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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 吳玉山 | |
dc.contributor.author | Chun Chiang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 江軍 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T07:04:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-07-31 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2019-07-31 | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2019-07-28 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 壹、中文部分
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/72733 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本論文將中國人民銀行(下稱人行)在1993年至2018年間的治理定位變遷視作中國大陸經濟改革制度化的觀察焦點,企圖闡明兩個問題:第一,人行在總體經濟結構中的治理定位為何?第二,是什麼原因造成人行的治理定位變遷?變遷過程又為何?為了回應研究問題,本論文以金融危機為自變項、人行治理定位變遷為依變項,取徑於「制度變遷」、「央行獨立性」、和「危機途徑」三類理論文獻,提出分析框架,以之辯證人行治理地位變遷的原因與機制,進而標定人行治理定位的性質。立基於前述框架,本論文循金融危機爆發的時序,將1993-2018年間的中國經改歷程切分為五個時期,續依照危機→領導人立場→短期危機改革→長期金融結構調整,順序分析人行在各時期中的治理實況、危機發展路徑類型、和治理定位高低。最後,本論文在連結各時期的人行獨立性狀況、判定長期趨勢、並透過類型框架標定人行治理定位後,做出結論如下:一、以人行為中心的金融制度,在短期和長期上皆會因應危機的發生而有所調整,故可稱金融危機的爆發(或即將爆發)是致使人行制度變遷發生的必要條件;二、人行治理定位提升的程度仍須取決於領導者立場和財政部─人行─發改委三方互動狀況等充分條件;三、整體而言,在1993-2018年間,人行由決策和執行獨立性皆低、以經濟發展為主要任務的「信用配置型」央行,往決策獨立性低、執行獨立性高,以經濟穩定為主要任務的「共識協調型」央行方向轉型。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis focuses on the institutional evolution of People’s Bank of China (PBC) from 1993 to 2018. Based on the theories of institution change, we argue that financial crisis is a necessary condition resulting in the rising of PBC. Furthermore, we induce three ideal types of central bank from the literature of central bank independence (CBI) and then match the characteristics with a two-by-two typological matrix, which represents different degrees of decision-making and executive independence of central bank; on the other hand, with the help of crisis-induces-reform theories, we develop a branch model for revealing how the role of PBC alters among the ideal types during the economic transformation of China. Next, we divide the history of PBC between 1993 and 2018 into five crisis periods, including the inflation crisis after Deng Xiaoping’s southern patrol (1993-1996), the East Asian financial crisis (1997-2001), the crisis of non-performing debts (2002-2006), the subprime mortgage crisis (2007-2012), and the era of risk control (2013-2018), investigate the policy measures of financial reforms in each distinctive period, and finally extrapolate a causal mechanism by the process-tracing method. In the end, we conclude that the change of PBC’s institutional role depends on not only financial crisis but also domestically political circumstances, such as the will of top leaders and the interactions among Financial Ministry, Development and Revolution Commission, and PBC. Moreover, according to the taxonomic matrix, PBC is gradually transforming from a credit distributor, which does not possess both decision-making and executive power, to a consensus coordinator, which is responsible for economic stability with executive autonomy, since 1993. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T07:04:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-108-R04322014-1.pdf: 2870385 bytes, checksum: fb294c03e6fcdb68cdb4d233d189f253 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 文獻回顧 3 第三節 方法論 13 第四節 研究方法 14 第五節 章節安排 15 第二章 理論框架 17 第一節 央行治理定位:理念型 17 第二節 央行制度變遷:危機途徑 31 第三章 人行制度變遷:危機循環(一) 43 第一節 南巡後通膨危機時期(1993-1996) 43 第二節 東亞金融危機時期(1997-2001) 49 第三節 不良債務危機時期(2002-2006) 53 第四章 人行制度變遷:危機循環(二) 59 第一節 次貸金融風暴時期(2007-2011) 59 第二節 身處改革浪頭的人行(2012-2018) 65 第五章 結論 77 第一節 人行治理定位變遷的原因與過程 77 第二節 人行於中國經改歷程中的治理定位 79 第三節 與既有文獻的對話 84 第四節 結語 87 參考文獻 89 附錄A:人行法定獨立性評估(1993-1994) 107 附錄B:人行法定獨立性評估(1995-2002) 112 附錄C:人行法定獨立性評估(2003-2018) 117 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 中國大陸經濟改革的制度化進程:以中國人民銀行的治理定位變遷為觀察焦點(1993-2018) | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Process of Institutionalization in Chinese Economic Reform: A Perspective of the Changing Role of the People’s Bank of China (1993-2018) | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 107-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 蔡中民,童涵浦 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 中國人民銀行,中國大陸經濟改革,金融危機,央行獨立性,制度變遷, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | People’s Bank of China,Chinese economic reform,financial crisis,central bank independence,institutional change, | en |
dc.relation.page | 121 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201902083 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2019-07-29 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 政治學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 |
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