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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 王榮麟(Rong-Lin Wang) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Cheng-Ting Ling | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 凌振庭 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-20T00:50:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-21 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-20T00:50:51Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2020-08-21 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-08-11 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Ⅰ、康德著作縮寫與譯本 Kant, Immanuel. (1980) Lectures on Ethics. Translated by Louis Infield. USA: Hackett. --- (1991) “A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: Is the Human Race Continually Improving?” Kant, Political Writings. (177－190) Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Edited by Hans Reiss. USA: Cambridge University Press. --- (1996a) “On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice.” Immanuel Kant: Practical philosophy. (277－309) Translated and edited by Mary Gregor. USA: Cambridge University Press.（縮寫TP） --- (1996b) The Metaphysics of Morals. Immanuel Kant: Practical philosophy. (363－603) Translated and edited by Mary Gregor. USA: Cambridge University Press.（縮寫MM） --- (1998) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor. UK: Cambridge University Press.（縮寫G） II、其它翻譯著作 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. (1982) Science of Knowledge. Translated and Edited by Peter Heath and John Lachs. UK: Cambridge University Press. --- (2000) Foundations of Natural Right. Translated by Michael Baur, Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. UK: Cambridge University Press. --- (2005) The System of Ethics. Translated and Edited by Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller. UK: Cambridge University Press. Henrich, Dieter. (1982) “Fichte’s Original Insight.” Translated by David R. Lachterman. Contemporary German Philosophy, 1: 15–52. III、外文著作 Breazeale, Daniel. (2008) “The First-Person Standpoint of Fichte's Ethics.” Philosophy Today, 52(3－4): 270－281. Darwall, Stephen. (2005) “Morality and Practical Reason: a Kantian Approach.” The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. (282－320) Edited by David Copp. New York: Oxford University Press. --- (2006) The Second-Person Standpoint. USA: Harvard University Press. --- (2007) “Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson.” Ethics, 118(1): 52－69. --- (2013a) Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I. UK: Oxford University Press. --- (2013b) Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II. UK: Oxford University Press. --- (2014). “Why Fichte’s Second-Personal Foundations Can Provide a More Adequate Account of The Relation of Right than Kant’s.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 90: 5－20. De Maagt, Sem. (2018) “Korsgaard’s Other Argument for Interpersonal Morality: the Argument from the Sufficiency of Agency.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21: 887－902 --- (2019) “It only takes two to tango: against grounding morality in interaction.” Philos Stud, 176: 2767－2783. Gough, J W. (1957) The Social Contract. Great Britain: Oxford University Press. Geuss, Raymond. (1996) “Morality and identity.” The Sources of Normativity. (189－199) Edited by Onora O’Neill. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hanisch, Christoph. (2014) “Self-Constitution and Other-Constitution: The Non-Optionality of the Second Person Standpoint.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 90: 105–129. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996a). The Sources of Normativity. Edited by Onora O’Neill. New York: Cambridge University Press. --- (1996b) Creating the Kingdom of Ends. UK: Cambridge University Press. --- (2007) “Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A Commentary on Stephen Darwall’s The Second‐Person Standpoint.” Ethics, 118(1): 8－23. --- (2008) The Constitution of Agency. UK: Oxford University Press. --- (2009) Self-Constitution. UK: Oxford University Press. --- (2011) “Natural goodness, rightness, and the intersubjectivity of reason: Reply to Arroyo, Cummiskey, Moland, and Bird-Pollan.” Metaphilosophy, 42(4): 381－394. Lessnoff, Michael. (1986) Social Contract. Hong Kong: Macmillan Education LTD. LeBar, Mark. (2001) “Korsgaard, Wittgenstein, and the Mafioso.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39(2): 261－271. O’Day, Ken. (1998) “Normativity and interpersonal reasons.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1: 61－87, Pauer-Studer, Herlinde. (2010) “The Moral Standpoint: First or Second Personal?” European Journal of Philosophy, 18(2): 296－310. --- (2014). “Contractualism and The Second-Person Moral Standpoint.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 90: 149－168. Prichard, H. A. (1968) “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest. Essays and Lectures by H. A. Prichard. Edited by W. D. Ross and J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Skidmore, James. (2002) “Skepticism about Practical Reason: Transcendental Arguments and Their Limits.” Philosophical Studies, 109(2): 121－141. Stern, Robert. (2011) “The Value of Humanity: Reflections on Korsgaard’s Transcendental Argument.” Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. (74－95) Edited by Joel Smith and Peter Sullivan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schapiro, Tamar. (2010) “Desires as Demands: How the Second-Person Standpoint Might Be Internal to Reflective Agency.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(1): 229－236. Tarasenko‐Struc, Aleksy. (forthcoming) “Kantian constructivism and the authority of others.” European Journal of Philosophy. Download from: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ejop.12426/ Wallace, R. Jay. (2007) “Reasons, Relations, and Commands: Reflections on Darwall.” Ethics, 118(1): 24－36. Wood, Allen. (2008) Kantian Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. --- (2016) Fichte’s Ethical Thought. UK: Oxford University Press. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/8257 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 道德義務的「規範性問題（normative question）」問的是：我們能對道德義務被聲稱具有的權威提供什麼樣的證成。本文討論的是當代關於規範性問題的理論中，可視為康德式理論的內部爭論：規範性的來源是第一人稱（first-personal），還是第二人稱（second-personal）的？柯斯嘉（Christine Korsgaard）認為，規範性最終源於理性行動者對自己採取某些觀點並透過選擇實踐身分自我立法；因此規範性來源是第一人稱的，只要行動者會自問「我該如何行動？」，他便具有以義務約束自身的能力。而達沃（Stephen Darwall）則認為道德的規範性來源是第二人稱的⸺來自具有適當權威的他人對行動者提出的要求，在第一人稱的觀點中沒有什麼能讓我們理解並確保道德義務被假定具有的那種能於主體之間相互要求、負責的規範性。然而，第二人稱規範性可能面臨被化約為第一人稱，或從第一人稱觀點而言可選的風險。本文目的在於釐清兩種理論的爭點，並為第二人稱的理論辯護。最終本文主張柯斯嘉的第一人稱規範性必須具有第二人稱的形式，且不能預設自身或任何特定行動者作為該形式的主體。這顯示了道德義務的規範性來源是所有理性行動者之共同立法的構成性條件，因此是第二人稱，而非第一人稱的。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The “normative question” about moral obligations is that how and why their alleged authority over us can ever be justified. The issue discussed in this essay is an internal dispute between Kantians on their theories of normativity: is the source of normativity first-personal or second-personal? Christine Korsgaard argues that normativity is derived ultimately from the rational agent who takes some point of view of himself and self-legislates by adopting some practical identity. Therefore, the source of normativity is first-personal, an agent has the capacity to obligate himself as long as he can ask himself, “How should I act?” On the contrary, Stephen Darwall argues that the source of moral normativity is second-personal, it is derived from the demands and claims addressed by others with legitimate authority over an agent. Nothing from our first-person perspective enables us to understand and justify the alleged normativity of moral obligations that can be mutually addressed between agents and make us responsible to each other. However, second-personal normativity may face the risk of being reduced to first-personal normativity, or being optional from the first-person standpoint. The aim of this essay is to clarify the respective arguments in these two theories and defend the second-person theory. In the end, I argue that only by second-personal form can Korsgaard’s first-personal normativity gain its alleged binding force, and one cannot presuppose a reflecting self or any particular agent as the subject of this form. This means that the source of normativity of moral obligations is a constitutive condition of common legislation among all rational agents, and thus it is second-personal rather than first-personal. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-20T00:50:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1108202017403800.pdf: 1821059 bytes, checksum: 62125e9e1aefde121cf672e4c9748785 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 前言 1 第一章 規範性來源的理論 5 第一節 柯斯嘉的第一人稱理論 5 一、回答規範性問題需要無法繼續被追問的答案 5 二、規範性的來源是實踐身分與自我立法 7 三、理由公共性論證 8 四、柯斯嘉的理由公共性論證為何不成功 10 第二節 達沃的第二人稱道德義務 11 一、道德、究責性與第二人稱觀點 12 二、與第一人稱理論的差異：規範性的「最終來源」 14 第二章 第二人稱的規範性來源如何可能？ 17 第一節 達沃對第二人稱道德義務的證成及其困難 17 一、達沃對第二人稱理由的「證明」：並不比其它理由更可疑 17 二、達沃解決了規範性問題嗎？ 19 第二節 第二人稱行動理由如何可能 21 一、柯斯嘉的「包裹式理由觀」 21 二、達沃的「規範態度理論」 22 三、柯斯嘉的批評：第二人規範性值得懷疑 24 第三章 不可化約的第二人稱規範性如何可能？ 27 第一節 契約、共同立法與第二人稱規範性 28 一、契約論的多餘批評 28 二、康德的契約論是多餘的嗎？ 29 三、責任與締約 32 第二節 契約的規範性能被化約為理性的規範性嗎？ 33 一、共同立法與理性的規範性 33 二、第二人稱規範性作為意志聯合之構成性要求 35 第三節 柯斯嘉理論中的意志聯合與第二人稱規範性 37 第四章 所有理性存在者的意志聯合作為規範性來源 47 第一節 第二人稱規範性應該是可選的嗎？ 47 第二節 達沃對費希特法權論的引用及其啟示 49 一、達沃對費希特式「召喚」與法權論的引用 50 二、費希特倫理學中的規範性來源 53 三、費希特的規範性理論是第一人稱的嗎？ 55 四、費希特論道德規範性的啟示 56 第三節 整合他者與自我建構的途徑 58 一、自我邊界的「社會化」擴展是適當的嗎？ 61 二、哈尼施（Hanisch）的「不干涉原則」 62 三、沙皮羅（Schapiro）論慾望的第二人稱形式 64 第四節 所有理性存在者的意志聯合作為自我建構的條件 66 一、奧戴（O’Day）對柯斯嘉私有立法的批評與建議 66 二、費希特論「自我」的困境 68 三、為什麼純粹的「第一人稱觀點」根本不可能？ 70 四、第一人稱主體性是偶然，意志聯合才是自我建構的先驗條件 72 結論 77 參考書目 79 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 道德義務的第二人稱規範性：基於共同立法作為自我建構之先驗條件的辯護 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Second-Personal Normativity of Moral Obligation : A Vindication Based on Common legislation as Transcendental Condition of Self-Constitution | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳豐維(Feng-Wei Wu),張忠宏(Chung-Hung Chang) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 道德義務,規範性,Korsgaard,Darwall,第二人稱觀點,共同立法, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | moral obligation,normativity,Korsgaard,Darwall,second-person standpoint,common legislation, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 82 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202002990 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2020-08-12 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 哲學系 | |
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