請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 王榮麟 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Rong-Lin Wang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 林益暉 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | I-Hui Lin | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-15T17:56:45Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2023-08-15 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2023-08-07 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文文獻
吳瑞媛 (2015)。〈導論〉。謝世民(編)，《理由轉向：規範性之哲學研究》，1-77。臺北市：國立臺灣大學出版中心。 祖旭華 (2010)。〈個別主義與整體主義〉。《哲學論集》，第43期，13-32。 張忠宏 (2015)。〈柯思嘉論道德實在論與規範性的本性〉。謝世民(編)，《理由轉向：規範性之哲學研究》，217-256。臺北市：臺大出版中心。 許 漢 (2017)。〈原則、情境與道德規範性〉。《人文及社會科學集刊》，第30卷第3期，313-347。 陳奕融 (2020)。《我為什麼應該遵守道德要求？────從理由存在的根源談起》。國立臺灣大學哲學系博士論文，臺北市。 謝世民 (2015)。〈主編序〉。謝世民(編)，《理由轉向：規範性之哲學研究》，i-iv。臺北市：國立臺灣大學出版中心。 二、外文文獻 Alvarez, Maria (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. New York: Oxford University Press. —— (2017). “Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/>. 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Candlish, Stewart, and George Wrisley (2019). “Private Language,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL =<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/private-language/>. Cohen, Gerald A. (1996). “Reason, humanity, and the moral law.” The Sources of Normativity (167-188). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Copp, David (2006). “Introduction: Metaethics and Normative ethics.” David Copp (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (3-35). New York: Oxford University Press. Crisp, Roger (2018). “Prudential and Moral Reasons.” Daniel Star (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (800-820). New York: Oxford University Press. Dancy, Jonathan (2000). Practical Reality. New York: Oxford University Press. —— (2004). Ethics Without Principles. New York: Oxford University Press. Darwall, Stephen (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. 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Oxford: Oxford University Press. de Maagt, Sem (2018a). “It only takes two to tango: against grounding morality in interaction.” Philosophical Studies, 176 (10): 2767-2783. —— (2018b). “Korsgaard’s Other Argument for Interpersonal Morality: the Argument from the Sufficiency of Agency.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21 (4): 887-902. —— (2019). “Why Humean constructivists should become Kantian constructivists.” Philosophical Explorations, 22 (3): 280-293. Enoch, David (2009). “Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason?” Philosophical Explorations, 12 (3): 319-339. Fischer, Stefan (2018). The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism. Berlin: De Gruyter. Foucault, Michel (1994). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. Alan Sheridan (trans.). New York: Vintage Books. Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971). “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1): 5-20. Gert, Joshua (2002). “Korsgaard's Private-Reasons Argument.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64 (2): 303-324. —— (2015). “Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons.” Inquiry, 58 (5): 439-459. Geuss, Raymond (1996). “Morality and identity.” The Sources of Normativity (189-199). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gibbard, Allan (1999). “Morality as Consistency in Living: Korsgaard's Kantian Lectures.” Ethics, 110 (1): 140-164. Habermas, Jürgen (1990). “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a program of philosophical justification.” Jürgen Habermas (ed.). Moral consciousness and communicative action (43-115). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hume, David (2007). A Treatise of Human Nature. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press. Hussain, N. J. Z. & Shah, N (2006). “Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard’s Rejection of Realism.” Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1 (265-294). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 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(2001). “Korsgaard’s Kantian arguments for the value of humanity.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31(1): 23–52. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1993). “The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values.” Social Philosophy and Policy, 10 (1): 24-51. —— (1996a). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (1996b). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (2007). “Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A Commentary on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint.” Ethics, 118 (1): 8-23. —— (2008). The Constitution of Agency. New York: Oxford University Press. —— (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. New York: Oxford University Press. —— (2011a). “The Activity of Reason.” Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon (3-22). R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman (eds.). 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Philosophical Investigations. G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (trans.). P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell. Wood, Allen W. (2007). Kantian Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88826 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 如果理由在本質上是公共的，那麼在某個人有某個理由做某個行動的情況之下，其他人也都可以有同樣的理由做該行動。在本論文之中，我會以克莉絲汀•瑪莉恩•柯思嘉德(Christine Marion Korsgaard)的理由論為基礎，來回答關於理由的公共性的哲學問題。這些問題包括：(1)「理由在本質上具有公共性」這個命題的涵義為何？(2)「理由在本質上具有公共性」這個命題如何可能被證成？(3)如果「理由在本質上具有公共性」這個命題能夠被證成，那麼這對我們而言會有什麼實踐的蘊含？為了回答這些問題，我會闡明柯思嘉德的哲學計畫與她為了證成該命題而提出的三個理由公共性論證──私有理由論證、互動論證與規範地位論證。並且，我會系統性地整理、分析與回應其他哲學家針對這些論證所可能提出的批評。與此同時，我會藉由批判、修改與補充柯思嘉德的理由論的部分內容，以發展一個更為完善的柯思嘉德式的公共理由觀。最終，我在本論文之中所試圖證成的是，作為在柯思嘉德的哲學計畫之中的最重要的部分的理由公共性論證，在該計畫的其他部分都成功的情況之下，會是健全的論證。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | If reasons are essentially public, then if someone has a reason for doing a certain action, everyone else can have the same reason for doing that action. In this thesis, I answer the philosophical questions concerning the publicity of reasons based on Christine Marion Korsgaard’s theory of reason. These questions include: (1) What is the meaning of the proposition “reasons are essentially public”? (2) How can the proposition “reasons are essentially public” be justified? (3) If the proposition “reasons are essentially public” can be justified, then what are its practical implications for us? In order to answer these questions, I explicate Korsgaard’s philosophical project and her three arguments for the publicity of reason — the private reason argument, the argument from interaction, and the argument from normative standing — that she makes to justify that proposition. Moreover, I systematically collate, analyze, and respond to the criticisms that other philosophers may have on these arguments. Meanwhile, I develop a more complete Korsgaardian conception of public reason by criticizing, revising, and supplementing parts of Korsgaard’s theory of reason. Ultimately, what I attempt to justify in this thesis is that the arguments for the publicity of reason, as the most important part of Korsgaard’s philosophical project, will be sound arguments if the other parts of that project are successful. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-08-15T17:56:45Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
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| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 i
謝辭 ii 摘要 iii Abstract iv 柯思嘉德著作縮寫表 v 目錄 vi 導論 1 第一章 柯思嘉德的哲學計畫 9 第一節 規範性的來源 10 一、規範性問題 10 二、規範理由 14 第二節 後設倫理學的建構論 18 一、意欲論、實在論與建構論 18 二、建構論的吸引力 24 第三節 從自我意識到定言令式 28 一、法則可普遍性論證 28 二、定言令式與道德法則 34 第四節 從定言令式到道德法則 39 一、人性看重論證 39 二、人性與道德 45 小結 51 第二章 私有理由論證 53 第一節 語意與理由之間的類比關係 54 一、私有語言論證與私有理由論證 54 二、對於類比關係的三種詮釋 56 第二節 五個方向的批評 64 一、私有語言論證的不健全性以及與整體論證之間的不相容性 64 二、私有理由論證的多餘性 66 三、語意與理由之間的不可類比性 69 四、公共性的歧義 71 第三節 四個類型的歧義 73 一、可被理解性與可被分享性 73 二、可被分享性與普遍可被分享性 79 三、可被分享性與必須被分享性 82 四、行動者相對的理由與行動者中立的理由的可被分享性 84 小結 86 第三章 互動論證與規範地位論證 89 第一節 互動論證 90 一、互動的範圍與可選擇性 90 二、內建的第二人式關係 96 三、從個人之內的互動到人際之間的互動 100 第二節 規範地位論證 109 一、人性所賦予的規範地位 109 二、人性的空洞性 113 小結 121 第四章 從理由的公共性到道德的普遍性 125 第一節 理由的公共性的涵義 126 一、行動者相對的理由與行動者中立的理由 126 二、公共性與普遍性之間的差異 136 第二節 理由與行動 142 一、行動的結構 142 二、理由與行動之間的同一性 145 第三節 理由的公共性的證成 151 一、可被理解性與公共性之間的蘊含關係 151 二、他人作為可能的自己 163 第四節 理由與道德 169 一、道德的理由與非道德的理由 169 二、對於可普遍化測試的實踐矛盾詮釋 173 小結 178 結論 183 參考文獻 189 一、中文文獻 189 二、外文文獻 189 | - |
| dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
| dc.subject | 規範性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公共理由 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 理性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 柯思嘉德 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 定言令式 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 道德法則 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 道德義務 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | moral obligation | en |
| dc.subject | Korsgaard | en |
| dc.subject | rationality | en |
| dc.subject | normativity | en |
| dc.subject | public reason | en |
| dc.subject | categorical imperative | en |
| dc.subject | moral law | en |
| dc.title | 柯思嘉德式的公共理由觀 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Korsgaardian Conception of Public Reason | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳豐維;張忠宏 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Feng-Wei Wu;Chung-Hung Chang | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 柯思嘉德,理性,規範性,公共理由,定言令式,道德法則,道德義務, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Korsgaard,rationality,normativity,public reason,categorical imperative,moral law,moral obligation, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 198 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202302395 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2023-08-09 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學系 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 哲學系 | |
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