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標題: | 企業使用non-GAAP盈餘於CEO薪酬合約之績效評估標準與發生併購之關聯性 The Use of Non-GAAP Performance Measures in Executive Compensation Contracts and M&A Decisions |
作者: | 羅暐翔 Wei-Xiang Lo |
指導教授: | 李艷榕 Yen-Jung Lee |
關鍵字: | non-GAAP盈餘,薪酬衡量因子,併購, non-GAAP earnings adjustment,compensation performance measures,mergers and acquisitions, |
出版年 : | 2022 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 本研究探討各公司採行non-GAAP盈餘作為CEO薪酬的衡量手段對於公司發動併購可能性的影響。本文發現,以non-GAAP盈餘作CEO薪酬衡量因子與公司發動併購可能性產生了顯著的正相關。本文另外探討在non-GAAP盈餘做為衡量CEO績效手段下,其他因子是否會顯著增強併購可能,實證結果發現研發強度較低或CEO權力較弱的公司,以non-GAAP盈餘做為衡量CEO績效與併購的關聯性更為顯著。這些發現證實薪酬的衡量手段會影響公司的決策行為,可做為未來研究績效評估相關因素對於併購可能性的相關研究基礎。 This study examines the impact of companies adopting non-GAAP earnings as a performance measure in CEO compensation on the likelihood of companies launching mergers and acquisition activities (hereafter, M&A). This paper finds that the use of non-GAAP earnings as a performance measure in CEO compensation is positively associated with the likelihood of firms launching M&A. This paper also explores whether other factors moderate the association between M&A and the use of non-GAAP earnings measure in CEO compensation contracts. Empirical results show that companies with low R&D intensity or weak CEO power enhance the association between the use of non-GAAP earnings in CEO compensation and the likelihood of firms launching M&A. These findings confirm that the performance measure used in CEO compensation can affect the decision-making of the company, and can be used as the basis for future research on the relevant factors of performance evaluation on the possibility of M&A. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/87799 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202300691 |
全文授權: | 未授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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