洗大澡會提高財務報導品質嗎？以財務會計準則第142號公報下商譽減損為例

Abstract

本研究針對美國財務會計準則142號公報「商譽與其他無形資產」規範下，洗大澡和財務報導品質的關聯性，探討新上任CEO透過洗大澡方式認列商譽減損後是否能夠提升公司財務報導品質和預測未來現金流，進而減少資訊不對稱。本研究以美國2012 至2016 年新上任CEO認列商譽減損的公司為樣本，發現在財務會計準則第142 號公報規範下，新上任CEO通過洗大澡方式認列商譽減損後，該公司財務導品質提升，且商譽預測未來一、二年現金流能力增加。顯示該公報規範下，原完成併購交易並認列商譽的CEO透過盈餘管理延遲減損商譽，使財報未能允當表達真實情況，財務報導品質下降，商譽亦失去與未來現金流相關的資訊價值。此外，本研究亦發現，市場對於新上任CEO洗大澡並認列商譽減損已有預期，宣告日的股價異常盈餘較低。

In June 2001, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 142, “Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets.” Under SFAS 142, goodwill has to be tested for impairment at least annually instead of amortizing. SFAS 142 provides the CEO discretionary to record goodwill impairment. This study focuses on the correlation between big bath and financial reporting quality, to explore whether the financial reporting quality of firm improves after the new CEO taking a big bath with goodwill impairment, thereby reducing information asymmetry. From a sample of US firms whose new CEO takes a big bath with goodwill impairment during 2012-2016, I present the compelling evidence that after the new CEO recognizes goodwill impairment by taking a big bath, the financial reporting quality improves and so does the ability of goodwill to predict one- and two- year ahead cash flow. It shows that under SFAS 142, the CEO who conducted the M&A transaction and recognized the goodwill delayed the goodwill impairment through earnings management, leading to an unfaithful statement and a lack of goodwill information about future cash. In addition, this study also provides convincing evidence that the market had expected that the new CEO would take a big bath with the goodwill impairment, leading to a lower cumulative abnormal return of the announcement.