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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 郭乃菱 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Nai-Ling Kuo | en |
dc.contributor.author | 李郁苓 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | Yu-Ling Li | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T16:43:37Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2023-08-09 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2023-07-26 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | 壹、中文部分
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88362 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 財源短缺是我國地方政府長久以來未解的問題與困境,過去我國學者主要從財政結構的面向切入,將其歸因於地方分權程度的不足,指出當前在法規上,財政權力及稅收依然集中於中央政府,係為地方財政問題之主因。然而,中央-地方權限之劃分及財源分配的整體結構僅能點出地方普遍面臨的現象,對於各地方政府間的差異較難觸及,因此本文從地方政府本身的收入結構切入,透過地方主要自籌財源-財產稅當中的地價稅檢視地方政府對於自身所享有財政權力的運用情況,以釐清地方財源短缺問題的根源。同時提出三個核心研究問題:近二十年來,我國地方政府在其享有的財政權限範圍下,所達成的租稅努力程度為何?各個地方政府租稅努力的差異及其變動受到哪些因素的影響?前述各項影響因素在地方政府稅基及稅率的調整制度下如何發揮作用?
透過國內外文獻的爬梳,本文以委託代理人理論、政治景氣循環理論及高層理論作為地方政府不願提升租稅努力的學理基礎,並透過實證文獻的蒐集將影響地方租稅努力之因素劃分為經濟條件與狀況、財政結構與狀況、政治利益與環境,以及組織管理四大類,且聚焦於政治面向與組織管理面向,進一步提出四大研究假設與其子假設探討影響我國地方租稅努力之因素。 針對前述研究問題,本文以我國直轄市與縣市政府作為研究對象,蒐集其自2001年至2020年的追蹤資料,以地價稅實質稅率作為租稅努力指標,結合質化與量化研究方法進行分析。本研究發現,我國地方政府的租稅努力長期低落,且直轄市與縣市政府的租稅努力程度有很大差異,其租稅努力的影響因素、影響方向與效果亦不同,因此將直轄市與縣市政府拆分個別估計並個別驗證其租稅努力之影響因素,其中,過去文獻所採用之傳統政治因素,包含選舉年、連任預期、府會關係與府際關係對直轄市與縣市租稅努力皆沒有顯著影響,但民意反映與利益團體遊說之政治因素仍影響地方租稅努力;組織管理面向亦對地方租稅努力有顯著影響,具經濟學科背景的縣市首長,租稅努力表現較佳、而政治經歷資深的直轄市首長租稅努力表現則較為低落;在經濟與財政面向上,消費者物價指數、家戶可支配所得中位數、地方財政負擔、人均府際財政移轉收入與財政需求水準都對地方租稅努力有顯著影響,另外鄰近縣市的地價調整幅度亦影響地方租稅努力。在由地方政府地政局所主導之地價稅基調整過程當中,經濟與財政面向之因素係由地政局在擬定地價調整方案時被納入考量,政治與組織管理面向之因素,形成地方首長的政策目標與認知,因而由地方首長與地方議會對地政局的領導與監督,在政策前端便發揮作用。 本文建議,未來在探討我國地方政府租稅努力相關議題時,應將直轄市與縣市政府拆分,個別估計與驗證,同時亦應納入組織管理面向之因素進行驗證或控制。而地方政府本身應加強對自籌財源的重視程度,並強化財稅單位在地價稅基調整制度中的角色,同時,中央政府亦可透過地價稅的政策定位以及府際財政移轉制度的設計督促地方提升租稅努力,以改善地方長期財源短缺之問題。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The financial shortage has been an unresolved problem and challenge for local governments in Taiwan for a long time. Previous studies mainly attributed it to the degree of decentralization in the fiscal structure, pointing out that the current fiscal power and taxation revenue are still concentrated in the central government, which is the main cause of the local financial problem. However, the structure of the division of central-local powers and revenue allocation can only explain the common phenomenon faced by local governments, and it is difficult to explain the differences among different local governments. Therefore, this study examines the utilization of financial autonomy by local governments through the main own source revenue, the land value tax, in order to clarify the root causes of the financial shortage at the local level. Three core research questions are proposed: 1) What is the level of tax effort achieved by local governments in Taiwan in the past two decades? 2) What are the determinants of the local governments’ tax efforts in Taiwan? 3) How do these determinants operate in the system of adjusting the tax base and tax rate for local governments?
Through a review of domestic and international literature, this study adopts principal-agent theory, political business cycle theory, and upper-echelons theory as the theoretical foundations for local governments' unwillingness to increase tax efforts. The determinants influencing local tax efforts are categorized into four dimensions: economic conditions, fiscal structure, political interests and environment, and organizational management. The study focuses on the political and organizational management aspects and proposes four research hypotheses and their sub-hypotheses to explore the determinants affecting tax efforts in local governments. To answer the research questions, this study selects municipal, city and county governments as the research subjects and collects panel data from 2001 to 2020. The effective land value tax rate is used as the indicator of tax efforts, and a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods is employed for analysis. The study finds that the tax efforts of local governments in Taiwan have been consistently low, and there are significant differences in tax efforts between municipal, city and county governments, with different determinants. Therefore, separate estimations and verifications of determinants of tax effort for municipal, city and county governments are conducted. Traditional political factors, such as election years, re-election expectations, and intergovernmental relations, do not significantly affect tax efforts in both municipal and city and county governments. However, political factors related to public opinion and interest group still influence local tax efforts. The organizational management determinants also significantly affect local tax efforts. The city and county mayor with economical education exhibit better tax effort performance, while municipal mayors with long political experience show lower tax efforts. Economic and fiscal factors, such as the consumer price index, median household disposable income, local fiscal burden, per capita intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and fiscal demand levels, have significant effects on local tax efforts. Additionally, the extent of land value tax base adjustments in neighbor also impacts local tax efforts. During the adjustment process of land value tax base led by local government's land administration, economic and fiscal factors are considered when formulating adjustment schemes, while political and organizational management factors shape the policy objectives and perceptions of mayors and playing a role in the policy process. This study suggests that future research on the tax efforts of local governments in Taiwan should separate municipal and city and county governments for individual estimations and verifications, and the determinants related to organizational management should be considered. Local governments should recognize the importance of own source revenue and strengthen the role of department financial in local government in the land value tax base adjustment system. Meanwhile, the central government can encourage local governments to increase tax efforts through the positioning of land value tax policies and the design of intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems, aiming to improve the persistent problem of local financial shortage. | en |
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dc.description.tableofcontents | 目 錄
口試委員會審定書 I 謝辭 II 中文摘要 IV 英文摘要 VI 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景 1 第二節 研究目的與研究問題 5 第三節 研究流程 11 第二章 文獻回顧 12 第一節 地方租稅努力的理論基礎 12 第二節 地方租稅努力的實證研究 20 第三節 小結 31 第三章 研究方法與設計 34 第一節 研究方法 34 第二節 研究假設與模型設計 38 第四章 我國地方政府地價作業實務概況 50 第一節 地價作業實務現況 50 第二節 地方租稅努力概況分析 57 第三節 小結 64 第五章 實證結果與分析 65 第一節 量化實證結果 65 第二節 影響地方租稅努力因素之綜合分析 83 第六章 結論與討論 91 第一節 研究發現 91 第二節 研究建議與研究限制 101 參考文獻 104 附錄 111 | - |
dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
dc.title | 影響臺灣直轄市及縣市政府租稅努力之因素 -以地價稅為例(2001年至2020年) | zh_TW |
dc.title | Determinants of Municipal, City and County Government’s Tax Efforts in Taiwan-the Case of Land Value Tax(2001-2020) | en |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 郭銘峰;郭昱瑩 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Ming-Feng Kuo;Yu-Ying Kuo | en |
dc.subject.keyword | 租稅努力,地方財政,政治景氣循環理論,高層理論,地價稅實質稅率, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | tax effort,local financial,political business cycle theories,upper-echelons theory,effective land value tax rate, | en |
dc.relation.page | 116 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202302139 | - |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
dc.date.accepted | 2023-07-27 | - |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | - |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 公共事務研究所 | - |
顯示於系所單位: | 公共事務研究所 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-111-2.pdf | 4.06 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
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