農田水利會的侍從結構與選舉動員：雲林水利會（管理處）的個案研究

Abstract

農田水利會在台灣農村一向與地方派系、選舉動員有著密切關聯，是地方政治中重要的利益分配系統。自2016年以來，民進黨政府針對水利會一系列國有化修法行動讓水利會從地方自治團體轉變為公務機關，被視為是中央建制削弱地方恩庇侍從關係的措施。本研究以兼具「農業」與「地方派系」代表性的雲林水利會為個案研究對象，探討雲林水利會的侍從結構與選舉動員，並檢視2020年修法改制後的影響。具體而言，雲林水利會的選舉動員方式包含買票動員與人情動員，藉由金錢、職位與服務的提供，和基層選民建立侍從連結，換取其選票支持。本研究發現，由於司法介入頻率增加，與缺乏動員資金的影響之下，雲林水利會的買票動員方式在10多年前已完全式微，並直接導致失去影響地方選舉的關鍵能力。另一方面，人情動員的影響力亦因產業結構變遷呈現衰退的趨勢。總的來說，長期而言農田水利會作為利益分配系統的能力下降、對地方選舉的影響力也不若以往，然而在地方事務中的特殊利益分配方式，仍保有侍從主義交換互惠的色彩，即便在2020年國有化之後也依然如此。

The Irrigation Association has long been associated with local factions and election mobilization in rural Taiwan, serving as an important interest distribution system in local politics. Since 2016, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government has launched a series of legislative amendments of nationalization to the Irrigation Associations, transforming them from local self-governing bodies into branches of public service agency, which is seen as a measure to weaken the local patronage and consolidate the authority of central government. This study focuses on the Yunlin Irrigation Association, a representative system in both agriculture and local factions in local politics, exploring its patronage-client structure and election mobilization and the impact of the nationalization revision in 2020. Specifically, the election mobilization means from Yunlin Irrigation Association include vote-buying bribery and personal relationship mobilization. These functions are maintained through the patrons' provision of money, jobs, and services to establish patron-client relationships with grassroots voters in exchange for their votes and support. The vote-buying bribery within the Yunlin Irrigation Association had declined since more than a decade ago for the frequency of judicial intervention has increased and the lack of mobilization funds. As a consequence, Yunlin Irrigation Association loss its capability to impact local elections. Likewise, personal relationship mobilization is also on the decline as a result of industry structure change in rural Taiwan. Overall, in the long term, the capacity of the Irrigation Association as a political distribution system has been reduced. Therefore, its influence on local elections is not as strong as in the past. However, the patron-client relationships of special interests in local affairs still retain somewhat reciprocity, even after the implementation of the nationalization revision in 2020.