企業使用 non-GAAP 盈餘於經理人薪酬合約之績效評估標準與 say-on-pay 投票反對率之關聯性

Abstract

在 2011 年，美國證管會要求公司必須在股東會上，讓股東對於薪酬委員會所提出給予經理人的薪酬合約，有投下同意或是反對的權利，也就是所謂的 Say-on-pay 制度。 本研究主要探討 say-on-pay 投票反對率，與公司使用 non-GAAP 盈餘於經理人之薪酬合約中的績效評估標準之關聯性，以及在使用 non-GAAP 盈餘的基礎下，分別探討公司治理不佳和高無形資產比例的情形下，對於 say-on-pay 投票反對率之影響。 本研究結果顯示，公司使用 non-GAAP 盈餘於經理人薪酬績效評估指標，與 say- on-pay 投票反對率呈現正向關係，代表投資人認為公司使用 non-GAAP 盈餘於經理人薪酬持較多反對意見，推測投資人傾向管理階層機會主義(Opportunistic Behavior)的觀點;而公司治理差且同時使用 non-GAAP 盈餘於經理人薪酬之績效評估指標，與 say-on-pay 投票反對率呈現正向關係，代表當公司治理差時會更加劇投資人對公司使 用 non-GAAP 盈餘於經理人薪酬中的反對程度;而高無形資產比例之公司且同時使 用 non-GAAP 盈餘於經理人薪酬之績效評估指標，與 say-on-pay 投票反對率並無顯著關係，顯示並不會因為公司之高無形資產比例導致投資人對於公司使用 non-GAAP 於經理人薪酬的看法有所影響。

In 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission required companies to give shareholders the right to agree or disagree with the compensation contract proposed by the compensation committee for managers at shareholder meetings, which is the so-called Say- on-pay vote. This study examines the relationship between the against rate of say-on-pay vote and the use of non-GAAP earnings in the performance evaluation in managers' compensation contracts. This study further explores cross-sectionally whether the corporate governance and the intensity of intangible assets moderate the association between the use of non-GAAP earnings managerial compensation contracts and the against rate of the say-on-pay vote. Empirical results of this study show that the company using non-GAAP earnings in managerial compensation contracts is positively associated with the say-on-pay vote against rate, indicating that investors hold more objections to companies using non-GAAP earnings in managers' compensation. This result suggests that investors are likely taking the opportunistic view of non-GAAP use in managerial compensation contacts. Moreover, poor corporate governance enhances the association between the use of non- GAAP earnings in managerial compensation. This suggests that when corporate governance is poor, investors will increase their opposition to the use of non-GAAP earnings in managers’ compensation. However, this study does not find that the intensity of intangible assets significantly influence the relation between the use of non-GAAP earnings in managerial compensation and the against rate of the say-on-pay vote.