediate memory”, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 20: 62-68. Zeki, S. (1991), “Cerebral akinetopsia (visual motion blindness). A review”, Brain, 114(2): 811–24. --- (2015), “Area V5—a microcosm of the visual brain”, Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 2015(9): 21. II. 中文部分 一.專書 陳瑞麟(2010),《科學哲學:理論與歷史》,臺北市:群學。 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/91418 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 現象學時間性研究的是人的主觀時間經驗層面,而非神經層級或次個人(sub-personal)層級。胡塞爾(Husserl)通過分析時間發生的起源,提出了「保留-原始呈現-預示」(retention-primal presentation-protention)的三重時間結構,為人的意識流的產生提供解釋。當代的現象學研究學者在現象學時間性的基礎上,進一步發展出電影模型(cinematic model)、保留模型(retentional model)和延展模型(extensional model)三種時間模型,但仍存在許多爭議與不足。其一,是「現在的持續時間」存在頗多爭論,這也是三個模型之間的關鍵區別之一,即電影模型和保留模型支持點狀的「現在」,而延展模型支持區塊狀的「現在」;其二,是「時間經驗的認知內容」存在頗多的爭議,特別是「如何知覺運動?」,「如何知覺連續性或變化?」。這是另一個重要的區別,即一般認為,電影模型和保留模型支持靜態的觀點,而延展模型支持動態的觀點。本文的焦點將放在探究保留模型上,為保留模型提供合理的辯護,並對保留模型的不合理之處進行修正。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The study of phenomenological temporality concerns the subjective level of human temporal experience, rather than the neurological or sub-personal level. By analyzing the origin of temporality, Husserl proposed a triple temporal structure of “retention-primal presentation-protention” to provide an explanation for the emergence of human stream of consciousness. Building upon phenomenological temporality, contemporary scholars in phenomenological research have further developed three temporal models, namely, the cinematic model, the retentional model, and the extensional model. But there are still many controversies. First, there are many controversies about the "duration of the present", which constitutes a key distinction among the three models. The cinematic model and the retentional model advocate for a point-like "present," while the extensional model supports a block-like "present." Second, there are many controversies about the “perceptual content of temporal experience," particularly concerning questions such as "how to perceive motion?" and "how to perceive continuity or change?" This represents another significant difference, with the cinematic model and the retentional model generally endorsing a static view, while the extensional model supports a dynamic view. This paper focuses on the examination of the retentional model, aiming to provide a defense of its principles while addressing and rectifying any implausible aspects within the model. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2024-01-26T16:25:07Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2024-01-26T16:25:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 中文摘要 iii
Abstract iv 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景及動機 1 1.2 研究目的及方法 2 1.3 章節安排 3 第二章 基本概念解釋 9 2.1 主觀時間、客觀時間與現象學時間意識 9 2.2 電影模型 11 2.3 保留模型 14 2.4 延展模型 18 2.5 對三種現象學時間模型的總結 22 2.6 三個基本問題 23 第三章 似是而非的現在 26 3.1 「現在」的無持續時間論證 27 3.2 對3.1的回應:「現在」的「最短」持續時間研究 30 3.3 「現在」的個體化論證 37 3.4 對3.3的回應:「現在」的「較長」持續時間研究 39 3.5 章節總結及其他討論 45 第四章 保留與運動 50 4.1 連續性的實在論與反實在論 51 4.2 保留模型對連續性問題的回應:實在論角度 55 4.3 保留模型對連續性問題的回應:反實在論角度 60 4.4 章節總結及其他討論 65 第五章 保留與記憶 68 5.1 「現在」的不完全知覺論證 69 5.2 「保留」的四個特徵 73 5.3 四種常見的記憶類型 77 5.4 圖像記憶 80 5.5 章節總結及其他討論 85 第六章 結論 88 參考文獻 93 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.subject | 時間性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 記憶 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 運動 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 似是而非的現在 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 保留模型 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 現象學 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | specious present | en |
| dc.subject | retentional model | en |
| dc.subject | temporality | en |
| dc.subject | phenomenology | en |
| dc.subject | memory | en |
| dc.subject | motion | en |
| dc.title | 當代現象學時間性研究:對保留模型的辯護與修正 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Contemporary Temporal Studies in Phenomenology: Defending and Revising the Retentional Model | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 112-1 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 周先捷;陳貴正 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Nihel Jhou;Kuei-Chen Chen | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 現象學,時間性,保留模型,似是而非的現在,運動,記憶, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | phenomenology,temporality,retentional model,specious present,motion,memory, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 98 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202304582 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(限校園內公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2024-01-02 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學系 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 哲學系 | |
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