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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 孔令傑(Ling-Chieh Kung) | |
dc.contributor.author | Wei-Han Chen | en |
dc.contributor.author | 陳維漢 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-20T00:49:32Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-24 | |
dc.date.available | 2021-05-20T00:49:32Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-08-24 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-08-17 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 交通部統計處,2017,民眾日常使用運具狀況調查摘要分析。 徐康明、李佳玲、馮浚與孟自云,2013,定製公交服務初探,城市交通,2013年第5期。 新北市政府交通局運輸管理科,2019,https://www.traffic.ntpc.gov.tw/home.jsp?id=f06672ba2aadbd3c,搜尋日期:2019年12月11日。 管維新,2016,基於博弈論的定製公交票價制定研究,西南交通大學碩士論文。 臺北市政府交通局,2013,臺北市聯營公車運價公式檢討方案。http://obas_front.tcc.gov.tw:8080/Agenda/DownloadFile.aspx?FileName=201300002495.pdf FilePath=201311 FileGrpKind=1,搜尋日期:2019年12月12日。 臺北市政府交通局,2016,臺北市聯營公車運價調整說明。https://www.pto.gov.taipei/News_Content.aspx?n=D065CCB1467288C8 sms=72544237BBE4C5F6 s=E31520C99FAA89F2,搜尋日期:2019年12月16日。 Agrawal, A., Catalini, C., and Goldfarb, A. 2014. Some simple economics of crowdfunding. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 14 (1): 63-97. Berechman, J., and Giuliano, G. 1984. Analysis of the cost structure of an urban bus transit property. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 18 (4-5): 273-287. Bian, C., and Lu, H. 2009. Analysis of price game between urban railway and bus. Highway Engineering, 34 (1): 49-51. Fujii, S., and Kitamura, R. 2003. What does a one-month free bus ticket do to habitual drivers? An experimental analysis of habit and attitude change. Transportation, 30 (1): 81-95. Hu, M., Li, X., and Shi, M. 2015. Product and pricing decisions in crowdfunding. Marketing Science, 34 (3): 331-345. Kauffman, R. J., and Wang, B. 2001. New buyers' arrival under dynamic pricing market microstructure: The case of group-buying discounts on the Internet. Journal of Management Information Systems, 18 (2): 157-188. Kung, L. C., and Chiu, W. L. 2019. Customer Segmentation Strategy of Crowdfunding Platform with Completion Time Uncertainty. Proceedings of Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS) in 2019, Xi'an, China. LTA Academy. 2014. Passenger Transport Mode Shares in World Cities. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2580/2966b8cff0aeaf730d8c5a1c65eb383c7899.pdf. Accessed on Dec. 11, 2019. Pedersen, P. A. 2003. On the optimal fare policies in urban transportation. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 37 (5): 423-435. Turvey, R., and Mohring, H. 1975. Optimal Bus Fares. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 9 (3): 280-286. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/8171 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 新北市為了滿足大量通勤族交通需要,將類似起訖與時段需求的乘客集中後,提供快速、直達的新型態公車服務,稱為「跳蛙公車」。此類公車通常由住宅區經高速公路直達市中心,每日定時發車一至數個班次,並依市區公車段票制計費,同時考慮通勤族固定乘車需求,另有逐月販售「跳蛙公車月票」,供定期搭乘的乘客購買,購買月票的乘客可以保留座位,享有不會因客滿而無法上車的權益。 跳蛙公車在開通時,以「政府設定跳蛙公車月票票價規則、但不提供補貼」的方式經營,直到2019年6月20日起,政府開始提供跳蛙公車月票補貼,實施「政府設定跳蛙公車月票票價規則,且提供票價補貼」。本研究探討政府實施「政府設定跳蛙公車月票票價規則,且提供票價補貼」與「政府不設定跳蛙公車月票票價規則,也不提供補貼」的差異,分別討論兩種情形下客運業者的定價決策、客運業者利潤、跳蛙公車月票票價、段票數、消費者剩餘的不同。本研究以經濟學模型模擬客運公司的決策過程。在模型中,將乘客以二元的方式分為遲到成本較高與遲到成本較低的兩種類型,並讓客運業者設計合約,以分別引導這兩類乘客購買跳蛙公車月票與公共運輸定期票。 本研究發現,在「政府設定跳蛙公車月票票價規則,且提供票價補貼」與「政府不設定跳蛙公車月票票價規則,也不提供補貼」兩種政策下,不論是哪種政策,當在意遲到的乘客比例較高時,跳蛙公車月票的票價、段票數與客運公司利潤均較高,消費者剩餘相對較低。若比較兩種政策,在在意遲到的乘客比例相同時,兩種政策的跳蛙公車月票票價相同,段票數和客運公司利潤以「政府不設定跳蛙公車月票票價規則,也不提供補貼」的情況較大,但消費者剩餘在兩種政策中均相同。然而,若在「政府設定跳蛙公車月票票價規則,且提供票價補貼」的情況下,當客運公司依據跳蛙公車月票票價推算段票數時,若段票數大於段票數收費上限,則跳蛙公車月票票價、段票數都將受到段票數上限的影響而最小,此時的客運公司利潤最小、消費者剩餘最大。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In order to solve the commuting problem in New Taipei City, the city government introduced a new concept of bus called “Commuter Express Bus.” This kind of bus is known to be fast and non-stop, and is usually used to deliver passengers from residential areas to downtown. Commuter Express Bus Routes share the same fare policy as other city bus routes, which is priced based on sections. Once a passenger gets on the bus before a fare increase buffer zone and gets off the bus after it, the passenger will be charged 2 sections. The more fare increase buffer zones the passenger gets through, the more sections the passenger has to pay. Moreover, to satisfy the needs of the commuters, those taking the Commuter Express Buses can buy monthly tickets in advance. Those buying the monthly tickets can choose their desired seats when purchasing the monthly tickets, and the seats will be reserved for them. That is, those buying monthly tickets are promised to get on the bus without worrying the bus is full because the driver will reserve the seats for them. At the beginning, the bus fare is set according to the pricing policy made by the government, and no other subsidy is given. On June 20, 2019, the government started to give subsidies to those who buy the monthly bus tickets. This research wonders if there are differences between “the government sets pricing policies and gives subsidies” and “the government does not set pricing policies and gives no subsidy.” This research discusses the difference of the pricing decisions and the revenue of the bus company, the price of the Commuter Express Bus Route monthly ticket, number of fare sections, and consumer surplus between the two government policies. The bus company’s decision process is simulated by an Economic model. In the model, passengers are divided into two parts by their cost of being late, and the bus company designs a contract that the passengers are induced to buy the Commuter Express Bus monthly tickets or the periodic tickets (another kind of 30-day ticket that allows free ride on MRTs and buses but have no promise to get on the Commuter Express Bus before full) respectively. According to the research, when the proportion of those who cares more about being late is higher, the price of the Commuter Express Bus monthly ticket, number of fare sections, and the profit of the bus company are higher, which leads to a lower consumer surplus. Comparing the two government policies, the prices of the Commuter Express Bus monthly ticket and the consumer surpluses are identical, while the numbers of fare sections and the profits of the bus company are higher if the government does not set pricing policies and gives no subsidy. However, under the circumstance that the government sets pricing policies and gives subsidies, when the bus company is calculating the number of fare sections and find that the optimal number of fare sections exceeds the upper limit of the number of fare sections set by the government, the price of the Commuter Express Bus monthly ticket and the number of fare sections are the lowest, which leads to the lowest profit of the bus company and the highest consumer surplus. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-20T00:49:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1708202011170700.pdf: 2678707 bytes, checksum: 6de723bb7cf77631c7df570ba3dffefe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 i Abstract v 目錄 vii 圖目錄 viii 表目錄 ix 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景 1 1.2 研究動機 7 1.3 研究問題 9 第二章 文獻回顧 11 2.1 公車票價政策 11 2.2 跳蛙公車與定期票 11 2.3 募資平台中的顧客行為 12 第三章 問題描述與模型建立 14 3.1 第一部分:政府不提供補貼,也不設定票價限制 15 3.2 第二部分:政府提供票價補貼,也設定票價限制 18 第四章 模型分析 20 4.1 第一部分:政府不提供補貼,也不設定票價限制 20 4.2 第二部分:政府提供票價補貼,也設定票價限制 24 4.3 兩個模型之間的比較 28 第五章 結論 33 參考文獻 35 附錄 37 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 跳蛙公車募資定價分析:考慮政府補貼之影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Crowdfunding and Pricing for Commuter Express Bus Routes Considering the Impact of Government Subsidy | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.coadvisor | 陳炳宇(Bing-Yu Chen) | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 洪一薰(I-Hsuan Hong),黃奎隆(Kwei-Long Huang) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 跳蛙公車,月票,定期票,定價,補貼, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Commuter Express Bus,monthly ticket,periodic ticket,pricing,subsidy, | en |
dc.relation.page | 38 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202003699 | |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-08-18 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 資訊管理學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 資訊管理學系 |
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