請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74668
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 蔡崇聖(Tsung-Sheng Tsai) | |
dc.contributor.author | Teng-Hsiang Yang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 楊登翔 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T09:05:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-01-21 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-01-21 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-01-14 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Boulding W., Kirmani A. (1993), “A consumer-side experimental examination of signaling theory: Do consumers perceive warranties as signals of quality?” Journal of Consumer Research, 20(1):111–123.
Chen T., Kalra A., Sun B. (2009), “Why do consumers buy extended service contracts?” Journal of Consumer Research, 36(4):611–623. Fu W., Atasu A. and Tereyagoglu N. (2018), “Warranty Length, Product Reliability, and Secondary Markets,” Georgia Tech Scheller College of Business Research Paper, No.18-46. Grossman, Sanford J. (1981), “The Information Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality,” Journal of Law and Economics, 24, 461-483. Heal G. (1977), “Guarantees and risk-sharing,” The Review of Economic Studies, 44(3):549–560. Kirmani A., Rao A. R. (2000), “No pain, no gain: A critical review of the literature on signaling unobservable product quality,” Journal of Marketing, 64(2):66–79. Spence M. (1977), “Consumer misperceptions, product failure, and producer liability,” The Review of Economic Studies, 44(3):561–572. Utaka A. (2006), “Durable-goods warranties and social welfare,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 22(2):508–522. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74668 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究分析保固長度在不同耐用度及二手市場價值下,對於耐久財市場廠商策略的影響。由於大部分的保固產品是耐久財,而二手市場與新產品的販賣是耐久財市場的重要特性,因此本文考慮這兩個特性,分析保固長度作為廠商傳遞自身耐用度的訊號的功能。我以一個三期的耐久財市場模型,探討廠商決定新舊產品的價格、是否維修、維修價格以及保固長度的決策,首先在完全訊息求出高耐用度和低耐用度廠商的均衡策略。接著在不完全訊息中,我討論分離均衡的結果來了解高耐用度廠商是否能夠藉由提供不同的保固長度作為給消費者的訊號。最後也比較完全訊息及不完全訊息下高耐用度廠商策略的異同,並以圖形來顯示不同二手市場價值和耐用度下高耐用度廠商的均衡策略。本研究結果顯示,高耐用度廠商可能提出較長的保固長度作為訊號,也可能以較短的保固長度作為訊號,此時保固長度可以作為一種訊號。然而在某些狀況下,高耐用度廠商會提供與低耐用度廠商相同的保固長度,也就是說此時無法以保固長度當作訊號。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In this research, I analyze how warranty length influences the durable-goods monopolist’s strategies under different reliability and secondhand market values. Most goods with warranties are durable goods. Thus, it is important to consider two of the important characteristics in durable-goods market, secondhand market and new products. In this article, I embed these two characteristics in my framework and investigate the signaling role of warranty length. I use a three period durable-goods model to discuss the monopolist’s strategies, including the price of the product in first period and third period, the repair price, and the warranty length. First of all, I find the equilibrium of the high-reliability and low-reliability firms in complete information respectively. Furthermore, I investigate the separating equilibrium in incomplete information to make sure whether the high-reliability firm can use warranty length to signal its own type. Finally, I compare the results in complete information with the ones in incomplete information and use some graphs to show the equilibria under different reliability and secondhand values. I find out that sometimes the high-reliability monopolist can use a longer warranty to signal its type, and sometimes it uses a shorter warranty to do so. However, in some cases, the high-reliability firm offers the same warranty length as the low-reliability firm does, that is, warranty length cannot signal the manufacturer’s type. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T09:05:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-109-R06323059-1.pdf: 2047698 bytes, checksum: e802cc2738c53e789bfd41eca6da1604 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii 壹、緒論 1 貳、文獻回顧 2 參、理論模型 3 3.1 模型設定 3 3.2 假設條件 5 3.3 完全訊息在v_1 Q^0≥c_r下的均衡 7 3.3.1 第三期 7 3.3.2 第二期 11 3.3.3 第一期 12 3.3.4 保固 13 3.3.5 低耐用度均衡 14 3.3.6 高耐用度均衡 14 3.4 不完全訊息在v_1 Q^0≥c_r下的均衡 15 3.5 完全訊息與不完全訊息在v_1 Q^0≥c_r下的比較 17 3.6 完全訊息在v_1 Q^0≤c_r下的均衡 18 3.6.1 第三期 18 3.6.2 第二期 19 3.6.3 第一期 21 3.6.4 保固 21 3.6.5 低耐用度均衡 22 3.6.6 高耐用度均衡 23 3.7 不完全訊息在v_1 Q^0≤c_r下的均衡 25 3.7.1 v_2 Q^0≥c_r 25 3.7.2 v_2 Q^0≤c_r 26 3.8 完全訊息與不完全訊息在v_1 Q^0≤c_r下的比較 31 3.9 二手市場價值與耐用度對廠商策略的影響 32 3.9.1 v_1 Q^0≥c_r 32 3.9.2 v_1 Q^0≤c_r≤v_2 Q^0 33 3.9.3 c_r≥v_2 Q^0 34 肆、結論 36 參考文獻 38 附錄A. 參數計算過程 39 附錄B. 參數值對照表 41 附錄C. 不完全訊息的推導 43 C.1 v_1 Q^0≥c_r時的不完全訊息推導 43 C.2 v_1 Q^0≤c_r≤v_2 Q^0時的不完全訊息推導 45 C.3 v_2 Q^0≤c_r時的不完全訊息推導 50 附錄D. 完全訊息時的高耐用度廠商均衡 57 D.1 v_1 Q^0≥c_r時 57 D.2 v_1 Q^0≤c_r≤v_2 Q^0時 58 D.3 v_2 Q^0≤c_r時 59 附錄E. 不完全訊息時的分離均衡 59 E.1 當v_1 Q^0≥c_r時的分離均衡 59 E.2 當v_2 Q^0≥c_r且v_1 Q^0(1+ρ^H)≥c_r時的分離均衡 60 E.3 當v_2 Q^0≥c_r≥v_1 Q^0(1+ρ^H)時的分離均衡 61 E.4 當v_2 Q^0≤c_r≤v_1 Q^0 (1+ρ^H)時的分離均衡 63 E.5 當v_2 Q^0≤c_r且v_1 Q^0 (1+ρ^H)≤c_r時的分離均衡 64 附錄F. 當v_1 Q^0≤c_r時完全訊息與不完全訊息均衡策略的比較 67 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 產品耐用度與二手市場對廠商保固策略的影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Effects of Goods Reliability and Secondhand Market on Firm’s Warranty Length Strategies | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 黃景沂,吳震台 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 保固,保固長度,訊號,耐久財,二手市場,分離均衡, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | warranty,warranty length,signal,durable goods,secondhand market,separating equilibrium, | en |
dc.relation.page | 69 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202000119 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-01-15 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 經濟學系 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-109-1.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 2 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。