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請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/81854
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor李怡庭(Yiting Li)
dc.contributor.authorHung-Chi Changen
dc.contributor.author張宏齊zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-25T03:05:07Z-
dc.date.available2023-09-15
dc.date.copyright2021-07-23
dc.date.issued2021
dc.date.submitted2021-07-20
dc.identifier.citationBakos, J. Y. (1997). Reducing buyer search costs: Implications for electronic marketplaces. Management science 43(12), 1676–1692. Berentsen, A., G. Camera, and C. Waller (2007). Money, credit and banking. Journal of Economic theory 135(1), 171–195. Biais, B. and C. Gollier (1997). Trade credit and credit rationing. The Review of Financial Studies 10(4), 903–937. Cipollone, A. and P. E. Giordani (2019). Entrepreneurs meet financiers: Evidence from the business angel market. Journal of Business Venturing 34(5), 105913. Cornelli, G., J. Frost, L. Gambacorta, R. Rau, R. Wardrop, and T. Ziegler (2020). Fintech and big tech credit: a new database. BIS Working Paper 887. Eeckhout, J. and P. Kircher (2010). Sorting versus screening: Search frictions and competing mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory 145(4), 1354–1385. Franks, J., N. Serrano­Velarde, and O. Sussman (2021). Marketplace lending, information aggregation, and liquidity. The Review of Financial Studies 34(5), 2318–2361. Freedman, S. and G. Z. Jin (2008). Do social networks solve information problems for peer­to­peer lending? evidence from prosper. com. Gu, C., F. Mattesini, C. Monnet, and R. Wright (2013). Endogenous credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy 121(5), 940–965. Gu, C., F. Mattesini, and R. Wright (2016). Money and credit redux. Econometrica 84(1),1–32. Guerrieri, V., R. Shimer, and R. Wright (2010). Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium. Econometrica 78(6), 1823–1862. Huangfu, S. (2009). Competitive search equilibrium with private information on monetary shocks. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics 9(1). Lagos, R. and R. Wright (2005). A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis. Journal of Political Economy 113(3), 463–484. Li, Y.­S. and Y. Li (2013). Liquidity and asset prices: A new monetarist approach. Journal of Monetary Economics 60(4), 426–438. Lotz, S. and C. Zhang (2016). Money and credit as means of payment: A new monetarist approach. Journal of Economic Theory 164, 68–100. Madison, F. (2019). Frictional asset reallocation under adverse selection. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 100, 115–130. Masters, A. (2011). Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two­sided investment in competitive search equilibrium. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 35(7), 1017–1031. Rocheteau, G. (2011). Payments and liquidity under adverse selection. Journal of Monetary Economics 58(3), 191 – 205. Rocheteau, G. and R. Wright (2005). Money in search equilibrium, in competitive equilibrium, and in competitive search equilibrium. Econometrica 73(1), 175–202. Rocheteau, G., R. Wright, and C. Zhang (2018). Corporate finance and monetary policy. American Economic Review 108(4­5), 1147–86. Shao, E. (2014). The threat of counterfeiting in competitive search equilibrium. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 47, 168–185. Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. The American economic review 71(3), 393–410. Vallée, B. and Y. Zeng (2019). Marketplace Lending: A New Banking Paradigm? The Review of Financial Studies 32(5), 1939–1982. Wei, Z. and M. Lin (2017). Market mechanisms in online peer­to­peer lending. Management Science 63(12), 4236–4257. Willington, M. and L. Navarro (2015). Work hours regulation in a search economy with adverse selection. Economics Letters 136, 46–48. Wong, C.­Y. and Y.­K. Eng (2020). Implications of platform finance on monetary policy transmission. The Singapore Economic Review, 1–23.
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/81854-
dc.description.abstract本論文旨在以競爭搜尋模型捕捉網路借貸平台的搜尋模式,探討有限承諾及逆選擇對借貸市場的影響,並揭示貨幣政策於借貸平台的傳遞效果及管道。一般而言,貨幣作為自有資金改善因逆選擇問題所導致的效率損失。此乃因放款人能以預付款要求借款人承擔部分倒帳風險。而有限承諾使借貸平台須以驅逐違約者確保借款人還款,造成內生借貸上限。借貸上限過小時,Guerrieri et al. (2010)中的唯一分離均衡不一定存在且對於競爭搜尋均衡的相關結論須仰賴配對機率的嚴格單調性才能成立。即便均衡存在,有限承諾將限縮放款人透過調整契約篩選借款人的能力,扭曲均衡配對機率,惡化逆選擇問題。此時貨幣能透過提供流動性並幫助放款人篩選借款人減輕外部融資成本。模型中通貨膨脹有兩效果。其一,通貨膨脹打擊借款人攜帶自有資金克服金融摩擦的誘因。其二,通貨膨脹提高違約成本並擴大借貸上限。然而由於借貸上限受市場參與者的信念影響,借貸平台可能發生自我實現的信貸緊縮。而信念驅動此特質也使通貨膨脹的效果難以捕捉。不同於大多文獻,我們發現較高的通膨率可能造成較低的均衡借貸上限,使生產效率下降。zh_TW
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2022-11-25T03:05:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
U0001-0607202119100600.pdf: 2477230 bytes, checksum: 63d82c1012b69aa08c52b723c86b61e5 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2021
en
dc.description.tableofcontents"謝辭 i 摘要 ii Abstract iii Contents iv List of Figures vi List of Tables vii Chapter 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Chapter 2 Environments 13 Chapter 3 Marketplace Lending 16 3.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2 Competitive Search Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3 Money and Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Chapter 4 Macroeconomic Analysis 43 4.1 Inflation and Money Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.2 Endogenous Credit Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Chapter 5 Numerical Analysis 51 5.1 Money, Credit and Production Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.2 Comparative Statics: Endogenous Credit Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Chapter 6 Concluding Remarks 64 References 65 Appendix A — Omitted Proofs 69 Appendix B — Extensive Sorting 75"
dc.language.isoen
dc.subject逆選擇zh_TW
dc.subject競爭搜尋模型zh_TW
dc.subject借貸平台zh_TW
dc.subject有限承諾zh_TW
dc.subject內生借貸上限zh_TW
dc.subject貨幣搜尋模型zh_TW
dc.subjectMarketplace Lendingen
dc.subjectLimited Commitmenten
dc.subjectAdverse Selectionen
dc.subjectEndogenous Credit Limiten
dc.subjectMonetary Search Modelen
dc.subjectCompetitive Search Modelen
dc.title論具逆選擇問題之借貸平台對貨幣政策的影響zh_TW
dc.titleMarketplace Lending and Monetary Policy in a Competitive Search Market with Adverse Selectionen
dc.date.schoolyear109-2
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee王建強(Hsin-Tsai Liu),朱玉琦(Chih-Yang Tseng)
dc.subject.keyword借貸平台,競爭搜尋模型,逆選擇,有限承諾,內生借貸上限,貨幣搜尋模型,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordMarketplace Lending,Competitive Search Model,Adverse Selection,Limited Commitment,Endogenous Credit Limit,Monetary Search Model,en
dc.relation.page83
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU202101307
dc.rights.note同意授權(全球公開)
dc.date.accepted2021-07-20
dc.contributor.author-college社會科學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept經濟學研究所zh_TW
dc.date.embargo-lift2023-09-15-
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