論獨立董事之選舉

Abstract

觀察我國近年發生經營權爭奪之公司的董事、獨立董事選舉，過程中毋寧充滿各方勢力的角力與布局，而股東間往往利用繁複的策略性配票，試圖博取更多席次、甚至翻轉敗局，情形更甚以往的董事、監察人選舉。在董事的選舉中，股東除需耗費資金取得或持有相當比例的股權或爭取更多支持，過程中亦需要消耗大量成本盤算配票策略，即便如此，也未必能經由選舉取得符合預期席次。而這些因董事選舉所產生的實務問題，在強制累積投票制的法制環境下，並不僅限於經營權爭奪時。本文的研究目標，係為分析相關實務現象的成因，並嘗試釐清現行獨董選舉制度與公司治理的關聯，並在此基礎上提出修法建議。

經由相關的文獻爬梳與案例試算，本文得出累積投票制本身的性質並非導致上開實務現象的主因，而真正的原因在於現行法規定公司須採取「合併選舉、分別計票」的選舉方式同時選出獨立董事與非獨立董事，為驗證此結論，本文摘取實際選舉案例的股權結構、應選席次等資訊推算後，將現行獨董選舉制度與監察人所採取的「分別選舉、分別計票」的選舉方式進行比較，發現現行制度會產生監察人選舉制度所無的「博弈」性質，而正是因為此性質，導致股東間選舉董事時，除了需要預測對手在獨董與董事候選人之間如何分配表決權以進行相對應的配票，甚至需要一定程度的「運氣」才能夠選出符合預期的席次數。

現行制度之所以會採取「合併選舉、分別計票」選舉方式，與我國在引進獨立董事之初，股東較無意願將表決權分配予獨董的普遍實務現象難脫關聯。當時主管機關除了強制公司採取「合併選舉、分別計票」之外，亦同時強制獨立董事的選舉應適用董事候選人提名制度，目的係為了確保公司能選出符合相關法規所限制的獨董最低人數。而比較法上，採取全額連記法並不會衍生出「合併」或「分別」選舉之問題，美國法亦對此無強制規定，而是由公司自行負責選出足額之獨董。於中國大陸法上，因符合特定條件的上市公司須採取強制累積投票制，因此該部分公司也會有與我國相同之問題，但其採取「分別」選舉方式以解決如何選出足額獨立董事的問題。

本文認為，現行獨董選舉的「博弈性質」可能產生許多不必要的實務疑慮，現階段下，允宜考慮將之調整為如同監察人的「分別選舉、分別計票」之模式。但進一步言，如果考量到我國大型公司普遍存在「少數控股結構」，而採取分別選舉將抑制少數股東串連選出董事會代表的結果，本文建議參考「金融機構自然人專業董事」的選舉方法，將獨立董事選舉調整為「修正式的合併選舉與合併計票」。此外，在現行的獨董選舉制度與獨董席次數較少的交互作用下，往往產生控制股東囊括全部獨立董事的情形，為使我國內部監督發揮應然的效果，本文建議參考美國法之單軌制度，調整我國董事會及審計委員會的職權與定位，並在此基礎之上，或可考慮強化非獨立董事於內部監督所能扮演的功能。

Observing the board and independent director elections in companies involved in recent management battles in our country, it is evident that the process is rife with power struggles and maneuvers from various parties. Shareholders often utilize intricate and strategic vote allocations to vie for more seats, even attempting to overturn unfavorable outcomes, a situation that is more pronounced than in past director and supervisor elections. In these director elections, shareholders not only need to expend financial resources to acquire or hold a significant proportion of shares but also invest substantial efforts in devising voting strategies. However, even with such endeavors, there is no guarantee of obtaining the expected number of seats through the elections. These practical issues arising from director elections are not confined solely to management battles, particularly under the legal framework of mandatory cumulative voting. The objective of this article is to analyze the underlying causes of these practical phenomena and attempt to clarify the relationship between the current independent director election system and corporate governance. Based on this examination, we will propose recommendations for legislative amendments. Through a review of relevant literature and case studies, this article concludes that the nature of cumulative voting itself is not the main cause of the practical issues in our country. The real problem lies in the current election method employed for independent directors and non-independent directors, which involves “combined elections and separate vote counting.” By examining the shareholding structure and the number of seats in several actual election cases, this article compares the current independent director election system with the “separate elections and separate vote counting” method used for supervisor elections. It is found that the current system introduces a “game-like” nature that is absent in the supervisor election system, which leads to the need for shareholders to predict how opponents will distribute their votes between independent directors and director candidates. Additionally, luck plays a certain role in achieving the expected number of seats.

The reason for the current adoption of the “combined elections and separate vote counting” method is closely related to the prevailing practice at the time when independent directors were introduced in our country. At that time, the regulatory authority not only mandated companies to adopt this method but also required the nomination system for independent director elections to ensure the selection of the minimum number of independent directors as stipulated by relevant regulations. In comparison, there is no issue of “combined” or “separate” elections under the full vote pooling system in foreign laws, and the United States does not have mandatory requirements in this regard. Companies are responsible for electing the required number of independent directors. In mainland China, due to the mandatory adoption of cumulative voting by certain listed companies meeting specific conditions, similar problems arise as in our country. However, they employ a different “separate” election approach to address the issue of electing the required number of independent directors.

This article believes that the “game-like” nature of the current independent director elections may create many unnecessary practical concerns, and it is worth considering adjusting it to the “separate elections and separate vote counting” model used for supervisors. However, considering the prevalent “minority control structure” in large companies in our country, adopting separate elections may suppress the ability of minority shareholders to collectively elect representatives to the board of directors. In this regard, this article suggests referring to the election method for “natural person professional directors” in financial institutions and adjusting the independent director election to a “modified combined election and combined vote counting” approach. Furthermore, under the interaction between the current independent director election system and the limited number of independent director seats, it often results in controlling shareholders occupying all independent director positions. To ensure the effective role of internal supervision in our country, this article recommends considering the “unitary-board” system from U.S. law, adjusting the authority and positioning of the board of directors and audit committee, and potentially strengthening the role of non-independent directors in internal oversight.