Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/87811
Full metadata record
???org.dspace.app.webui.jsptag.ItemTag.dcfield??? | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 王衍智 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Yan-Zhi Wang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 廖彥傑 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | Yen-Chieh Liao | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-07-19T16:37:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2023-07-19 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2023-05-03 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | (1) Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance. 23(4), 589-609.
(2) Bauwhede, H. V., & Willekens, M. (2008). Disclosure on corporate governance in the European Union. Corporate Governance, 16(2), 101-115. (3) Bebchuk, L., & Fried, J. M. (2004). Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. European Business Organization Law Review, 7(3), 753-763. (4) Black, B. S., & Kim, W. (2012). The effect of board structure on firm value: a multiple identification strategies approach using Korean data. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 203-226. (5) Boubaker, S., Cellier, A., & Manita, R. (2020). Does corporate social responsibility reduce financial distress risk? Economic Modelling, 91, 835-851. (6) Cadbury, A. (1992). Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance. London: Gee & Co. Ltd. (7) Chang, T. C. (2003). 違約機率與信用評分模型. 台灣金融財務季刊, 4(1), 19-37. (8) Chang, T. C., Lin, Y. L. (2009). Credit risk model establishment for private firms: the integration of merton model and ohlson model. 中山管理評論, 17(4), 1045-1081. (9) Chou, H. C. (2009). Performance and application of the default risk model based on barrier option framework. 管理學報, 26(3), 275-289. (10) Core, J. E., Holthausen, R.W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371-406. (11) Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., & McConnell, J. J. (2008). Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: a cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 73-100. (12) Daines, R., Gow I. D., & Larcker, D. F. (2010). Rating the ratings: how good are commercial governance ratings? Journal of Financial Economics, 98(3). (13) Ehrenberg, R. G., & Smith, R. S. (2009). Modern labor economics: theory and public policy. Pearson Education, 11. (14) Fama, E. (1980) Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307. (15) Gul, F.A., Kim, J. B., & Qiu, A. A. (2010). Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity evidence from China. Journal of Financial Economics, 95, 425-442. (16) Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (1991). The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management, 20(4). (17) Ichan, C. (1986). What ails corporate America-and what should be done? Business Week, October 27, 98-104. (18) Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance. 48(3), 831-880. (19) Joh, S. W. (2003). Corporate governance and firm profitability: evidence from Korea before the economic crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 68(2), 287-322. (20) John, K., & Senbet, L. W. (1998). Corporate governance and board effectiveness. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(4), 371-403. (21) Lee, T. S., & Yeh, Y. H. (2004). Corporate governance and financial distress: evidence from Taiwan. Corporate Governance, 12(3), 378-388. (22) Lin, F. Y., Wang, T. S., & Huang, S. Y. (2019). Investigate the role of directors and officers liability insurance from fat cat company announcement. 證券市場發展季刊, 31(3), 79-124. (23) Liu, B., Ju, T., & Bai, M. (2021). Imitative innovation and financial distress risk: the moderating role of executive foreign experience. International Review of Economics & Finance, 71, 526-548. (24) Liu, C., Qing L., & Yu E. L., (2022). Corporate transparency and firm value: does market competition play an external governance role? Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 2699. (25) Manuel Ammann, M., Oesch, D., & Schmid M. M. (2013). Product market competition, corporate governance, and firm value: evidence from the EU area. European Financial Management, 19(3), 452-469. (26) Millar, C. C., Eldomiaty, T. I., Choi, C. J. (2005). Corporate governance and institutional transparency in emerging markets. Journal of Business Ethics, 59, 163-174. (27) Munchen, D. (2022). The effect of financial distress on capital structure: the case of Brazilian banks. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 86, 296-304. (28) Ohlspn, J. A. (1980). Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting Research, 18, 109-131. (29) Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 52, 737-783. (30) Singh, M., & Davidson III, W. N. (2003). Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(5), 793-816. (31) Vafeas, N. (1999) Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 113-142. (32) Vitaliano, D. F. (2010). Corporate social responsibility and labor turnover. Corporate Governance, 10(5), 563-573. (33) Yang, T. H., & Su, C. C. (2012). The impact of executive stock-based compensation on default risk. 會計評論, 54, 77-115. | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/87811 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 公司治理為如何指導公司設定了準則,並提高公司的資訊透明度。良好的公司治理可以提高公司的信譽與財務績效,從而增強投資者信心並吸引資金投入。研究結果發現在資訊透明、股權結構及企業競爭力這三面的公司治理作為能顯著降低破產機率。而董事會結構及薪酬這兩面向的公司治理作為,迴歸結果表示其會增加企業破產的機率。根據公司治理地圖,從2000年之後公司治理的得分逐漸好轉。以產業看,金融產業在董事結構、股權結構及企業競爭力都有比較好的得分。以企業的壽命來看,從1980存續到現在的企業,在資訊透明、董事結構、股權結構及薪酬的表現比非長壽的企業還要來的更好。從市值來看,台灣市值前20大的企業在公司治理的五個面向全部都優於市值非前20大的公司。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Corporate governance sets the guidelines for a company and improves information transparency for it. Good corporate governance can improve the company's reputation and financial performance, thereby enhancing investor confidence and attracting capital investment. The results of the study find that corporate governance in the three aspects of Transparency, Ownership and Competition can significantly reduce the probability of bankruptcy. As for Director and Compensation, the regression results show that they will increase the probability of corporate bankruptcy.
According to the corporate governance landscape, the score of corporate governance has gradually improved since 2000. In terms of industry, the financial industry has relatively good scores in Director, Ownership and Competition. In terms of the lifespan of companies, companies that have survived from 1980 to the present have performed better than non-longevity companies in terms of Transparency, Director, Ownership and Compensation. In terms of market capitalization, the top 20 companies in Taiwan by market capitalization outperform the non-top 20 companies in all five aspects of corporate governance. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-07-19T16:37:48Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-07-19T16:37:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 致謝 i
中文摘要 ii 英文摘要 iii 目錄 iv 第一章:引言 1 第二章:文獻回顧 5 公司治理回顧 5 破產機率回顧 8 第三章:研究假說及模型 10 基本假說 10 迴歸模型 11 變數定義 11 資料及研究方法 12 第四章:迴歸結果 15 資料分析 15 迴歸結果 17 每五年的公司治理地圖 22 第五章:結論與建議 24 參考資料 27 附錄 30 表格 37 | - |
dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
dc.title | 台灣公司治理地圖-從破產機率分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Corporate Governance Landscape of Taiwan Companies- Analysis Based on Bankruptcy Probability | en |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 何耕宇;張景宏;許嫣茹 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Keng-Yu Ho;Ching-Hung Chang;Yen-Ju Hsu | en |
dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,企業破產機率,公司治理地圖,O-score,Z-score, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | corporate governance,corporate bankruptcy probability,O-score,Z-score,corporate governance landscape, | en |
dc.relation.page | 48 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202300759 | - |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
dc.date.accepted | 2023-05-03 | - |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學系 | - |
Appears in Collections: | 財務金融學系 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-111-2.pdf | 2.22 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.