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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 黎士瑋 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Shih-Wei Li | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Joey LI | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Joey LI | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-10-24T16:52:56Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2025-10-17 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2023-10-24 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2023-08-04 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | [1] Apache http server benchmarking tool. http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/programs/ab.html.
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Fontana. Linux Observability with BPF: Advanced Programming for Performance Analysis and Networking. O’Reilly Media, 2019. [11] N. Carlini, A. Barresi, M. Payer, D. Wagner, and T. R. Gross. {Control-Flow} bend-ing: On the effectiveness of {Control-Flow} integrity. In 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15), pages 161–176, 2015. [12] N. Dautenhahn, T. Kasampalis, W. Dietz, J. Criswell, and V. Adve. Nested kernel: An operating system architecture for intra-kernel privilege separation. In Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, pages 191–206, 2015. [13] L. Davi, D. Gens, C. Liebchen, and A.-R. Sadeghi. Pt-rand: Practical mitigation of data-only attacks against page tables. In NDSS, 2017. [14] X. Ge, H. Vijayakumar, and T. Jaeger. Sprobes: Enforcing kernel code integrity on the trustzone architecture. arXiv preprint arXiv:1410.7747, 2014. [15] X. Jiang, X. Wang, and D. Xu. 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Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 16(4):2650–2667, 2019. [31] J.-K. Zinzindohoué, K. Bhargavan, J. Protzenko, and B. Beurdouche. Hacl*: A verified modern cryptographic library. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 1789–1806, 2017. | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/91047 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | None | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Many of the currently running OSes in the cloud are monolithic. Unfortunately, a monolithic design is prone to be highly vulnerable due to the nature of its arrangement. A single kernel vulnerability or a rootkit could grant the attacker full authority over the system. To mitigate this issue, we present K-Int, an additional layer of protection that ensures the execution of only approved code with the superuser privilege while still allowing external module loading even if the kernel is compromised. Past research has proposed solutions to improve the security of monolithic kernels. However, very few of them were built on Arm64. By relying on virtualization, K-Int interposes on all updates to the kernel page table and kernel code. Therefore, it prevents kernel code modification and malicious kernel page table manipulation. Since K-Int relies only on the basic hypervisor and Arm64’s features, it does not need the host hypervisor to provide complex implementations. In this sense, K-int is an extension that would be portable on hypervisors. K-Int leverages Arm virtualization extensions to protect Arm64 kernels. It is built upon SeKVM and reuses its formally verified functionality. The code base is composed of 4205 LoC and only 3 hypercalls to apply the protective layer. The implementation of K-Int over SeKVM suggests just a small overhead in performance at run time (e.g. < 2%). | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-10-24T16:52:56Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-10-24T16:52:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Abstract i
Contents iii List of Figures v List of Table vi 1.Introduction 1 2.Design Goal and Threat Model 4 2.1 Design Goals and Challenges 4 2.2 Threat Model and Assumption 5 3. Background 6 3.1 Overview of Arm’s Architecture 6 3.2 Overview of SeKVM 10 4. K-Int Design 13 4.1 W⊕PX 14 4.2 Kernel page table protection 15 4.3 Kernel Code Integrity 19 4.4 Module Management 21 5. Implementation 23 5.1 Subownership 24 5.2 Static Protection 25 5.3 Kernel Page Table Protection 28 5.4 W⊕PX 31 5.5 Loadable Kernel Modules 32 5.6 DMA Protection 36 6. Evaluation 37 6.1 Performance 37 6.2 Discussion 40 6.2.1 Comparison with Linux existing protection mechanism 40 6.2.2 Protection against real-world attacks 41 6.3 Limitation 44 6.4 Future Work 45 7. Related Work 49 8. Conclusion 52 References 53 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.subject | 虛擬機 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | KVM | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 系統核心完整性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 系統安全 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Virtualization | en |
| dc.subject | System Security | en |
| dc.subject | Kernel Integrity | en |
| dc.subject | KVM | en |
| dc.title | K-Int, 作業系統核心完整性保護之執行器 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | K-Int, Kernel Code Integrity Enforcer | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 蕭旭君;黃俊穎 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Hsu-Chun Hsiao;Chun-Ying Huang | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 系統安全,系統核心完整性,KVM,虛擬機, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | System Security,Kernel Integrity,KVM,Virtualization, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 56 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202301655 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2023-08-07 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 電機資訊學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 資訊網路與多媒體研究所 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 資訊網路與多媒體研究所 | |
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