論我國發行中央銀行數位貨幣之法律架構與個人資料保護

Abstract

從比特幣、ICO、Libra幣之進展，可見密碼貨幣之發展正衝擊法幣的存在。各國關於CBDC之發展，多數仍尚在研究中，目前可能採行CBDC的國家有兩大極端，一端是高度發展國家而邁向無現金社會，如瑞典；另一端則是經濟體不穩定、金融機構服務普遍欠缺或不足、無獨立法幣如馬紹爾。對於台灣而言，發行CBDC亦將受惠於追蹤資金流向、健全支付體系、採行負利率而有效執行貨幣政策、減少交易成本並達成普惠金融服務。 國際上對於CBDC之底層設計尚未有定論，依據發行及分配主體、發行對象、發行模式、發行類型（與法幣關係）、底層技術、與現金關係、附加利息與否等設計細節不同，而將影響金融法及個資法之權利義務等。本文參考瑞典E-Krona區分小額支付與大額支付，因而建議以下兩種發行態樣：（一）為現金替代、且屬法幣之貨幣型，採私鏈技術並由央行直接發行且不附利息（代幣模式）；以及（二）用以大額支付但與法幣為一比一兌換的電子支付型，採中心化帳本技術及雙層發行架構，且可能附加低於銀行之優惠利率（帳戶模式）。 在本文的兩種CBDC發行態樣下，鑑於CBDC將與法幣直接連結，除貨幣法令授權以外，亦應立法限制央行涉入太多原本非其職權之活動。即在金融法令部分，應認為電子支付型CBDC有高度特別法需求以限制央行之權力；而在貨幣相關法令下，雖然得透過些微調整立法用語、變更實務見解等，惟為了法律解釋及體系一致，應以一部CBDC特別法含括不同發行態樣之相關法令。 從個資法令觀察，因CBDC仍有可能蒐集歐洲人民之個人資料，因而除了遵循我國個資法以外，亦可能受到GDPR相關規範拘束。然而，我國個資法與GDPR在許多規範均有重疊，如CBDC之帳戶及交易資料類似IP地址，應屬個人資料，央行及其受託發行與分配之私部門應符合個資處理原則、原則限制目的外利用、對人民明確告知、負擔資安措施等；在GDPR下，則應注意處理生物辨識資料之影響評估，及區塊鏈上刪除權及更正權、智能合約自動剖析之適法處理，應特別立法明定央行之法定義務或在開立帳戶時與人民訂立契約取得人民同意。

The advancement of Bitcoin, ICO and Libra shows that cryptocurrency is gradually influencing the existence of fiat currency. As a result of this trend, many countries are actively researching Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). Those likely to adopt CBDC present two extremes. One is for highly developed countries to move towards cashless societies, such as Sweden, while the other kind takes place in the unstable economies which have insufficient financial services with no independent fiat currency, such as Marshall Islands. Issuance of CBDC can benefit Taiwan from tracking the flow of funds, improving the payment system, implementing negative interest rates for effective monetary policy, reducing transaction cost and achieving financial inclusion. At present, most countries have not yet finalized the infrastructure of CBDC. The detailed design of CBDC, including the issuers and distributors, recipients, issuance models, issuance types (the relationship with the fiat currency), the underlying technology, the relationship with cash, and whether to have incurred interest or not, will affect the relevant rights and obligations in financial acts and personal information protection acts. This thesis refers to the distinction of small payment and large payment under Swedish E-Krona, and distinguishes the two following CBDC models: (1) CBDC serving as an alternative to cash, the Currency Model is fiat currency without interest, and CBDC uses private blockchain to be directly issued by the central bank (Token-based); and (2) CBDC uses Electronic Payment Model for large payments with 1:1 exchange rate to fiat currency, adopting centralized ledger and dual issuance structure, with potentially lower interest rate than banks (Account-based). Since CBDC will be directly related to fiat currency in the two aforementioned models, in addition to the authorization under monetary acts, the special legislation is required to restrict the central bank from engaging in too many activities that are beyond its authority. That is, there is a high need for special legislation of financial acts to limit the central bank’s power under Electronic Payment Model CBDC. Although it is possible to fine-tune the legislative language and change precedents under existing monetary acts, the special legislation on CBDC can better cover all the relevant acts of different CBDC models to maintain consistence in legal and systematic interpretation. In terms of personal information protection acts, besides complying with the Taiwan Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), CBDC in Taiwan may also be subject to the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) since CBDC may collect European personal information. However, there are certain overlapping regulations between PDPA and GDPR. For instance, the account and transaction information of CBDC are similar to IP addresses and are considered personal information. Thus, the central bank and its entrusted private sectors to issue and distribute CBDC shall comply with the principles of personal information processing. They should prohibit secondary use in general, obtain explicit consent from people, and undertake security measures, etc. Under GDPR, further notice should be paid to the impact assessment of biometric identification, the rights to erasure and correction, and the legitimate processing of automatic decision-making of smart contracts on the blockchain. To comply with foregoing issues under GDPR, the legal obligation of the central bank should be specified by the special legislation, or the central bank should obtain people’s consent or enter contracts with people when they open the account.