請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/81336完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 吳淑鈴(Shu-Ling Wu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Shan Liu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 劉伊珊 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-11-24T03:43:57Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-20 | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-11-24T03:43:57Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2021-08-04 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2021-07-20 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 吳淑鈴、羅浩芸(2017)。分析師提供現金流量預測是否影響公司採用現金流量作為高階經理人之績效衡量指標。會計審計論叢 7(2): 23-56。 Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. (1992). An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting. The Review of Economic Studies 59(3): 473-494. Akono, H. and Nwaeze, E. (2018). Why and how firms use operating cash flow in compensation. Accounting and Business Research 48(4): 400-426. Anatharaman, D., Fang, V. W. and Gong, G. (2014). Inside debt and the design of corporate debt contracts. Management Science 60(5): 1260-1280. AT T Inc. (2004). Form DEF 14A (definitive proxy statement): Fiscal year 2003. Dallas, Texas: AT T. Baber, W., Janakiraman, S. and Kang, S. (1996). Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21(3): 297-318. Banker, R. D. and Datar, S. M. (1989). Sensitivity, precision and linear aggregation of signals for performance valuation. Journal of Accounting Research 27(1): 21-39. Barth, M., Beaver, W. and Landsman, W. (1999). Accruals, cash flows, and equity value. Review of Accounting Studies 3(Supplement): 205-229. Beatty, A., Weber, J. and Yu, J. (2008). Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45(2-3): 154-174. Bradley, M. and Roberts, M. R. (2004). The structure and pricing of corporate debt covenants. Working Paper. Brockman, P., Martin, X. and Unlu, E. (2010). Executive compensation and the maturity structure of corporate debt. Journal of Finance 65(3): 1123–1161. Bushman, R. M. and Smith, A. J. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 32(1-3): 237-333. Chava, S., Kumar, P. and Warga, A. (2010). Managerial agency and bond covenants. Review of Financial Studies 23(3): 1120-1148. Chava, S. and Roberts, M. R. (2008). How does financing impact investment? The role of debt covenants. Journal of Finance 63(5): 2085-2121. Christensen, H. B. and Nikolaev, V. V. (2012). Capital versus performance covenants in debt contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 50(1): 75-116. Dechow, P. M., Kothari, S. P. and Watts, R. (1998). The relation between earnings and cash flows. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(2): 133-168. Demiroglu, C., and James, C. M. (2010). The information content of bank loan covenants. Review of Financial Studies 23(10): 3700-3737. Dewatripont, M. and Tirole, J. (1994). A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(4): 1027-1054. Dickinson, V. (2011). Cash flow patterns as a proxy for firm life cycle. The Accounting Review 86(6): 1969-1994. Duke Energy. (2004). Form DEF 14A (definitive proxy statement): Fiscal year 2003. Washington, D.C.: DUK. Eastman, K. (1997). EBITDA: An overrated tool for cash flow analysis. Commercial Lending Review 12: 64-69. Garleanu, N. and Zwiebel, J. (2009). Design and renegotiation of debt covenants. Review of Financial Studies 22(2): 749-781. Gaver, J. J. and Gaver, K. M. (1993). Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16(1-3): 125-160. Gaver, J. J., Gaver, K. M. and Austin, J. R. (1995). Additional evidence on bonus plans and income management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19(1): 3-28. General Electric Company (GE). (2004). Form DEF 14A (definitive proxy statement): Fiscal year 2003. Fairfield, CT: GE. Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94(4): 691-719. Hamilton, B. (2003). EBITDA: Still crucial to credit analysis. Commercial Lending Review 18(5): 47-48. Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1988). Incomplete contracts and renegotiation. Econometrica 56(4): 755-785. Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1990). Property rights and the nature of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 98(6): 1119-1158. Heckman, J. J. (1979). Samples election bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47(1): 153-161. International Business Machines Corporation (IBM). (2004). Form DEF 14A (definitive proxy statement): Fiscal year 2003. Armonk, NY: IBM. Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360. Jensen, M. C. and Murphy, K. J. (1990a). A new survey of executive compensation: full survey and technical appendix. Working Paper: Harvard Business School: 90-067. Jensen, M. C. and Murphy, K. J. (1990b). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98(2): 225-255. Kumar, K., Ghicas, D. and Pastena, V. (1993). Earnings, cash flows and executive compensation: An exploratory analysis. Managerial Finance 19(2): 55-75. Lambert, R. A. and Larcker, D. F. (1987). An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 25(Supplement): 85-125. Li, N. (2016). Performance measures in earnings-based financial covenants in debt contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 54(4): 1149-1186. Motorola. (2004). Form DEF 14A (definitive proxy statement): Fiscal year 2003. Schaumburg, IL: Motorola. Mulford, C., Jayaraman, N. and Wedge, L. (2004). Accounting fraud and management turnover. Working paper, Georgia Institute of Technology. Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5(2): 147-175. Natarajan, R. (1996). Stewardship value of earnings components: Additional evidence on the determinants of executive compensation. The Accounting Review 71(1): 1-22. Nini, G., Smith, D. C. and Sufi, A. (2012). Creditor control rights, corporate governance and firm value. Review of Financial Studies 25(6): 1713-1761. Nortel Networks Corporation. (2003). Form DEF 14A (definitive proxy statement): Fiscal year 2002. Brampton, ON: Nortel Networks Corporation. Nourayi, M. M. and Mintz, S. M. (2008). Tenure, firm’s performance, and CEO’s compensation. Managerial Finance 34(8): 524-536. Nwaeze, E., Yang, S. and Yin, Q. (2006). Accounting information and ceo compensation: The role of cash flow from operations in the presence of earnings. Contemporary Accounting Research 23(1): 227-265. Ozelge, S. and Saunders, A. (2012). The role of lending banks in forced ceo turnovers. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 44(4): 631-659. Rhodes, A. (2016). The relation between earnings-based measures in firm debt contracts and CEO pay sensitivity to earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 61(1): 1-22. Roberts, M. R. and Sufi, A. (2009). Control rights and capital structure: an empirical investigation. Journal of Finance 64(4): 1657-1695. Rozenbaum, O. (2019). EBITDA and managers’ investment and leverage choices. Contemporary Accounting Research 36(1): 513-546. Salazar, M. (2018). Accounting information and the structure of corporate debt covenants. Master Project. Sloan, R. G. (1993). Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16(1-3): 55-100. Smith, C. W. and Warner, J. (1979). On financial contracting-ananalysis of bond covenants. Journal of Financial Economics 7(2): 117-161. Smith, C. and Watts, R. (1992). The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32(3): 263-292. Strischek, D. (2001). A banker's perspective on working capital and cash flow management. Strategic Finance 83(4): 38-45. Stumpp, P. (2000).Putting EBITDA in perspective: Ten critical failings of EBITDA as the principal determinant of cash flow. Moody’s Investors Service: Global Credit Research. Walt Disney Company. (2004). Form DEF 14A (definitive proxy statement): Fiscal year 2003. Washington, D. C.: Disney. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/81336 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | "因應SFAS95，美國上市公司從1987年開始必須編製現金流量表，並提供來自營運活動之現金流量資訊。近年來公司本身與外部市場對於營運現金流量與營運資金的重視程度愈趨提升。薪酬契約中即經常以現金流量指標作為績效評估措施。然而，銀行債權人在設置債務條款時，仍偏好以息前稅前折舊攤銷前淨利（Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization expenses, EBITDA）衡量借款公司是否有足夠的現金流量來償還債務。本研究之研究重點在於探討EBITDA基礎之債務條款如何影響高階主管現金薪酬對於現金流量的敏感度。 本研究以1993年至2019年之美國公司作為樣本，研究發現當公司於債務合約中簽署以EBITDA為基礎之債務條款，將使CEO現金薪酬對於來自營運活動現金流量之敏感度增加。額外測試結果顯示，當年度或前一年度債務合約中包含EBITDA基礎債務條款的公司，相對於未含有EBITDA基礎債務條款的公司，更有可能在CEO薪酬契約中實際納入來自營運活動之現金流量作為績效衡量指標。綜合上述結論，本研究認為股東在評估管理者績效並制定薪酬契約時，會根據債務條款之設定調整高階管理階層績效指標的權重，除了考量會計盈餘，將同時更加重視管理者實際透過本業經營而為公司賺進現金流的能力。透過加強來自營運活動現金流量與薪酬的連結，亦能有效達到維持EBITDA穩定高於債務合約所要求的水準之上。" | zh_TW |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2022-11-24T03:43:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1707202112561300.pdf: 2003967 bytes, checksum: 9997297bb3e9af4f361b11e2a2432871 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 i Abstract ii 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 文獻探討與假說推論 4 第三章 樣本篩選與研究方法 13 第一節 樣本篩選 13 第二節 模型設計 14 第三節 主要變數衡量與敘述性統計 16 第四章 實證結果與分析 20 第一節 主要實證結果 20 第二節 穩健性測試 22 (一) 以Heckman (1979)方法控制樣本自我選擇偏誤 22 (二) 以依公司規模分群之樣本進行額外測試 30 (三) 以RATIO_EBITDA和NUM_EBITDA作為債務條款替代衡量變數之額外測試 37 (四) 公司簽署EBITDA基礎債務條款與以現金流量作為績效指標之額外測試 43 第五章 結論 47 參考文獻 49 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 現金流量 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 債務條款 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | EBITDA | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 薪酬績效敏感度 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 高階管理階層 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Debt Covenant | en |
| dc.subject | CEO | en |
| dc.subject | EBITDA | en |
| dc.subject | Cash Flow | en |
| dc.subject | Pay-Performance Sensitivity | en |
| dc.title | EBITDA基礎債務條款對高階主管薪酬－現金流量敏感度之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Relation Between EBITDA-Based Debt Covenants and CEO Pay Sensitivity to Cash Flows | en |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 109-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 洪聖閔(Hsin-Tsai Liu),廖芝嫻(Chih-Yang Tseng) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 債務條款,薪酬績效敏感度,現金流量,EBITDA,高階管理階層, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Debt Covenant,Pay-Performance Sensitivity,Cash Flow,EBITDA,CEO, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 52 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202101535 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(限校園內公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2021-07-20 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.embargo-lift | 2026-07-20 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| U0001-1707202112561300.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 1.96 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。