論BOT契約的風險、爭議及仲裁研究

Abstract

公私合夥潮流日趨發展，1994年我國制定有獎參條例丶2000年2月制訂有促參法，法規規範政府機構將特定之重大公共建設委託民間機構投資、興建與營運，以提供社會大眾使用。所以根據此種架構，政府機構必須以公共利益為政策規劃目標，民間機構也會以營利為目標; 於此種BOT模式執行中，一般由政府機構提供特許經營權、用地取得、融資、租稅及附屬事業等優惠政策，同時政府機構也應有監督管理機制設置規定,來監管規範公共建設之興建質量、工期管理、營運收費及服務品質等;BOT投資契約就是規定政府機構與民間機構權利義務之規範。現用代理理論的角度來闡明我國促參法及BOT契約上有關代理假設、代理成本、代理風險及資訊不對稱等關鍵問題。並參酌經濟學及法學來分析BOT模式之法制，以明確政府機構、民間機構在BOT模式執行中應扮演的角色。 BOT䅁最引人注目的案件; 如臺灣高鐵、高雄捷運及台北大巨蛋等案件，其中所衍生出甚多履行契約中的爭議，造成轟動社會之案件。因此，「促進民間參與公共建設法」之頒布實施，目的就是在引進民間機構資金和專業經營管理，興建完成公共建設，降低政府機構財政負擔，同時能繁榮地方商機增加就業工作及國家經建發展。 BOT投資契約爭議似有激增之象，其爭議之解決究應採民事訴訟、仲裁(含調解)或行政訴訟方式解決，現下依然有不同之主張。經深入研究，將BOT契約定位為私法契約，而行政機關可以依法干預。此參酌2010年公共工程委員會所修訂「促參案件招商文件及投資契約範本」之規定，認為以仲裁(含調解)解決BOT履約爭議，具有合法、專業、省錢、快速及保密等優點;為費時曠日之訴訟做不到的。再說仲裁程序在法律適用上的嚴謹度與訴訟程序並沒有兩樣，也就是說仲裁判斷的公平性、合法性不僅是當事人也是我們社會高度期待的結果;可謂是BOT履約爭議最有效率之解決方法。日後如果對於BOT投契約履約爭議越來越多時，選用仲裁制度應該比較能夠迅速並有效率的解決爭議，就訴訟實益上也可減少訟累; 如此，除可提高民間機構投資BOT專案意願外，對於BOT目標的完成、重大公共建設質量的提升及對我國之國力競爭都將會有很大的幫助。

With the development of public-private partnership (PPP), the regulations stipulate that government agency can entrust private institutions to invest, construct and perate the specific public construction. In 1994, “Statute for Encouragement of Private Participation in Transportation Infrastructure Projects” was passed. In February 2000, “Statute for Promoting Private Participation in Public Construction” was formulated. According to this relationship, the government will focus on public interest and the private business will focus on profits. In this cooperation mode, the government provides preferential policies such as franchise rights, eminent domain, financing, taxation reduction and ancillary businesses. At the same time, the government should have provisions to regulate the construction quality of public works, the management of the construction period, operating charges and service quality. The contract of BOT investment is a specification of duties and rights between government and private business. From the perspective of agency theory, this paper clarifies the topics of agency hypothesis, agency cost, agency risk and information asymmetry in the contract of BOT investment. The economics and law are used to analyze the BOT model to clarify the role of government agencies and private business in PPP. The BOT cases, like Taiwan High-Speed Railway, Kaohsiung Mass Rapid Transport, and Taipei Big Deme, etc., raise many disputes about contract performance, and draw a lot of social attention to them. Taiwan Government established “Promotion of private participation public construction law” in February 2000, and hoped the introduction of private enterprises’ budget and management model in the infrastructure not only reduce government finance burden but also bring along business opportunity. In 2001 United Nations International Trade Committee formulated “Guide of private finance for public construction” in order to create economical planning and development by the public private partnership. The article 47th of Taiwan BOT law stipulates that “The disputes between the applicant and the sponsor institution in the application and the approve formula should based on the government procurement law. And the article 48th stipulates that “The public construction and running based on BOT law are independent of the government procurement law.” In fact of the increasing BOT disputes, it is still unsettled in adapting civil action, arbitration, or the administrative proceedings to solve them. This claim should be characterized as a private contract of BOT contract at execution stage; the administrative authority may intervene in accordance with the law. In 2010 the Public Construction Committee Amendment “Samples of Tender Document and Investment Agreement for Promotion of Private Participation”, Chapter 24 for dispute resolution and arbitration clause, be specified. Therefore, the disputes will be settled by the arbitration on BOT contract, with a professional, fast, economical and confidentiality, etc., stronger than litigation. Although the arbitration is not strict as litigation on the lawful basis, but the fair and reasonable of the arbitral award are highly expected from the parties of the BOT contract and the community, and less impact on the scheduling of the project by arbitration. Hopefully, the disputes over the BOT investment contract can be solved by arbitration as much as possible, and our society and public construction could benefit from it.