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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 王道一(Joseph Tao-yi Wang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Chun-Hou Cheng | en |
dc.contributor.author | 鄭淳厚 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-20T00:52:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-12 | |
dc.date.available | 2021-05-20T00:52:12Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-08-12 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-08-05 | |
dc.identifier.citation | References
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/8330 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 人們如何處理與原先信念衝突但可能有幫助的資訊?我們用經濟學實驗來研究人在面對這類資訊時如何進行貝氏修正。實驗中電腦將每個人獨立地隨機指定到兩個盒子之一、從中抽出一顆球,然後獲得另一個人所申報的新資訊,但他只有一半的機會跟自己是同一個盒子。我們發現當新資訊與自己原先的資訊相衝突時,人們更新信念的結果會更偏離貝氏更新的預測,表示他們將新資訊過度地歸因於與自己不同的盒子,而且即使考慮人們認定他人有可能胡亂申報,這個效果仍然存在。因此,當新資訊與原先信念衝突時,人們會有將之歸因於不相干的傾向,進而忽略新資訊、不願更新信念,形成穩定的同溫層均衡。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | How do individuals update beliefs from contradicting information that could be potentially irrelevant? We conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the ability to process such information, in which each subject independently draws a ball from one of two digital urns and receives information reported by another subject who may or may not have drawn from the same urn. We document evidence that subjects who receive new conflicting information deviate more from Bayesian updating, indicating that subjects overly believe the new information is irrelevant. This effect is robust even allowing subjects to perceive others reporting randomly. This pattern of attributing conflicting information as irrelevant may form the foundation of stable echo chambers or equilibria where additional information has no effect on beliefs. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-20T00:52:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-0308202023403900.pdf: 5039870 bytes, checksum: 542ceb9fcd084743cc85d2c940b9f142 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄 口試委員審定書............................................................... i 誌謝............................................................................... ii 中文摘要........................................................................ i ii 英文摘要......................................................................... iv 1. Introduction................................................................... 1 2. Experimental Design......................................................... 5 2.1 Design Details.........................................................5 2.2 Belief Eliciation...................................................... 6 2.3 Experimental Procedures............................................7 2.4 Bayesian Probability Predictions...................................9 3. Results...........................................................................16 3.1 Adherence to Bayesian Updating................................... .16 3.2 The Echo Chamber.....................................................19 3.3 Inferred Prior Beliefs of Other’s Information..................... 25 4. Conclusion..................................................................... 33 References......................................................................... 34 Appendix: First Phase Belief....................................................36 Appendix: Second Phase Raw Data........................................... .36 Appendix: Alternative Experimental Designs.................................37 Appendix: Experimental Instructions..........................................41 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 用經濟學實驗研究貝氏修正偏誤差異與同溫層效果 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Asymmetric Failure of Bayesian Updating and the Echo Chamber Effect: An Experimental Study | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.coadvisor | 狄萊(Patrick DeJarnette) | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳儀(Josie I Chen),黃景沂(Ching-I Huang),吳仕煒(Shih-Wei Wu) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 貝氏定理,貝氏修正偏誤,不對稱更新,同溫層效應,兩極化效應, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Bayes’ rule,polarization,belief-updating,asymmetric processing,biased interpretation, | en |
dc.relation.page | 48 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202002331 | |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-08-06 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 經濟學系 |
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