請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/73341
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 湖星陽(Shing-Yang Hu) | |
dc.contributor.author | Cheng-Yang Lee | en |
dc.contributor.author | 李正揚 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T07:29:25Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-07-03 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2019-07-03 | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2019-06-17 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Bae, K. H., Kang, J. K., & Kim, J. M. (2002). Tunneling or value added? Evidence from mergers by Korean business groups. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2695-2740.
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2001). The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27, 231. Chen, An-Lin, Lan-Feng Kao, Mei-Lan Tsao, and Chin-Shun Wu (2007),“Building a Corporate Governance Index from the Perspectives of Ownership and Leadership for Firms in Taiwan,” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15, 251–261. Chiou, Chei-Chang and Ching-Lu Jhuang (2010), “Association among Independent Directors (Supervisors), Corporate Information Transparency and Firm Value,” Sun Yat-Sen Management Review, 18, 949–1008. Chou, H. I., Hamill, P. A., & Yeh, Y. H. (2018). Are all regulatory compliant independent director appointments the same? An analysis of Taiwanese board appointments. Journal of Corporate Finance, 50, 371-387. Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2741-2771. Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, H.P., 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57, 2741–2742. Dharwadkar, B., George, G., & Brandes, P. (2000). Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory perspective. Academy of management review, 25(3), 650-669. Doidge, C., Karolyi, G. A., & Stulz, R. M. (2004). Why are foreign firms listed in the US worth more?. Journal of financial economics, 71(2), 205-238. Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1988). The determinants of board composition. The RAND Journal of Economics, 589-606. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. Jiang, Y., & Peng, M. W. (2011). Principal-principal conflicts during crisis. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(4), 683-695. Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A., & Friedman, E. (2000). Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis. Journal of financial Economics, 58(1-2), 141-186. Kaplan, S. N., & Minton, B. A. (1994). Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers. Journal of Financial Economics, 36(2), 225-258. Klein, A. (1998). Firm performance and board committee structure. The Journal of Law and Economics, 41(1), 275-304. La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal determinants of external finance. The journal of finance, 52(3), 1131-1150. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of political economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. Luan, Chin-Jung and Ming-Je Tang (2007), “Where is Independent Director Efficacy?” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15, 636–643. Lechner, M. (2011). The estimation of causal effects by difference-in-difference methods. Foundations and Trends in Econometrics, 4(3), 165-224. Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., & Yeung, B. (2005). Corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. Journal of economic literature, 43(3), 655-720. North, D. C. (1990). A transaction cost theory of politics. Journal of theoretical politics, 2(4), 355-367. Peng, W. Q., Wei, K. J., & Yang, Z. (2011). Tunneling or propping: Evidence from connected transactions in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(2), 306-325. Thomsen, S., & Pyehedersen, T. (2000). Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal, 21(6), 689-705. Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of financial economics, 53(1), 113-142. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of financial economics, 40(2), 185-211. Yeh, Y. H., & Woidtke, T. (2005). Commitment or entrenchment?: Controlling shareholders and board composition. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(7), 1857-1885. Young, Chaur-Shiuh, Liu-Ching Tsai, Chia-Hui Chen, and Ssu-Ting Liao (2012), “Board Characteristics and Real Earnings Management,” NTU Management Review, 23, 363–399 陳業寧, & 邱顯比. (2004). 與洪雲萍 (2004),“獨立董事與公司治理: 政府應該要求所有上市上櫃公司聘任獨立董事嗎?”《 證券市場發展季刊》, 64, 1–36. Chen, Yehning, Shean-bii Chiu, and Yun-ping Hung, 1-36. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/73341 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究檢驗了台灣獨立董事制度對於公司價值(Tobin’s Q)的因果關係。樣本採用2009年、2010年、2013年、2015年之非金融業台灣上市上櫃公司作為主要分析對象,利用雙重差分法在控制時間變動對於公司價值的影響後,以公司價值(Tobin’s Q)為被解釋變數來探討獨立董事制度是否使公司價值顯著提升。
本研究將符合獨立董事制度的公司分為自願型以及被強迫型兩者。實證結果顯示在符合政府要求之獨立董事制度後,不論是自願型以及被強迫型的公司,其公司價值增加皆大於控制組公司。透過被強迫型公司的實證結果,本研究確認政府確實能用獨立董事政策來增加公司價值。 另進一步研究發現,獨立董事制度對於超額控制高、資訊需求高的公司有較大的正向影響。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the casual relation between the Taiwanese independent director policy and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. Using the methodology of difference-in-difference and using the data from 2009, 2010, 2013, 2015 of non-financial public corporates, the empirical result shows that independent directors can impose higher firm value for companies adapting the policy.
This research separates companies that conformed to the policy as self-volunteered and compelled. For both types of companies, by conforming to the regulation, the increase of firm value is significantly higher than firms in the control group (of which the adaption of the policy did not happen during the test period). The empirical result of the compelled type firms supports the casual relationship between the policy and increase of firm value. Furthermore, this paper also discovers that for firms having higher excess control and higher information need, the conformation to the policy has more significant positive impact to its firm value. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T07:29:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-108-R06723034-1.pdf: 1374408 bytes, checksum: ea8b85ae77e86da3be3fb96e8b5cfeaf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
中文摘要 ii Abstract iii 目錄 iv 第一章 文獻回顧與研究動機 1 第二章 研究假說 4 2.1 假說一 4 2.2 假說二 4 第三章 研究方法與研究樣本 6 3.1 法規解釋 6 3.2 雙重差分模型 7 3.3 假說一之被解釋變數與自變數、研究樣本 7 3.4 假說二之被解釋變數與自變數、研究樣本 7 3.5 控制變數解釋 8 第四章 實證結果與分析 13 4.1 假說一之實證結果 13 4.2 假說二之實證結果 14 4.3 獨立董事法規對不同超額控制的公司的公司價值影響 15 4.4 獨立董事法規對不同資訊需求的公司的公司價值影響 16 第五章 結論 18 參考文獻 19 表目錄 表一 假說一與假說二之樣本篩選過程 22 表二 假說一之樣本各變數敘述統計量 24 表三 假說一之迴歸分析各控制變數之間的相關係數 25 表四 假說二之樣本各變數敘述統計量 26 表五 假說二之迴歸分析各控制變數之間的相關係數 28 表六 假說一之實證結果 30 表七 假說二之實證結果 32 表八 超額控制與獨立董事制度對於公司價值影響之實證結果 34 表九 資訊需求與獨立董事制度對於公司價值影響之實證結果 35 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 獨立董事制度對於公司價值的關係 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The relationship of independent director policy and firm value | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 107-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 邱顯比(Shean-Bii Chiu),陳明賢(Ming-Shen Chen) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,公司價值,獨立董事,超額控制, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Board structure,firm value,independent board,excess control, | en |
dc.relation.page | 36 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201900932 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2019-06-18 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 財務金融學系 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-108-1.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 1.34 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。