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標題: | 三消費族群之霍特林模型下雙佔店家與外送平台定價決策 Pricing Strategies of Duopolistic Stores and Delivery Platform under the Hotelling Model with Three Groups of Consumers |
作者: | 王子齊 Zih-Ci Wang |
指導教授: | 黃奎隆 Kwei-Long Huang |
關鍵字: | 隨選經濟,霍特林模型,外送平台,定價策略,傭金抽成率, on-demand economy,Hotelling model,delivery platform,pricing strategy,commission rate, |
出版年 : | 2023 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 隨著科技發展與網路的普及,人們的消費管道有了多樣化的趨勢。近年更因新冠疫情推波助瀾,使隨選經濟與外送服務成為一股消費潮流。在現今的銷售環境下,餐飲業者與零售業者必須面臨是否與外送平台合作的重要課題。因此,本研究提出一個賽局模型,由一間外送平台制定傭金抽成比率後,兩間互相競爭的商品店家決定是否與平台合作以提供線上外送消費管道並制定自己的商品價格,最後我們考量三種消費者族群的購買行為。有別於過去的研究,本文提出的三種消費者族群各有不同可選用的消費管道,分別為只可線下購買、可於兩種管道購買、與只可線上購買之三種族群。本研究探討在不同市場參數下,當市場達到對稱或非對稱賽局均衡結果後,外送平台與商品店家的可得利潤,藉此提供平台最佳抽成比率之建議,並協助商品店家做出是否與平台合作的決策。我們發現當消費者自取成本適中且商品價值高時,市場均衡下可能只有一間店家與平台合作。此時該合作店家可制定比對手更高的價格,卻獲得較低的利潤。此外我們發現在某些市場情境下,若平台願意提供小額折扣給消費者,可以同時提高平台與兩間合作店家的利潤。最後,我們發現外送平台在大多數市場情境下皆傾向制定極高的傭金抽成比率,呼應台灣今日外送市場的實際情況。 With the rapid development of technology and the widespread use of the Internet, peoples’ consumption methods have become diversified. In recent years, due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the on-demand economy and delivery services have become popular consumer trends. In today's market environment, restaurants and commodity stores face the important issue of whether to cooperate with delivery platforms. Therefore, this study proposes a game model in which a delivery platform sets a commission rate, then two competing stores decide whether to cooperate with the platform to provide an online delivery shopping channel and determine their own product prices. Finally, we consider the purchasing behavior of three groups of consumers. Unlike previous studies, this paper introduces three groups of consumers, each with different available shopping channels: offline-only, both online and offline, and online-only. This research examines the profits that the delivery platform and those two stores can obtain under different market parameters. By achieving symmetric or asymmetric game equilibria, we provide recommendations for the optimal commission rate for the platform and assist stores in making decisions regarding cooperation with the platform. We found that when the consumers’ unit transportation cost is moderate and the perceived value of the products is high, there may be only one store cooperating with the platform in equilibrium. In this case, the cooperating store might set a higher price than its competitor but obtain lower profits. Additionally, we discovered that in some market situations, if the platform provides slight price discounts to consumers, it can simultaneously increase the profits of both the platform and the two cooperating stores. Finally, we observed that the delivery platform tends to set extremely high commission rates in most market situations, reflecting the current situation in Taiwan’s delivery market. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88748 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202302789 |
全文授權: | 未授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 工業工程學研究所 |
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