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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 黃俊堯 | |
dc.contributor.author | Chin-Hsing Hsu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 徐景星 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-07-10T21:36:38Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-07-10T21:36:38Z | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2016-10-17 | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2016-07-04 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文部分
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Agrawal, A.,Koneber, CR.2001.Do some outside directors play a political roles?,journal of laws and economics. 4. Amy J. Hillman, Albert A. Cannella and Ramona L. Paetzold . 2002.The Resource Dependence Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to Environmental Change. 5. G. Raheja . 2005.Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards,Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,June 2005. 6. Christopher, W.1998.The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy, American Bankruptcy Law Journal,Vol.72,winter, 1998:111. 7. DJ Denis .2000.Managerial discipline and corporate restructuring following performance declines ,Journal of Financial Economics. 8. Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen. 2001.Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations ,Virginia Law Review . 9. 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S Parker, GF Peters, HF Turetsky. 2002.Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society. 30. Sealy ,L.S.1984.Company Law and Commercial Reality ,Sweet & Maxwell, Center For Commercial Law Studies. 31. Stephen A. Ross ; The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem 32. The American Economic Review; Vol. 63, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1973), pp. 134-139 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/76771 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 公司治理,是指在企業的所有權和管理權分離的情況下,公司股東、董事會、高階管理階層及其他利益相關者等方面的制度安排。目前,學術界和實務界大部分認為,公司治理能夠解決各項權利安排的多種問題。目前,較多文獻都是從股權結構、獨立董事等角度,來探討公司治理所出現的問題,並大多得出結論,應該改善股權、增強獨立董事的專業性甚至規模等等。而且美國等國家的法律規定,證券交易所的上市準則,都對上市上櫃公司的公司治理提出了不同的要求。
但是目前,在國內以及美國上市的公司,財務舞弊、掏空關聯假交易仍然層出不窮。本研究首先介紹包括公司治理的概念和原理,以及關於公司治理的文獻及法律法規。其次,介紹漢康科技個案公司的歷史發展、財務狀況,關聯假交易的來龍去脈。再者,描述漢康科技個案公司之公司治理情況,理論邏輯推導,闡述公司治理的功能是有限的。漢康科技個案公司在掏空案發生之後,主要採取機構重整(董監事整頓與股權整頓)、品牌重塑、理清舊賬(透過減資與增資)、注入新的資金,並未經過法院重整,而公司內部自行整頓,實現了重組的成功。 分析個中的原因,漢康科技個案公司在掏空案的啟示有:誠信勤勉是公司生存發展之根本,健全的公司治理結構與有效的制度安排相輔相成。本研究以上櫃公司漢康科技個案公司在掏空案之後的重整為例,從財務危機公司治理的視野起始,系統地介紹了其重整的方式;然後,分別以重整之後的市場反應以及重整前後財務指標的變化,對該重整事項做績效評估。相關的結果證實,選擇適用的重整方式與資金注入,可以在相當程度上為財務危機公司帶來正面的效益。 此外,對於透過重整方式“獲得新生”的上櫃個案公司而言,也面臨了如何在後重整時期提昇其未來發展能力的嚴峻考驗。 本研究之研究目的茲綜合整理如下: 1.探討「公司治理」制度之規範與執行情形,並提出建議及防制的對策,以避免發生信心危機。 2. 提出個案公司對未來公司重整與公司治理的策略。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Corporate governance refers to the case of ownership and management of enterprises separation, institutional arrangements shareholders, board of directors, senior management and other stakeholders class and so on. Currently, most academics and practitioners believe that corporate governance can solve many problems of the rights arrangements. Currently, more documents are discussed the corporate governance problems from the ownership structure, and independent director of view, and most concluded that equity should be improved to enhance the professionalism of the independent directors and even the size and so on. The United States and other countries of the provisions of the law, stock exchange listing criteria, all of the publicly traded company's corporate governance put forward different requirements.
But now, companies in the domestic market as well as the United States, financial fraud, false emptied related transactions still are emerging. This study introduces including corporate governance concepts and principles, as well as the documents , laws and regulations on corporate governance. Secondly, introduces the historical development, the financial situation of the fake transactions in the case study companies. Furthermore, described the governance of the cases study company, using the logical deduction to explain the function of corporate governance is limited. After the financial fraud of the cases study company ,Mainly make the agency reorganization (consolidation and equity consolidation directors and supervisors), rebranding, clear the old debts (through capital reduction and capital increase), and inject the new capital, without the court restructuring, but the company's own internal consolidation, and to achieve a successful reorganization. An inspirations of the insight analysis in the cases Company are: 1. Integrity and diligence is the fundamental development of the company to survive. 2. improve the corporate governance structure and effective institutional arrangements are mutually supportive. In this study, take an example of the case Company after the financial fraud, starting from corporate governance of the financial crisis, introduced its reforming way; Then, respectively, take the financial indicators before and after the reaction of the market to restructuring the performance evaluation. Relevant results are confirmed, select the appropriate way of reforming and capital injection, it can bring a positive benefit to a considerable extent on the financial crisis of the case company. In addition, through the reforming of 'new life' in the case of case study companies, also face a severe test to improve their ability in the future development after the reforming period. The objective of this study is hereby consolidated summarized as follows: 1. Discussion the normative and operational situation of 'Corporate Governance', and make recommendations and control measures in order to avoid a crisis of confidence. 2. Make the future strategy of the corporate restructuring and corporate governance in the case study company | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-07-10T21:36:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-P03748015-1.pdf: 1369751 bytes, checksum: 5ce686625cd5408b88d6cca70df03c5e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
口試委員審定書 ii 誌謝 iii 中文摘要 iv 英文摘要 v 目錄 vii 圖目錄 ix 表目錄 x 第一章 緒論 1 第一節、研究動機1 第二節、研究目的2 第三節、研究架構2 第四節、研究方法3 第五節、研究貢獻3 第二章 文獻探討4 第一節、公司治理4 第二節、公司重整中的相關事宜 13 第三節、破產重整企業的治理結構16 第四節、國外學者的研究成果34 第五節、理論基礎36 第三章 個案分析43 第一節、個案公司業務之說明43 第二節、個案發生背景與重整說明45 第三節、個案公司之公司重整與治理的問題51 第四節、對個案公司之公司重整與治理的建議54 第四章 結論與建議 65 第一節、研究發現65 第二節、結論68 第三節、建議70 第四節、研究限制75 第五節、有待進一步研究的問題75 參考文獻 77 圖目錄 圖1-1 研究架構3 圖2-1 公司治理內涵的一種界定4 圖2-2 破產重整企業的治理結構 18 圖2-3 各個關係人的制衡關係 19 圖3-1 個案公司前副董事長兼總經理的犯罪流程表 47 圖3-2 個案公司掏空事件與重整時間表 51 表目錄 表2-1 美國的公司治理法律法規7 表2-2 OECD公司治理準則的主要規定8 表2-3 以債務人為主導的各關係人的權力監控22 表3-1重整前後個案公司績效之比較48 表3-2 政府介入重整與自行重整之比較54 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 公司重整與公司治理實務的研究:
以漢康科技個案公司為例 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Research on the practices of corporate restructuring and corporate governance: The Case Study of Han Kang technology company | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 104-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 練乃華,簡怡雯 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 機構重整,資產重整,公司治理,績效評估,財務危機, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Restructuring,Asset Restructuring,Corporate Governance,Performance Evaluation,Financial Crisis, | en |
dc.relation.page | 80 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201600644 | |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2016-07-05 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 商學組 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 商學組 |
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