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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳陽升 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Yang-Sheng Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 廖文偉 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Wen-Wei Liao | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-16T16:42:33Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-10 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2023-08-16 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2023-08-10 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文文獻（以下依照姓氏筆劃排序）
朱永發（2000），國際著作權立法之思潮，智慧財產權月刊，第13期，頁84-112。 陳弘儒(2022)，法律人工智慧的法哲學反省：判斷權限、執法機制與法治理念，歐美研究，第52卷第2期，頁175-245，DOI: 10.7015/JEAS.202206_52(2).0002。 二、外文文獻（以下依照英文字母順序排序） A. Bertolini (2013). Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications and Liability Rules. L. Innovation Techn. 2, 214–247. DOI:10.5235/17579961.5.2.214 A. Lai. (2020) Artificial Intelligence, LLC: Corporate Personhood as Tort Reform. 2021 Mich. St. L. Rev., Vol. 2021, p. 597. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3677360 A. Matthias (2004), The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the Actions of Learning Automata, Ethics and Information Technology. 6, 175–183. B. Smith (1928). Legal Personality. The Yale Law Journal, 37(3), 283–299. https://doi.org/10.2307/789740 D. C. Vladeck (2014). Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, Washington Law Review 89, 117–150. F. H. Lawson (1984). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 4(2), 153–156. I. Asimov (1950). "Runaround". I, Robot (The Isaac Asimov Collection ed.). New York City: Doubleday. p. 40. I. Stewart (1990). The Critical Legal Science of Hans Kelsen. Journal of Law and Society, 17(3), 273–308. https://doi.org/10.2307/1410155 J. Turner (2019), Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial Intelligence. Palgrave Macmillan 2019, P 193. K. Crawford, M. Whittaker, M. C. Elish, S. Barocas, A. Plasek and K. Ferryman (2016). The AI Now Report: The Social and Economic Implications of Artificial Intelligence Technologies in the Near-Term, AI Now, https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2016_Report.pdf L. B. Solum (1992). Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1231. https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol70/iss4/4 Montesquieu, Lettres persanes, Lettre XLVI. Usbek à Rhédi, à Venise (1721) N. Naffine (2003). Who Are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects. The Modern Law Review, 66(3), 346–367. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1097561 O. Bracha (2008). The ideology of authorship revisited: authors, markets, and liberal values in early American copyright. Yale LJ. 118(186):267. S. A. Negri (2021). Robot as Legal Person: Electronic Personhood in Robotics and Artificial Intelligence. Frontiers in Robotics and AI. 8, 1-10. DOI:10.3389/frobt.2021.789327 S. Bayern (2015). Three Problems (and Two Solutions) in the Law of Partnership Formation, U. Mich. JL Reform 49, p.624 S. Bayern, T. Burri, T. D. Grant, D. M. Hausermann, F. Moslein and R. W. Hastings (2017). Company law and autonomous systems: a blueprint for lawyers, entrepreneurs, and regulators, Sci. & Tech. LJ 9, 135. https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/hascietlj9&div=11 S. Padfield. (2013). Rehabilitating Concession Theory. 66 Okla. L. Rev. 327, https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/4 S. Schane (1987). The Corporation is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, Tulane Law Review 61(3). http://www.jstor.org/stable/764492 T. Y. Gruenberg (2019), Driving Cars will Likely Increase Product Liability Litigation, The National Law Review, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/self-driving-cars-will-likelyincrease-product-liability-litigation V. Kurki, A Theory of Legal Personhood, 2019, 138-150. W. N. Price II (2018). Medical Malpractice and Black-Box Medicine. In I. Cohen, H. Lynch, E. Vayena, & U. Gasser (Eds.), Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics, 295-306. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI:10.1017/9781108147972.027 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88999 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 科技的進步使得人類越來越難以預測人工智慧（俗稱AI）的行為和產出。當人工智慧出錯時，確定由誰來承擔責任也變得困難。由於人工智慧的設計者和使用者越來越無法預測人工智慧的反應，因此當人工智慧產品發生糾紛時，常造成許多難解的法律問題。近年來，人工智慧在人類生活中的廣泛使用，使生活變得便利，也產生了許多學者與專家過去未曾預見的問題。本研究以人工智慧在法律上產生的實務案例為基礎進行探討，說明人工智慧目前在法律上所產生的權利和義務問題，並針對人工智慧在這些案例中應承擔的責任進行討論。此外，我們也探討賦予人工智慧法人格的可能性，透過實務案例的討論，說明賦予人工智慧法人格成為解決相關問題的可行方案。最後，本研究也說明人工智慧法人格的可行架構，並對本研究的未來方向進行討論與建議。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The advancement of technology has made it increasingly difficult for humans to understand the behaviors and outputs of artificial intelligence (AI), presenting major obstacles in assigning responsibility when AI make a mistake. As more and more AI developers and users are unable to predict AI's behaviors determining liability often becomes difficult when disputes arise. AI has been widely used in human life in recent years, making life more convenient but also leading to many unforeseen issues from the perspective of legal scholars and experts. This study discusses practical cases involving AI legal problems, elaborating on various issues related to rights and obligations arising from AI in the legal context, and deliberates on the responsibilities and obligations that AI should assume in these cases. Furthermore, the possibility of granting legal personality to AI is discussed and analyzed through doctrine discussion and practical case analysis, demonstrating that providing AI with legal personality could be a solution to relevant real-life cases. Finally, an explanation of the framework of AI legal personality is provided, and the future research of this study is discussed and recommended. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-08-16T16:42:33Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-08-16T16:42:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 誌謝 ............................................................... i
中文摘要 .......................................................... ii 英文摘要 ......................................................... iii 第一章 緒論 ....................................................... 1 第一節 研究動機 ................................................ 1 第二節 研究範圍 ................................................ 1 第三節 研究步驟 ................................................ 2 第二章 人工智慧之演進與問題之衍生 ................................. 3 第一節 侵權問題 ................................................ 3 第二節 著作權議題 .............................................. 3 第三節 平等及隱私權問題 ........................................ 4 第四節 小結 .................................................... 5 第三章 人工智慧之侵權與被侵權案例 ................................. 6 第一節 Tesla-自動駕駛相關個案整理 .............................. 6 第二節 人工智慧自動交易（Automated Trading System）及人工智慧自動合約（Contract automation）個案整理 ........................... 10 第三節 創作型人工智慧相關訴訟案例 ............................. 12 第四節 從上述案例談人工智慧產品或服務衍生的責任 ............... 13 第五節 當前法律難以應付科技之快速變遷 ......................... 14 第四章 授予人工智慧法人格於法律上之可能性 ........................ 16 第一節 法人及法人種類 ......................................... 16 第二節 賦予人工智慧法人格之學理依據 ........................... 18 第三節 公司模式予人工智慧法人模式之借鏡 ....................... 19 第四節 人工智慧法人格相關之法律提案與法律見解 ................. 22 第五章 從實務案例談授予人工智慧法人格 ............................ 24 第一節 人工智慧產品責任問題與法人格 ........................... 24 第二節 人工智慧侵權問題與法人格 ............................... 25 第三節 人工智慧案著作權問題與法人格 ........................... 27 第四節 人工智慧案倫理道德問題與法人格 ......................... 30 第五節 小結 ................................................... 31 第六章 人工智慧法人格之可能性架構 ................................ 32 第一節 人工智慧法律實體 ....................................... 32 第二節 人工智慧法人格新想法 ................................... 33 第三節 本方案的其他優點 ....................................... 34 第七章 人工智慧實務案例於我國之挑戰 .............................. 36 第一節 現行自動駕駛相關條例 ................................... 36 第二節 物之瑕疵擔保 ........................................... 36 第三節 侵權責任 ............................................... 37 第四節 消費者保護法 ........................................... 37 第五節 小結 ................................................... 38 第八章 建議與展望 ................................................ 39 第一節 人工智慧倫理平等問題 ................................... 39 第二節 合約自動化之不對等問題 ................................. 39 第三節 人工智慧法人格是否可喪失 ............................... 40 參考文獻 .......................................................... 41 一、中文文獻（以下依照姓氏筆劃排序） ............................ 41 二、外文文獻（以下依照英文字母順序排序） ........................ 41 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.title | 從實務案例談授予人工智慧「法人格」之法律可能性 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Legal Possibility of Grant Legal Personality to AI - A Study Based on Real Cases | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 賈文宇;林家暘 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Wen-Yu Chia;Chia-Yang Lin | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 人工智慧,實務案例,法人格,ＡＩ, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Artificial Intelligence,Practical cases,Legal Personality,AI, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 42 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202303321 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2023-08-10 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 進修推廣學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 事業經營法務碩士在職學位學程 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 事業經營法務碩士在職學位學程 | |
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