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DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 施世駿(Shih-Jiunn Shi) | |
dc.contributor.author | Hyunwook Cheng | en |
dc.contributor.author | 鄭顯旭 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T08:48:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-08-07 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2019-08-07 | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2019-08-05 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/74653 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本文基於「經濟國策」的概念框架分析了中國自21世紀頭十年以來為支持其外交政策目標而部署大規模經濟資源的原因。以此分析為背景,本研究從比較政治經濟學的角度進一步探討,為何中國的兩個主要對象(國),韓國和臺灣,儘管具有類似的外部條件,但對中國的經濟國策做出了不同的回應。
透過鋪陳江澤民、胡錦濤、習近平等不同時期中國外交政策主軸的變化,本論文主張,中國領導層在尋求崛起為大國的過程中,戰略性地運用經濟國策來保護自己的核心利益。許多國家不對稱地依賴中國市場,但實際上中國在聯盟體系當中受到很大限制,當中國已經在能夠控制國內企業和社會的情況下,加大頻繁使用經濟國策作為強化其國際政治影響力手段的力道。這種戰略往往以幾種特色形式為代表,例如對特定企業和旅遊業的選定目標制裁。 除此之外,本文透過 ①中韓自由貿易協定,②中國對韓國部署終端高空防禦飛彈(THAAD)系統的經濟報復,③兩岸經濟合作架構協議(ECFA),④中國對臺灣民進黨勝選的非正式經濟制裁等的四個案例分析發現,韓國和臺灣對中國的正面經濟國策(經濟籠絡)和負面經濟國策(非正式的經濟制裁)呈現出不同的反應。針對這些問題,韓國政府無論政黨輪替與否,大部分傾向於經濟實用主義,而其應對的重點是在於維護國家安全同時保護和最大化國家的經濟利益。相比之下,臺灣政府按照當時執政黨對大陸的不同態度呈現波動趨勢,採取政治防禦立場並沒追求短期經濟利益。 關於這兩個對象(國) 對中國經濟國策的不同反應,本文從比較的角度來分析,韓國和臺灣的反應與他們不同的政治經濟屬性有關。自從90年代初,政治-商業關係和國家鑲嵌自主性在各自發展時期形成,以及與中國經濟關係發展的動機和初步推動力,影響了兩國政府隨後以路徑依賴制定後續政策決策的方式。韓國政府開始推動與中國關係的發展,其最初原因是經濟實用主義,並以自上而下的方法尋求避險(hedging)。政府與企業之間的密切關係以及國家在商業領域的鑲嵌自主性也影響了韓國政府對中國的政策制定。這些特色繼續影響韓國政府對中國政策在2004年至2015年推動中韓自由貿易協定從談判到拍板定案,以及採取對抗2016-2017年THAAD經濟報復的措施。 相形之下,臺灣的私人企業以自下而上的方式引領兩岸關係的發展。儘管臺灣政府在90年代初期在一定程度上放鬆了企業對大陸投資的限制,但後來主要試圖通過政治考量控制兩岸貿易增長的速度。臺灣政府與企業之間相對寬鬆的關係以及 較為薄弱的國家鑲嵌自主性也影響了臺北對中國大陸的政策。這種機制在臺灣政府應對兩岸服務貿易協議(ECFA的後續條約之一)與中國大陸對民進黨勝選的非正式經濟制裁時, 又以政治防禦的形式而政黨之間不一致的方式出現。 本研究理論上的意義在於本文概念化了中國有意將經濟手段用於政治目標,並通過比較研究擴大了對中國經濟國策的研究範圍。同樣地,本研究中提出的比較政治經濟學觀點可以補充新現實主義學說無法解釋對象(國)獨特反應的嶄新觀點。同時,透過本文提供之外交政策領域新視角,將有助於提升發展型國家研究之豐富度。另外,這項研究可能對在試圖制定反制措施的中國對象國會產生政策影響,有助於他們了解中國經濟國策的背景,意圖和新趨勢。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This dissertation analyzes why China has deployed vast economic wealth to support its foreign policy goals since the first decade of the 21st century based on the conceptual framework of “economic statecraft.” With this analysis as a background, the research further explores why its two main targets, South Korea and Taiwan, took divergent responses to China’s economic statecraft despite their similar external conditions from the lens of comparative political economy.
By elaborating the changing keynotes of China’s foreign policy in the eras of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, this research argued that the Chinese leadership has strategically exercised economic statecraft to protect its core interests, while seeking to rise as a global power. While many countries are asymmetrically dependent on the Chinese market, China is significantly limited in the alliance system. Because this nation is able to control domestic corporations and society, economic statecraft has been frequently wielded as an effort to strengthen its international political influence beyond economic power. This strategy tends to be typified by several characteristic forms such as targeted sanctions on specific enterprises, and tourism. In addition, this dissertation discovered that South Korea and Taiwan exhibited contrasting responses to China’s economic statecraft—both positive economic statecraft (economic inducements) and negative economic statecraft (informal economic sanctions)—focusing on the four case sets: (1) the China-South Korea FTA, (2) the economic retaliation against South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD missile defense system, (3) the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between mainland China and Taiwan, and (4) the informal economic sanctions against Taiwan’s DPP election. In response to these issues, the South Korean government tended to lean toward economic pragmatism in a unified manner regardless of regime change, which focused on protecting and maximizing the state’s economic interests while maintaining national security. By contrast, the Taiwanese government displayed a fluctuating tendency in a disunified manner in accordance with the ruling party, and took politically defensive stances rather than short-term economic interests. With regard to the two targets’ different responses to China’s economic statecraft, I argue that their responses were related to their different political-economic attributes from a comparative perspective. The government-business relations and the state’s embedded autonomies, which were shaped during each of their developmental periods, and the motivations and initial impetus for the development of economic relations with China in the early 1990s, influenced the ways the two governments made subsequent policy decisions with the path dependence. Seoul began to promote the development of its relations with China with the initial aim of economic pragmatism and offsetting political risks (hedging) from a top-down approach. The close relationship between the government and business and the state’s embedded autonomy in the business sector also affect the South Korean government’s China policy decision making. These features continued to influence the decision of the South Korean government’s China policy in promoting the China-South Korea FTA from 2004 to 2015, and in taking countermeasures against the economic retaliation due to the THAAD in 2016-2017. By contrast, Taiwan’s private sector led the development of cross-strait relations from a bottom-up approach, and the Taiwanese government mainly attempted to put the brakes on the pace of cross-strait trade growth due to their political consideration, although they at intervals relaxed their constraints on investment in the mainland. Taiwan’s relatively loose relationship between the government and business and weak embedded autonomy of the state also affected Taipei’s policy toward the mainland. These initial mechanisms were also reproduced as a political defense of the government in response to the CSSTA negotiation, one of the follow-up treaties of the ECFA, and China’s informal economic sanctions against the DPP election in a disunified manner. This study has theoretical implications as it conceptualized China’s intentional use of economic means for political objectives, and enlarged the scope of research on China’s economic statecraft through a comparative study. At the same time, the comparative political economic perspective presented in this study could complement the point that a neo-realist view does not explain the target countries’ distinctive responses. This dissertation also may enrich research on developmental states by offering a new perspective, which relates to the foreign policy domain. In addition, it could have policy implications for China’s target countries, who are attempting to prepare countermeasures as a way to understand the background, intentions, and new trends of China’s economic statecraft. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T08:48:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-108-D02341009-1.pdf: 19580248 bytes, checksum: 29dd441af8ec8db8a2e314d41cc594ab (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 誌 謝 i
Abstract ii 中文摘要 iv List of Tables x List of Figures xii Abbreviations xiv CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1. Research Background and Motivation 1 1.1. Changing foreign policy practice of China 1 1.2. Different responses of targets 4 2. Research Questions and Objectives 8 2.1. Research questions 8 2.2. Research objectives 9 3. Methodology 10 3.1. Research methods 10 3.2. Research scope 11 3.3. Case selection 12 4. Structure of Chapters 15 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 17 1. Literature Review 17 1.1. Conceptual review 17 1.2. Theoretical review 26 2. Research Approach 33 2.1. Foreign policy making analysis 34 2.2. A comparative political-economic analysis 38 2.3. The developmental state theory 39 3. Analytical Framework 44 PART Ⅰ. CHINA’S ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 47 CHAPTER 3. CHANGING FOREIGN POLICIES, STATE CAPITALISM, AND ECONOMIC STATECRAFT OF CHINA AFTER REFORM AND OPEN-DOOR 48 1. Introduction 48 2. Reorganization of the International Political Economy and Economic Statecraft 50 3. Distinguishing Structural Factors of China’s Political Economy and Economic Statecraft 52 3.1. Asymmetric trade relations 52 3.2. Constraints of military capability 53 3.3. State capitalism as the mechanism of china’s economic statecraft 53 4. Changing Foreign Policies as the Rationale of Exercising Economic Statecraft 57 4.1. “Keeping a low profile” in Deng and Jiang eras 57 4.2. The emergence of “economic diplomacy” and the foreign policy transition in the Hu Jintao period 63 4.3. “Striving for Achievements” as a new foreign strategy under Xi Jinping 70 5. Chinese Characteristics in Exerting Economic Statecraft 77 6. Conclusion 80 PART Ⅱ. CHINA’S ECONOMIC STATECRAFT TOWARD SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN, AND THEIR REPONSES 82 CHAPTER 4. THE CHINA-KOREA FTA AS CHINA’S ECONOMIC INDUCEMENT AND THE RESPONSE OF SOUTH KOREA 83 1. Introduction 83 2. External Background: Proliferation of FTAs as Geopolitical Strategy 84 2.1. Proliferation of FTAs and the purposes behind them 84 2.2. Basic FTA strategies of China and South Korea 86 3. The Negotiation Process of the China-Korea FTA from an International Political View 90 4. The China-Korea FTA as Chinese Economic Statecraft 98 4.1. China’s strategic goals behind the China-Korean FTA 98 4.2. China’s economic inducements through the China-Korea FTA 104 5. South Korea’s Response to the China-Korea FTA: policy decision processes of each administration 111 5.1. The Roh Moo-hyun administration 112 5.2. The Lee Myung-bak administration 116 5.3. The Park Geun-hye administration 121 6. Conclusion 124 CHAPTER 5. CHINA’S ECONOMIC RETALIATION AGAINST THAAD AND THE RESPONSE OF SOUTH KOREA 127 1. Introduction 127 2. The THAAD Deployment Process and Background of the South Korean Decision 128 3. The THAAD Retaliation as China’s Economic Statecraft 136 3.1. Beijing’s official criticism of THAAD 136 3.2. China’s genuine concern on THAAD and its implications 140 3.3. Putting pressure on South Korea with economic leverage 145 4. South Korea’s Response to China’s THAAD Retaliation 154 4.1. The Park Geun-hye administration 154 4.2. The Moon Jae-in administration 155 5. Conclusion 160 CHAPTER 6. THE ECFA AS CHINA’S ECONOMIC INDUCEMENT AND THE RESPONSE OF TAIWAN 163 1. Introduction 163 2. Regionalism and Taiwan’s Marginalization: the external background 165 2.1. Proliferation of regional economic integration and changes in China’s strategy on regionalism 166 2.2. Taiwan’s isolation from regional economic integration and the contrasting approaches of the KMT and the DPP 169 3. The Negotiation Process of the ECFA from a Political View 172 3.1. The 2005 KMT-CPC summit as a stepping stone of the ECFA 172 3.2. Practical progress toward the ECFA after 2008 177 3.3. Taiwan’s domestic conflict over the follow-up discussions of the ECFA 180 4. The ECFA as Chinese Economic Statecraft 181 4.1. China’s strategic goals behind the ECFA 181 4.2. Chinese economic inducements through the ECFA 191 5. Taiwan’s Response to the ECFA: policy decision processes of the Ma Ying-jeou administration 198 6. Conclusion 205 CHAPTER 7. CHINA’S ECONOMIC RETALIATION AGAINST THE DPP ELECTION AND THE RESPONSE OF TAIWAN 207 1. Introduction 207 2. The Background of the DPP Election and China’s Political Logic 208 3. Informal Sanctions against the DPP Government as China’s Economic Statecraft 220 3.1. Background of China’s retaliatory economic sanctions against Taiwan 220 3.2. Specific measures of informal economic sanctions 226 4. Taiwan’s Response to China’s Informal Sanctions 238 4.1. Promoting the New Southbound Policy 238 4.2. Claiming legitimate rights of Taishang and tolerating their public support for “1992 Consensus” 246 4.3. Boosting tourists from Southeast Asia 248 4.4. Avoiding politicization of the milkfish issue and indirect support for the loss recovery 250 5. Conclusion 252 Part Ⅲ. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 254 CHAPTER 8. A COMPARISON ON THE DIFFERENT RESPONSES OF SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN 255 1. Introduction 255 2. Patterns of South Korea and Taiwan’s Responses 256 2.1. South Korea 256 2.2. Taiwan 258 3. A Comparative Analysis on Contrasting Responses of South Korea and Taiwan 260 3.1. South Korea and Taiwan’s economic relations with China 260 3.2. Government-business relations 268 3.3. The state’s embedded autonomy 273 4. Conclusion 275 CHAPTER 9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 277 1. Findings and Arguments 277 2. Implications 280 2.1. Theoretical implications 280 2.2. Policy implications 282 3. Future Research 283 Appendices 285 Bibliography 289 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 中國經濟國策與對象(國)的不同回應: 韓國與臺灣為例的比較分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | China’s Economic Statecraft and the Different Responses of its Targets: A Comparative Analysis of South Korea and Taiwan | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 107-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
dc.contributor.coadvisor | 左正東(Chen-Dong Tso) | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 徐進鈺(Jinn-Yuh Hsu),周嘉辰(Chia-Chen Chou),蔡中民(Chung-Min Tsai),林宗弘(Thung-Hong Lin) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 經濟國策,經濟籠絡,經濟制裁,中韓自由貿易協定,終端高空防禦飛彈,海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議,民進黨, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Economic statecraft,Economic inducement,Economic sanctions,China-Korea FTA,THAAD,ECFA,DPP, | en |
dc.relation.page | 315 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201902211 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2019-08-05 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 國家發展研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 國家發展研究所 |
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