請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88841完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 黃銘傑 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Ming-Jye Huang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 楊博翔 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Po-Hsiang Yang | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-15T18:00:27Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2023-08-15 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2023-08-08 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | 中文文獻
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(2021). The Draft Digital Markets Act: a legal and institutional analysis. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 12(7), 561-575. H. Schweitzer. (2021). The art to make gatekeeper positions contestable and the challenge to know what is fair: A discussion of the Digital Markets Act proposal. Forthcoming, ZEuP(3). W. Kerber. (2021). Taming Tech Giants with a Per-Se Rules Approach? The Digital Markets Act from the'Rules vs. Standard'Perspective. Taming tech giants with a per se rules approach, 28-34. A. De Streel, B. Liebhaberg, A. Fletcher, R. Feasey, J. Krämer and G. Monti. (2021). The European Proposal for a Digital Markets Act: A First Assessment. Centre on Regulation in Europe, 19. 三、研究報告 HM Treasury. (2019). Unlocking digital competition, Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel (2019). G. Nicola, H. G. Hector, F. Peter, N. Elisabeth, G. Aliki, I. Ela, N. Lorenzo, R. Francesco and T. Alexander. (2023). The 2022 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. OECD. (2014). Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy. F. Scott Morton, P. Bouvier, A. Ezrachi, B. Jullien, R. Katz, G. Kimmelman, A. D. Melamed and J. Morgenstern. (2019). Committee for the study of digital platforms: Market structure and antitrust subcommittee report. Chicago: Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, 36. P. Sofia. (2021). Ex ante regulation and competition in digital markets. European Commission (2010). Communication on A Digital Agenda for Europe, 19 May 2010, COM (2010), 245 final. European Commission (2015). Communication on A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, 6 May 2015, COM (2015), 192 final. CMA. (2020). Online platforms and digital advertising market study. G. Monti. (2022). Procedures and Institutions in the DMA. European Commission. (2020). 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Equitable Interoperability: The'Super Tool'of Digital Platform Governance. Available at SSRN 3923602. J. C. Monika Schnitzer, David Dinielli, Amelia Fletcher, Paul Heidhues, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Katja Seim. (2021). International Coherence in Digital Platform Regulation: An Economic Perspective on the U.S. and EU Proposals. B. Martens. (2020). Data Access, Consumer Interests and Social Welfare: An Economic Perspective. Consumer Interests and Social Welfare: An Economic Perspective (May 18, 2020). 四、網路資料 PwC, Global Top 100 public companies by market capitalisation: 2022. 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European Commission, Antitrust: Commission publishes market study on hotels' distribution practices (2022), at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5045 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the use of non-public independent seller data and opens second investigation into its e-commerce business practices (2020), at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2077 European Commision, Sneak peek: how the Commission will enforce the DSA & DMA - Blog of Commissioner Thierry Breton, at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_22_4327. Alba Ribera Martínez, The DMA’s Governance: The Apple Never Falls Far From the Tree, at https://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2023/04/03/the-dmas-governance-the-apple-never-falls-far-from-the-tree/. NATSUKO SUGIHARA, Japan's digital platform regulations:Online mall operators and app store operators now subject to regulation, and additional entities to be covered in future, at https://www.cliffordchance.com/insights/resources/blogs/talking-tech/en/articles/2021/08/japan-s-digital-platform-regulations.html. Sangyun Lee, Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2022 – Korea, (2022), at https://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2022/12/13/main-developments-in-competition-law-and-policy-2022-korea/ | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88841 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 隨著網際網路的發展和成熟,除為大眾生活帶來諸多娛樂和便利的科技產品外,越來越多的經營手段和商業模式也日漸豐富和多樣,讓人不禁感嘆數位科技的進步為人類社會帶來的巨大改變,其中尤以Google、Apple、Meta以及Amazon被美國合稱為四大科技巨頭的公司,對市場的影響最大。無論是Google Search改變人類記憶、搜尋資訊的方式,或是iPhone帶來行動裝置的變革,又或者是Mega顛覆人際之間聯繫的方式,以及Amazon對全球電商和物流帶來的衝擊,都讓人甚至難以想像如今的生活缺少這些科技巨頭提供的服務和產品將會成為什麼模樣。
然而,隨著這些科技巨頭在數位市場上的影響力日益龐大,各國競爭法主管機關陸續對他們的一些經營行為提出質疑,認為這些科技巨頭以有別於傳統的方式悄悄的限制數位市場中的競爭,並扼殺可能的潛在競爭對手。有鑒於此,各國競爭法主管機關開始嘗試應對數位市場中的種種新興商業模式和經營型態。除調整競爭法事後審查的分析方法外,部分國家的競爭法主管機關近年來也開始擬議針對數位市場訂定事前管制措施,期待透過事前管制簡化分析、提前預防的方式,能快速因應數位市場近年來層出不窮的濫用市場地位之行為、防止可能損害的擴大,並更進一步希望透過課予數位市場主導者事前義務的方式,為數位市場引入可競爭性,降低市場的參進障礙。 本文將目光聚焦在前述數位市場的事前管制上。本文從數位市場自身的特性開始分析,試圖釐清數位市場與其他產業市場在性質上究竟有何特殊之處,致使在競爭法事後管制存在的情形下,仍有必要另行訂定事前管制的需求。接著本文借鑑德國、美國及歐盟所擬定的數位市場事前管制措施,發現比較法上儘管其規範細節上有所差異,但主要透過市場主導者的指定、事前義務課予的劃定、應受事前禁止的濫用市場地位行為態樣的指明以及互操作性義務的課予等手段,達成促進數位市場可競爭性,以及預防濫用市場地位行為之損害擴大的目的。 最後,本文參考學者們對歐盟數位市場法的分析與建議,並比較當前可供參考的比較法法制上的差異,嘗試梳理出在數位市場引進事前管制可能帶來的效益和疑慮,並認為我國仍有參考比較法引入事前管制的空間,惟立法模式上應考量我國產業狀況進行相應的調整。一方面,在預防濫用市場地位行為之損害擴大的面向上,除在守門人的指定和事前義務課予的範疇應採取較為彈性的認定標準外,事前禁止的濫用市場地位行為態樣也應允許市場主導者有更多抗辯的空間。另一方面,促進數位市場可競爭性的面向上,本文鼓勵觀察國際間的立法動態,引入系統互操作性和消費者的資料可攜權,幫助數位市場的資料流通,降低市場的參進障礙,但同時反對引入資料互操作性義務,避免潛在競爭對手的搭便車行為扼殺數位市場的創新動能。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | With the development and maturation of the Internet, along with the numerous entertainment and convenience brought by technological products, there is an increasingly diverse range of business methods and models that continue to enrich the digital market. The advancements in digital technology have brought significant changes to human society, and among the companies known as the four tech giants in the United States - Google, Apple, Mega, and Amazon - their impact on the market is the greatest. Whether it is Google Search changing the way we access and search for information, the iPhone revolutionizing mobile devices, Meta transforming interpersonal communication, or Amazon rebuilding global e-commerce and logistics, it is difficult to imagine what life would be like without the services and products provided by these tech giants.
However, as the influence of these tech giants in the digital market grows, competition authorities in various countries have raised questions about some of their business practices. They believe that these tech giants quietly limit competition in the digital market in ways that differ from traditional methods, and suppress potential competitors. In light of this, competition authorities in different countries have begun to address emerging business models and practices in the digital market. In addition to adjusting the analysis methods of ex post competition law review, some competition authorities have proposed implementing ex ante regulatory measures, aiming to respond quickly to the increasing abusive conduct arising in the digital market, prevent potential harm, and further introduce competition into the digital market by imposing ex ante obligations on dominant players and reducing barriers to market entry. This article focuses on the ex ante regulation of the digital market. Starting with an analysis of the characteristics of the digital market itself, the article attempts to clarify the unique aspects of the digital market compared to other industry markets, which emphasize the need for separate ex ante regulations despite the existence of ex post competition law regulation. The article then draws on the ex ante regulatory measures proposed by Germany, the United States, and the European Union, finding that though there are differences in the specific regulatory details, they primarily aim to promote competition in the digital market and prevent the expansion of harm resulting from the abuse of market power, through the designation of market dominators, imposition of ex ante obligations, identification of abusive conduct subject to ex ante prohibition, and imposition of interoperability obligations. Lastly, we referred to scholars' analyses and recommendations regarding EU Digital Market Act, and compared the differences in legal systems in other countries. We attempted to summarize the benefits and concerns that may arise from introducing ex ante regulation in the digital market. We believe that Taiwan can still consider implementing ex ante regulation, but adjustments should be made to the legislative model based on our country's industry conditions. On one hand, in terms of preventing the expansion of harm resulting from the abuse of market power, more flexible criteria should be adopted for the designation of gatekeepers and imposition of ex ante obligations, allowing greater room for defense against abusive conduct subject to ex ante prohibition. On the other hand, in terms of promoting competition in the digital market, the article encourages observation of international legislative developments, the introduction of system interoperability and consumer data portability to facilitate data circulation in the digital market, and the reduction of barriers to market entry. However, it opposes the imposition of data interoperability obligations to avoid stifling innovation in the digital market by potential competitors hitching a ride on existing market players' efforts. | en |
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| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-08-15T18:00:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 i
中文摘要 ii Abstract iv 目錄 vii 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究範圍 2 第三節 研究方法 2 第二章 數位市場的市場失靈及比較法上的應對 4 第一節 數位市場的失靈 4 第一項 數位市場的現況概述 4 第二項 數位市場高度集中及其形成的市場障礙 8 第三項 數位市場的濫用市場地位 13 第四項 傳統競爭法面臨的困境 18 第五項 公平會當前對數位市場競爭議題的應對 20 第六項 小結 26 第二節 德國法 27 第一項 中介者市場力量的明文化及其認定要素 28 第二項 「對跨市場競爭具極重要意義事業」之界定及其事前行為規範的訂定 29 第三項 關鍵設施條款的修訂-平台資料的共享 31 第四項 結合申報義務的擴大 31 第五項 小結 32 第三節 美國法 34 第一項 法案概述 36 第二項 美國選擇與創新線上法案 38 第三項 授權服務轉換強化相容性與競爭性法案 42 第四項 開放應用程式市場法案 45 第五項 終止平台壟斷法案 48 第六項 其他法案 49 第七項 小結 53 第三章 歐盟數位市場法的因應 56 第一節 歐盟數位市場的相關法規 56 第一項 概述 56 第二項 濫用市場力量的防止 58 第三項 結合管制制度 60 第四項 其他數位市場相關法規 64 第五項 小結 70 第二節 數位市場法概述 72 第一項 訂定背景 72 第二項 立法目的 72 第三項 數位市場法和競爭法的關係 73 第三節 數位市場守門人的標準 74 第一項 核心平台服務的擇定 74 第二項 守門人的指定 75 第四節 數位市場法的內容 78 第一項 事前義務 78 第二項 守門人併購的告知義務 91 第五節 DMA監管機關的設計 91 第四章 歐盟數位市場法的評析 93 第一節 數位市場法的性質 93 第一項 市場失靈與管制機制 93 第二項 競爭政策 94 第三項 經濟管制 95 第四項 競爭法與經濟管制的差異與相互關係 96 第五項 競爭法與經濟管制交錯領域的主管機關 99 第六項 不對稱管制 100 第七項 數位市場法的性質 105 第二節 數位市場法的目的 107 第一項 公平性與可競爭性的關係 107 第二項 公平性 108 第三項 可競爭性 110 第三節 數位市場守門人標準的評估 115 第一項 採用量性標準的缺陷 115 第二項 完全採用質性標準並交由主管機關審查 116 第三項 適當限制主管機關的認定權限 116 第四節 數位市場法事前義務的評估 117 第一項 事前義務的立法模式 117 第二項 事前義務的一體適用模式 120 第三項 允許提出豁免辯護的範圍 122 第五節 數位市場法的互操作性 123 第一項 互操作性如何增進福利 124 第二項 互操作義務的公平性 125 第三項 互操作性的實施 126 第五章 結論 132 第一節 數位市場事前管制的適當性 132 第二節 數位市場事前管制的建議 141 參考文獻 148 附錄 數位市場法法條摘錄 158 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.subject | 網路效應 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 互操作性義務 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 不對稱管制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 守門人 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 數位市場法 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 事前管制 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 數位市場 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Digital market | en |
| dc.subject | Network effect | en |
| dc.subject | Interoperability obligation | en |
| dc.subject | Asymmetric regulation | en |
| dc.subject | Digital Market Act | en |
| dc.subject | Gatekeeper | en |
| dc.subject | Ex ante regulation | en |
| dc.title | 論數位市場的管制趨勢:以歐盟數位市場法為核心 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Regulatory Trends in the Digital Market: Focusing on EU Digital Market Act | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 劉華美;戴豪君 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Hwa-Meei Liou;Hao-Chun Tai | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 網路效應,數位市場,事前管制,數位市場法,守門人,不對稱管制,互操作性義務, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Network effect,Digital market,Ex ante regulation,Digital Market Act,Gatekeeper,Asymmetric regulation,Interoperability obligation, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 176 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202303652 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2023-08-10 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學系 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 | |
文件中的檔案:
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-111-2.pdf | 2.64 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
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