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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 王泰昌(Taychang Wang),劉嘉雯(Chiawen Liu) | |
dc.contributor.author | Liang-Shiuan Chen | en |
dc.contributor.author | 陳良軒 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T09:05:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-03-17 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-03-17 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-01-14 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74674 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究探討公司財務相關資訊透明度及股票相關資訊透明度對於執行長(以下簡稱CEO)之薪酬合約中會計基礎績效指標及股份基礎績效指標權重之影響。首先,本研究以公司股票之買賣價差衡量公司股票相關資訊透明度,發現當公司股票之買賣價差愈大、股票相關資訊透明度愈低時,薪酬合約中放置於會計基礎績效指標之權重顯著提升;同時,放置於股份基礎績效指標之權重顯著降低。此外,本研究亦以針對公司證券進行分析之分析師個數多寡衡量公司股票相關資訊透明度,發現當針對公司證券進行分析之分析師個數愈多、股票相關資訊透明度愈高時,薪酬合約中放置於會計基礎績效指標之權重顯著降低;同時,放置於股份基礎績效指標之權重顯著提升。
另一方面,本研究以財務報表資訊品質衡量公司財務相關資訊透明度,並以裁決性應計數之絕對值衡量財務報表資訊品質。當裁決性應計數之絕對值愈大時,代表財務報表資訊品質愈差,財務相關資訊透明度愈低。本研究發現,當依照公司財務報表資訊計算之裁決性應計數之絕對值愈大時,薪酬合約中放置於會計基礎績效指標之權重顯著降低。然而,股份基礎績效指標之權重並未因此而提升。穩健性測試採用不同公式計算會計基礎績效指標及裁決性應計數,實證結果與上述實證結果相同。另外,考量產業特性進行迴歸分析,發現不同產業之產業特性差異並未對薪酬合約中之會計基礎績效指標及股份基礎績效指標之權重產生顯著影響。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This study examines the effect of information opacity of accounting numbers and stock-related information on the weighting of accounting-based and stock-based performance measures in CEO’s compensation contracts. For stock-related information opacity, I find that the weighting of the accounting-based performance measure significantly increases and that the weighting of the stock-based performance measure marginally decreases if the bid-ask spread of the stock increases. In addition, I find that the weighting of the accounting-based performance measure significantly decreases and that the weighting of the stock-based performance measure significantly increases if the number of analysts of a corporation increases.
For information opacity of accounting numbers, I find that the weighting of the accounting-based performance measure significantly decreases if the quality of the information of financial statements worsens. However, the weighting of the stock-based performance measure does not increase at the same time. Robustness tests provide the same empirical results as the main tests. Lastly, I take industries into account and find that different business models in different industries do not result in significantly higher or lower weighting on both accounting-based and stock-based performance measures. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T09:05:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-109-R07722002-1.pdf: 903885 bytes, checksum: fded22005b1830f174c759a8bb625463 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 論文口試委員審定 i
摘要 ii Abstract iii 目錄 iv 圖目錄 v 表目錄 v 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 文獻回顧及假說建立 3 2.1 資訊透明度 3 2.2 會計基礎績效指標及股份基礎績效指標 4 2.3 假說建立 6 第三章 迴歸變數、迴歸模型及樣本來源 8 3.1 迴歸變數 8 3.1.1 應變數 8 3.1.2 主要自變數 8 3.1.3 控制變數 10 3.2 迴歸模型 11 3.3 樣本來源 13 第四章 樣本選取及實證結果 14 4.1 股票相關資訊透明度迴歸模型─樣本選取 14 4.2 股票相關資訊透明度迴歸模型─敘述性統計及相關係數矩陣 15 4.3 股票相關資訊透明度迴歸模型─實證結果 16 4.4 財務相關資訊透明度迴歸模型─樣本選取 23 4.5 財務相關資訊透明度迴歸模型─敘述性統計及相關係數矩陣 24 4.6 財務相關資訊透明度迴歸模型─實證結果 25 第五章 額外分析 32 5.1 穩健測試:採用EBITDA及EBIT計算資產報酬率 32 5.2 考量產業特性因素 38 第六章 結論及研究限制 41 參考文獻 44 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 資訊透明度對於執行長之薪酬合約中績效指標權重之影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Effect of Information Opacity on the Weighting of Performance Measures in Compensation Contracts of CEOs | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 李啟華(Chihua Li),洪聖閔(Shengmin Hung) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 薪酬合約,資訊透明度,資訊精確度,會計基礎績效指標,股份基礎績效指標, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | compensation contracts,information opacity,information accuracy,accounting-based performance measures,stock-based performance measures, | en |
dc.relation.page | 46 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202000107 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-01-14 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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