考量服務品質與市場規模在不同合約機制下之研究——以雙邊獨佔平台為例

Abstract

隨著科技與時代的演進，使用線上平台進行消費已經充斥在現代人的生活之中，對於產品或服務的供應商來說，選擇加入平台便是一個重要的選擇。而一般而言，平台商與供應商所簽訂之合約多為下列二種：收益分享合約與固定規費合約。本研究在資訊對稱且平台商可以決定合約內容的情況下，透過一期的 Stackelberg game 的方式求解平台商與服務提供者在此二種合約下的決策行為，並且除了價格之外也涵蓋服務品質、市場潛力等因素進入考量。由於平台商有較高的談判力，並且可以影響服務提供者之行為，我們便先進行平台商的利潤極大化決策求解後，別可解出所有模型的變數。研究結果顯示在相同的環境設定之下，平台商選擇使用固定規費合約可以獲得最高的利潤，但此時服務提供者利潤逼近於0。而在使用收益分享合約時，在一定的參數環境設置之下，平台商與服務提供者都能享有部分利潤，相對而言是較為互利的模式。而我們發現除了在固定規費合約下之服務提供者利潤由於利潤近乎為0之外，潛在市場需求量、消費者對平台品質以及服務提供者所提供之服務品質之敏感度與平台商與服務提供者利潤有正相關，而與消費者對價格的敏感度有負向關係。

With the development of the times and the technologies, consuming goods on digital platform is familiar with modern people. On the other hand, to join a platform or not is a critical issue for those suppliers of services or products. In general, there are two main contracts between a platform and service providers: revenue-sharing contract and fixed fee contract. In this research, we try to discover the decision of the platform and the service provider by consideration of price, market potential,and service quality of both firms under symmetry information via a Stackelberg game. We focus on the profit-maximizing problem for the platform with more bargaining power in the model, once we solve that problem, we can obtain all the optimal solution of the model. Also, under the same parameter setting, fixed fee contract is a more favorable contract to the platform over the revenue-sharing contract, since it will charge nearly all revenue that service provider made. By contrast, under revenue-sharing contract, it is possible for both firms to gain a part of the revenue and it would be a fairer contract for both firms. We also found that potential market size and the consumer sensitivity for the service quality of both firms have positive relations with the profit of the service provider and the platform and have a negative relation with the price sensitivity of the consumer under both contract types except the profit of service provider under fixed fee contract with almost 0 profit.