分析大法官作為臺灣憲政運作否決者之條件：以民主化後違憲審查案件為中心

Abstract

本文試圖從法實證研究途徑證明大法官普遍而言是否積極介入憲政運作。結合司法決策模型與否決者理論，本研究創建兩個依變項：維持現狀或改變現狀、溫和改變或基進改變現狀，並分析影響大法官決策之因素。在自變項方面，納入內部組成因素（民主化選任、選任黨派意識形態與內部分歧度）、外部因素（法令類型、民意新舊）、法理因素（特別權力關係案件），並控制決策門檻、省籍、留學、實務出身大法官之比例，以及是否為舊時期法令、人權保障與政治性案件。 從民主化後的違憲審查解釋中（釋字第217號至第813號），本研究整理出816件案件爭議，發現改變現狀案件超過四成，顯示大法官相當積極介入政治。依二元勝算對數模型分析，在內部組成方面，民主化前選任的大法官，較難以改變現狀，民主化後不同時期大法官基進改變現狀傾向不同，但無法推論與黨派意識形態及內部分歧度相關。外部因素方面，法令類型雖未影響大法官改變現狀與否，但審查憲法與法律、行政命令時，相較判例類法令，大法官在改變現狀時較難採取基進改變的方式。法令公告日越久遠者，大法官雖傾向改變現狀，但會傾向溫和改變，且審查第二屆新國會就職後通過之法令，大法官亦傾向溫和改變，顯示民意新舊有所影響。在法理因素方面，大法官審查特別權力關係案件時，會傾向改變現狀。 要注意的是，積極介入政治、作出改變現狀的決定，與扮演否決者理論中的憲政運作否決者、作出超出政治部門偏好之決策並不相同。本研究雖未逐案證明大法官是否扮演否決者，但整體而言，已可使學界省思台灣憲政運作中大法官角色之複雜性，並開啟未來更多關於大法官決策、司法行為與司法政治研究的辯論。

This thesis adopts the quantitative approach of empirical legal studies to prove whether the Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC) has been actively engaged in constitutional politics. By integrating the model of judicial decision-making and the veto player theory, I create two dependent variables: maintaining or changing the status quo, changing moderately or radically, and further analyze the factors that affect the TCC’s decisions. With respect to the independent variables, the composition of Grand Justices (democratic appointment, party ideology and internal variation), the external factors (the types of law, public opinion), and the jurisprudence factor (special authority relationship cases) are all included therein. The control variables contain the decision-making threshold, the proportion of Justices’ ethnicity, studying-abroad experience, prior judicial experience, and whether the subject cases were involved with obsolete laws, human rights protections, and political issues. Focusing on the constitutional review interpretations after democratization (Interpretation No. 217 to No. 813), this study has sorted out 816 cases and identified that TCC has decided to change the status quo in more than 40 percent of the cases, indicating that TCC are quite active in playing a role in politics. According to the binary logistic regression, in terms of the composition of TCC, Justices nominated before democratization had the difficulty in changing the status quo. Although different periods of composition show the different tendency to change radically, there is no evidence that the partisanship and internal ideological variations really affect Justices’ decisions. In terms of the external factors, the types of law have no effect on the maintenance or change of the status quo, but it is easier for Justices to make a radical change when reviewing judicial precedents rather than administrative rules, acts and the Constitution. Moreover, the longer the law was promulgated, the more Justices tend to change the status quo but especially in a moderate way. When reviewing the laws promulgated after the inauguration of the second Legislative Yuan, Justices also have a tendency to make moderate changes, suggesting the influence of the later public opinion. As for the jurisprudence factor, Justices are inclined to change the status quo when reviewing special authority relationship cases. However, the role of TCC actively engaged in politics is notably different from the role of being the veto player in constitutional operations, requiring making a decision that is not absorbed by the existing political veto players. On the whole, even though this study didn’t prove it case-by-case, the aforementioned findings could still cast light on the complex roles of TCC in constitutional politics for the academic world in Taiwan. Last but not least, this article hopes to bring more debates about the research on Justices’ decision-making, judicial behavior and judicial politics in the future.