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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 社會科學院
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請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/87066
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor陶儀芬zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorYi-fen Taoen
dc.contributor.author東方洛zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorDorota Maczugaen
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-05T17:18:49Z-
dc.date.available2023-11-09-
dc.date.copyright2023-05-05-
dc.date.issued2023-
dc.date.submitted2023-02-10-
dc.identifier.citationChinese sources:
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林滿紅,1996, 《有關日據時期台灣經濟史的四種誤解》台灣社會研究季刊 ; 23期 /Man-Houng Lin, 1996, Youguan riju shiqi Taiwan jingjishi de sizhong wujie. Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan; 23 qi.
林夏如, 陳方隅,林添貴,2019,《 台灣的中國兩難: 台灣認同下的兩岸經貿困境》,初版. 臺北市: 商周出版/ Lin Syaru Shirley. 2019. Taiwan de zhongguo liangnan: Taiwan rentong xia de liangan jingmao kunjing. Chuban. Taibei shi: Shangzhou chuban.
林易萱,2022,《一年才42台的EUV機,幾乎全給了tsmc!艾司摩爾為什麼這麼挺台積電?》商周 (Business Weekly) / Lin Yixuan. 2022. Yinian cai 42 tai de EUV ji, jihu quangei tsmc! Aisimoer wei shenme zheme ting taijidian? Shangzhou (Business Weekly). In: https://www.businessweekly.com.tw/business/blog/3010142
國家發展委員會,2004,《資訊通信科技與經濟成長來源︰國際經驗與啟示》,經建會綜計處 / National Development Council (NDC). 2004. Zixun tongxin keji yu jingji chengzhang laiyuan: guoji jingyan yu qishi. Jingjianhui zongjichu. In: https://ws.ndc.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9hZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yLzEwL3JlbGZpbGUvNjIwMC8xOTI2Ni8wMDAzNzkyLnBkZg%3D%3D&n=6LOH6KiK6YCa6KiK56eR5oqA6IiH57aT5r%2Bf5oiQ6ZW35L6G5rqQLnBkZg%3D%3D&icon=..pdf
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国务院,2015,《国务院关于印发《中国制造2025》的通知》,中华人民共和国中央人民政府/ PRC State Council. 2015. Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa “zhongguo zhizao 2025” de tongzhi. Zhonghua renmin heguo zhongyang renmin zhengfu. In: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm
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dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/87066-
dc.description.abstract中文摘要

半導體是現代經濟的重要組成部分。由於近期全球芯片短缺,以及台海緊張局勢升溫,全球半導體供應鏈的穩定性已成為國際政商廣泛討論的話題。由於台灣仍然是全球供應鏈不可或缺的一部分,鑑於中國與美國在台海的利益衝突,問題仍然是它如何影響美中技術競賽。本文提出了一篇論文,將通過描述台灣的發展模式以及衡量國際電子對台灣的依賴程度來探討台灣在全球半導體供應中的作用,特別強調美國和中國。這項研究旨在促進對美中緊張局勢及其技術競爭的討論,以及國際上越來越多的努力使半導體製造本土化,從而結束對台灣的依賴。在這篇文章中,我將論證,由於將半導體供應鏈的穩定性視為國家安全問題,現在旨在確保其半導體供應的幾個國家和地區正在助長逆轉半導體生產的全球化進程的趨勢。

關鍵字:半導體、兩岸關係、美中關係、發展型國家、複合式相互依賴
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractABSTRACT

Semiconductors are a crucial element of the modern economy. Due to the recent global microchip shortage, as well as the rising tensions on the Taiwan Strait, the stability of the global semiconductor supply chain has been widely discussed in international politics and business. Since Taiwan remains an indispensable part of the global supply chain, the question remains how it influences the US-China technological race, given the conflicting interests of the two big powers on the Taiwan Strait. This essay proposes a thesis that will explore Taiwan’s role in the global semiconductor supply through describing its development model, as well as measuring the degree of international electronic dependence on the island, with a special emphasis on the United States and China. This research aims to contribute to the discussion on the US-China tensions and their technological rivalry, as well as the increasing international effort to domesticate the semiconductor manufacturing, thus ending the dependency on Taiwan. In this essay, I will argue that due to having framed the stability of semiconductor supply chain as a question of national security, several states and regions now aiming to secure their semiconductor supply are contributing to the increasing tendency to reverse the process of globalization of the semiconductor production.

Keyword: semiconductors, cross Strait relations, US - China relations, East Asian developmental state, complex interdependence.
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dc.description.tableofcontentsCONTENTS
ABSTRACT I
中文摘要 II
CONTENTS III
List of Figures V
List of Tables VI
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHOD 5
1. Literature review 5
2. Theoretical framework 12
2.1. East Asian Developmental State 13
2.2. Complex Interdependence 23
2.3. Back to developmentalism? Neoliberalism, “statism”, and complex interdependence 31
3. Methodology 33
Chapter 3: EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND HIGH-TECH: BUILDING TAIWAN’S SEMICONDUCTOR POTENTIAL 35
1. The geography of chip making: the industry’s structure and global shift towards East Asia 35
2. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry: the story of success of the Taiwanese developmentalism 40
2.1. Introduction 40
2.2. Definition of national innovation system 44
2.3. Taiwan’s national innovation system in action: the development of the semi-conductor industry 46
2.4. Key characteristics of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry 54
Chapter 4: THE POLITICIZATION OF MICROCHIP: THE COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY CHAIN 57
1. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry in the 21st century: general overview and prospects 57
2. Complex interdependence and the global semiconductor supply chain 63
2.1. Introduction 63
2.2. The Sino-American semiconductor competition 71
3. Onshoring the semiconductor production: the global efforts to bring the chip home. 78
3.1. “Climbing up a rocky path”: China’s uneven challenges. 78
3.3. “Re-claiming the chip”: US and its national innovation system on semiconductors. 84
3.4. “Keeping up with the race”: South Korea, Japan and the European Union 91
Chapter 5: THE END OF GLOBALIZATION? NEW DEVELOPMENTALISM IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY CHAIN AND THE FUTURE OF THE SILICON SHIELD 96
1. Reversing the globalization of the semiconductors: echoes of developmentalism in the interdependent world 96
2. Silicon Shield: the past or the future? 103
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 108
BIBLIOGRAPHY 112
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dc.language.isoen-
dc.subject發展型國家zh_TW
dc.subject中美關係zh_TW
dc.subject半導體zh_TW
dc.subject兩岸關係zh_TW
dc.subject複合式相互依賴zh_TW
dc.subjectSemiconductorsen
dc.subjectUS-China relationsen
dc.subjectCross-strait relationsen
dc.subjectEast Asian developmental stateen
dc.subjectcomplex interdependenceen
dc.title晶片製造的政治:台灣在半導體製造中的角色及其對全球政治經濟的影響zh_TW
dc.titleThe Politics of Chipmaking: Taiwan’s Role in the Semiconductor Manufacturing and its Influence on the Global Political Economyen
dc.typeThesis-
dc.date.schoolyear111-1-
dc.description.degree碩士-
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee陳明祺;廖小娟zh_TW
dc.contributor.oralexamcommitteeMing-chi Chen;Mandy Liaoen
dc.subject.keyword發展型國家,半導體,中美關係,兩岸關係,複合式相互依賴,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordEast Asian developmental state,Semiconductors,US-China relations,Cross-strait relations,complex interdependence,en
dc.relation.page132-
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU202300258-
dc.rights.note同意授權(全球公開)-
dc.date.accepted2023-02-10-
dc.contributor.author-college社會科學院-
dc.contributor.author-dept政治學系-
顯示於系所單位:政治學系

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