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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 徐學庸(Hsei-Yung Hsu) | |
dc.contributor.author | Heng-Yen Liu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 劉蘅宴 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T09:06:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-01-21 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-01-21 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-01-10 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Primary Sources, Translations, and Commentaries
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The Hellenistic Philosophers. Volume 2: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography. Cambridge University Press. Secondary Sources Algra, K. et al. (ed.). 1999. The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Annas, J. 1992. Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Berkeley: University of Chicago Press. –. 2008. “The Sage in Ancient Philosophy.” Anthropine Sophia, F. Alesse et al. (ed.), volume in memory of Gariele Giannantoni, Naples, Bibliopolis, p.11-27. Retrieved 2 April, 2019: http://www.u.arizona.edu/~jannas/Published%20Articles/sage.pdf Bénatouïl, T. & Bonazzi, M. “Θεωρια and Βιοσ Θεωρητικοσ from the Presocratics to the End of Antiquity: An Overview,” 2012. Bénatouïl, T. & Bonazzi, M. (ed.). Theoria, praxis, and the contemplative life after Plato and Aristotle. Leiden: BRILL. Bobzein, S. 2002. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Brennan, T. “Stoic Moral Psychology,” Brad Inwood (ed.). 2003. The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. Cambridge University Press. Brunschwig, J. & M. Nussbaum. (eds.) 1993. Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Collette-Dučić, B. 2014. “Plotinus on founding freedom in Ennead VI.8[39],” Pauliina Remes and Svetla Slaveva-Griffin (eds.). 2014. The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism. Abingdon: Routledge. Cooper, J. 1999. Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Pyschology and Ethical Theory. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. –. 2004. “Chapter 9: Stoic Autonomy.” Knowledge, Nature and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. –. 2005. “The Emotional Life of the Wise.” Ancient Ethics and Political Philosophy: Proceedings of the Spindel Conference 2004, ed. Tim Roche. Southern Journal of Philosophy, supplement 43, 176-218. Retrieved from: https://www.princeton.edu/~johncoop/ Donini, P. 1999. “Moral education and the problem of the passions.” The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Algra, K. et al. (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Foucault, M. 1986. The History of Sexuality, Vol.3: The Care of the Self. Robert Hurley (trans.). New York: Vintage Books. Frede D. and Brad Inwood (ed.) 2005. Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frede, M. 1986. “The Stoic doctrine of the affections of the soul.” M. Schofield and G. Striker (ed.). The Norms of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved 22 Aug, 2019 from: https://tomblackson.com/Frede/Stoic_Affections_Frede.pdf. –. 2011. A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gill, C. 1988. “Personhood and Personality: the Four-personae Theory in Cicero, De Officiis I.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6:169-99. –. “Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on Emotions?”. 1998. The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy. Shivola J. and T. Eegberg-Pedersen (eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer. p.113-148. Graver, M. 2007. Stoicism and Emotion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hadot, I. 2014. “Getting to Goodness: Reflections on Chapter 10 of Brad Inwood, Reading Seneca.” Seneca Philosophus. Julia Wildberger and Marcia L. Colish (ed.). Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG. Inwood, B. 1985. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxford University Press. –. 1999. “Passions.” The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Algra, K. et al. (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kidd, I.G. 1982. “Euemptōsia—Proneness to Diseases.” On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus, William Fortenbaugh (ed.). New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers. Laks & Schoffield (ed.). 1995. Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lastra A. and J. Monserrat-Molat (ed.). 2016. Leo Strauss, Philosopher. Albany: SUNY Press. Lu, M. 2014. “Getting Serious about Seriousness: On the Meaning of Spoudaios in Aristotle’s Ethics.” Proceedings of the ACPA. Vol.87: 285-293. doi: 10.5840/acpaproc201441412 Moreno, A. & R, Thomas. 2014. “Introduction.” Moreno & Thomas (ed.). Patterns of the Past: Epitēdeumata in the Greek Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Natali, C. 1995. “Oikonomia in Hellenistic political thought.” Laks & Schoffield (ed.). Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rabel, R. 1981. “Diseases of soul in Stoic psychology.” Greek, Roman, and Byzantin Studies 22, 385-93. Sales-Coderch, J.R. 2016. Leo Strauss, Philosopher. Lastra A. and J. Monserrat-Molat. (ed.). Albany: SUNY Press. Sedley, D. 1998. “Cognitive certainty.” In Stoicism. In The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor and Francis. Retrieved 18 Mar. 2019, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/stoicism/v-1/sections/cognitive-certainty. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-A112-1 –. 1993. “Chrysippus on Psychological Causality.” in Brunschwig, J. & Nussbaum (eds.) 1993. Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sellar, J. 2003. The Art of the Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy, 2nd edition. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Shivola J. and T. Eegberg-Pedersen (eds.). 1998. The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Sorabji, R. 2000. Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sparshott, F. 1994. Taking Life Seriously: A Study of the Argument of the Nicomachean Ethics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Swain, S. 2013. “Chapter 3: Property.” Economy, Family, and Society from Rome to Islam. A Critical Edition, English Translation, and Study of Bryson’s Management of the Estate. New York: Cambridge University Press. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74685 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 西塞羅在《圖斯庫勒論辯》(Tusculan Disputations)的第三和第四卷中,探討了斯多噶和伊比鳩魯等學派的情緒觀。其中,斯多噶學派將激情或「情緒」(pathos),如慾望、恐懼、愉悅和痛苦...等等,視為常人錯誤的價值判斷,源自於錯誤的道德知識和被扭曲的性格。基於斯多噶的理論,西塞羅也將情緒翻譯成帶有負面意涵的「擾動」(perturbatio)。從這樣的分析所衍生出來的則有「智者會完全免於情緒(apatheia)」的主張。更精確來說,斯多噶認為智者不會有常人所有的錯誤價值判斷,因為神智清明(sōphrosunē)這美德使得他們只有「好感受」(eupatheia)而沒有擾動。
這樣的情緒觀具爭議的地方在於,「免於情緒」看似是違反人性且極端的理想。也就是說,即使是看似有益的情緒(如憤怒和同情),在斯多噶眼裡都是錯誤、都反映出人的無知,甚至可能會養成病態且完全不理智的人格。或許是因為本作是西塞羅在女兒過世之後給自己的療傷之作,西塞羅不僅支持斯多噶學派的想法,認為我們必需「根除」(eradicate)情緒,更嘲笑消遙學派,認為情緒這種錯誤是沒有「適當」可言或「中庸」(moderate)的空間的。 從《圖斯庫勒論辯》作為主要依據,本文旨在釐清斯多噶真正的情緒觀:在什麼意義下,情緒是該被根除的擾動?而我們又要怎麼擁有免於情緒的狀態? | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In Tusculan Disputations Books 3 and 4, Cicero laid out Stoic and Epicurean theories on emotion (pathos). In particular, the Stoics defined emotions (distress, pleasure, desire, and fear) as false judgements that indicated a moral failing and the lack of wisdom. Based on Stoic definition, Cicero also translated emotion into ‘disturbance’ (perturbatio). From such negative characterization of emotions arises the notorious Stoic doctrine that the wise should have no emotions, attaining the passionless state known as apatheia. More precisely, the Stoics thought that wise people should have a good grasp of knowledge and have no incorrect opinion. Due to their virtue of sōphrosynē, the wise will only have ‘good affections’ known as eupatheia.
Such a theory seems to suggest that one must either have disturbances or the passionless state. In other words, having any trace of emotion, even the ones we typically find valuable like anger and pity, would indicate an abnormality of the soul. There does not seem to be any middle ground. Yet, in this work, Cicero embraces this ideal almost completely, advocating for Stoic eradication over Peripatetics’ moderation of emotion. Using the Tusculan Disputations as the main primary source of Stoic philosophy, this thesis answers the following: In what sense are emotions disturbances that should be eradicated? How can human beings free themselves from emotions? | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T09:06:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-109-R05124021-1.pdf: 1251972 bytes, checksum: 9985e2c12df928ac35534adf34c3d5c8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: Emotion as disturbance (perturbatio) 9 Section 2.1: Emotion and character 9 Section 2.2: The source of emotions 13 Section 2.3: Proclivities and sicknesses 23 Chapter 3: Eradication versus moderation of emotion 35 Section 3.1: Moderation of emotion 35 Section 3.2: Apatheia and eupatheia 44 Chapter 4: Choosing to be free from emotions 59 Section 4.1 Emotions are voluntary 59 Section 4.2 Freedom and apatheia 70 Chapter 5: Conclusion 79 List of Abbreviations 82 Appendix: Glossary 83 Reference 85 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 免於情緒:西塞羅《圖斯庫勒論辯》論斯多噶與情緒 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Apatheia: Cicero's Tusculan Disputations on the Stoics and Emotion | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 苑舉正,丁福寧 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 情緒,免於情緒,斯多噶,西塞羅,圖斯庫勒論辯, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | emotion,pathos,apatheia,Stoic,Cicero,Tusculan Disputations, | en |
dc.relation.page | 89 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202000072 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-01-10 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
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