中央政府追加預算之研究

Abstract

本文研究對象為中央政府追加預算，主要是將88年度至100年度中央政府9次追加預算的相關文獻和數據資料加以蒐集歸納，以瞭解追加預算制度與內涵。接著進一步分析追加預算審議過程中的爭議事項，瞭解行政、立法兩院以及朝野間的共識、分歧和互動關係，並且分析追加預算制度層面與審議過程的差異，及其內涵與審議過程的連結。 首先，在追加預算制度與內涵上，本文將追加預算的提出原因分為5個類別，以瞭解各類別和年度中經費分配的差異。另外，本文歸納追加預算整體結構後，發現追加預算經常門支出占整體的比例小於資本門占比，其中有6個年度的經常門支出小於資本門，3個年度的經常門支出大於資本門。就政事別而言，總額的前2名分別為經濟發展支出和社會福利支出，但若從平均值來看，前2名分別為經濟發展支出和債務支出；就機關別而言，總額的前2名分別為交通部主管和內政部主管，但若從平均值來看，前2名分別為交通部主管和財政部主管。 其次，在追加預算之審議過程分析上，本文將追加預算審議過程之爭議分為3大類別8個項目。本文發現追加預算的適法性不斷遭受質疑，爭議的根源來自於預算法第79條第3款中的「重大事故」和「法定預算」，尤其當行政院透過此款來因應擴張性財政政策或者因應軍公教人員待遇調整時。財源方面，本文發現追加歲入預算的爭議比較低，追減預算的爭議性較高，還有，行政院曾頻繁透過特別條例的方式排除財政法規的限制，或者透過債務基金和要求公股行庫延後償債期限的方式隱藏債務；行政、立法兩院也曾對於歲計賸餘應採現金基礎制或者應計基礎制來計算有不同意見，更牽涉立法院主決議的效力是否能夠限制行政權行使的課題。 此外，90年度和91年度追加預算的政治性遠高於經濟性，從立委地方小型工程款的爭議到國債跳票危機，行政、立法兩院與朝野間將法定義務支出作為政治對抗的工具，以政治性的協商與攻防，取代預算審議時應有之法律與專業考量。政治連鎖事件也造成諸多後續影響，比如立法院開始大量以「凍結」預算取代刪減預算，或者改以刪減歲入預算、統刪歲出預算代替刪減個別歲出預算，避免承擔刪減個別歲出預算的責任。 再者，因為追加預算在時效性上已經受到2項限制：第一，追加預算須在會計年度內執行完畢，並且在年度終了時同總預算一起辦理總決算；第二，追加預算不能未通過審議先行支付，故追加預算提出時間點和審議延宕為本文關注的焦點。 總之，追加預算適法性之爭議一直是審議過程中政治角力的焦點，本文建議若行政院想要完整地通過追加預算案，除了有賴表決程序中執政黨立委票數優勢外，妥適地分配政策利益也為可努力的方向。其次，本文認為追減預算的爭議雖然較多，但是減少支出、增加收入本為立法院的職權，故建議若行政院要提出追加預算案，追減預算為適當的財源，可以減少政府對舉借債務的依賴；再者，行政、立法兩院不應以特別條例排除財政法規限制，也不應以特別條例排除預算制度，延長追加預算的動支期限，如此傷害中央政府的財政紀律，也破壞預算法精神。還有，行政、立法兩院與朝野間不應讓政治連鎖事件再次發生，以法定義務支出作為政治對抗的工具。最後，追加預算在時效性上有2項限制，故避免落入審議延宕的7個情境相當重要，建議行政院提出追加預算案時可以先行思考如何降低追加預算財源之爭議。

This thesis focuses on the central government’s supplemental appropriations in Taiwan. It mainly collects and summarizes the relevant literature and data of the 9 times of supplemental appropriations from FY 1998 to FY 2011, in order to understand the systems of supplemental appropriations and the contents of supplemental appropriations. Further, it analyzes the budget approval process, in order to understand the disputes, the differences between system and the budget approval process and the links of content and the budget approval process. Finally, it analyzes the consensus, differences, and interactions between the executive, the legislative, the ruling parties and the opposition parties. First, in the systems and contents of supplemental appropriations, this thesis divides the reasons for supplemental appropriations into 5 categories to understand the differences in the distribution of funds in each category. Besides, this thesis summarizes the overall structure of supplemental appropriations and finds that proportion of the current account to the overall of supplemental appropriations is less than the ratio of the capital account. Among them, there are 6 years that the current account is less than the capital account, and there are 3 years that the current account is larger than the capital account. As far as expenditures by functions are concerned, the top 2 of the total are economic development expenditure and social welfare expenditure. However, from the point of the average, the top 2 are economic development expenditure and debt expenditure. As far as expenditures by agencies are concerned, the top 2 of the total are the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Ministry of the Interior. However, from the point of the average, the top 2 are the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Ministry of Finance. Second, in the analysis of the budget approval process, this thesis divides the disputes into 3 categories and 8 items. This thesis finds that the legality of the supplemental appropriations has been questioned constantly. The root of the disputes comes from “major accident” and “legal budget” in article 79, paragraph 3 of the budget law, especially when the Executive Yuan uses this paragraph to respond to the expansionary fiscal policy or enhance the salary of public servants. In terms of financial resources, this thesis finds that the disputes over the additional revenue budget are relatively low, and the controversy of the rescissions is high. In addition, the Executive Yuan frequently exclude the restrictions of financial regulations through special regulations, and the Executive Yuan also hide the debt through the debt service fund or the requirement of postponing to pay the debt. The administrative and the legislative also have different opinions on the calculation of the surplus of previous fiscal years, arguing that whether the government should use cash basis or accrual basis, and it also relates to the issue that whether the effectiveness of the main resolution of the legislature could limit the power of the administrative. Besides, supplemental appropriations of FY 1991 and FY 1992 are much more political than economical. From the controversy of local engineering funds to the crisis of bounced national debt, the administrative, the legislative and parties use entitlement spending as a tool for political confrontation, replacing the legal and professional considerations in the budget approval process. Political chain incidents have also caused many effects, for example, the Legislative Yuan has begun to replace budget cut with the budget block, cutting the budget for revenue or cutting the budget for expenditure uniformly, instead of cutting the budget for expenditure specifically, in order to avoid taking responsibility. Furthermore, because supplemental appropriations have been subject to two restrictions on timeliness: first, supplemental appropriations must be implemented in the fiscal year; second, supplemental appropriations couldn’t be paid before the budget approval process, the proposal timing of supplemental appropriations and the delay of budget approval process are also the main points in this thesis. In conclusion, this thesis argues that there are disputes over legality, the Executive Yuan could first think about how to properly distribute policy interests. Second, although there are disputes over rescissions, the cut of expenditure and the increase in income are the functions of the Legislative Yuan. Therefore, if the Executive Yuan proposes supplemental appropriations, rescissions could be a proper source of income to reduce the government’s dependence on debts. Third, the administrative and the legislative should not exclude financial regulations through special regulations, and should not use the special regulations to exclude the budget system to extend the period of supplemental appropriations. It will undermine the spirit of the budget law and the fiscal discipline of the central government. In addition, the administrative, the legislative and the parties should not allow political chain incidents to reappear with entitlement spending as a tool for political confrontation. Finally, this thesis finds that delay of the budget approval process is a serious problem because supplemental appropriations have been subject to two restrictions on timeliness. This thesis suggests that the Executive Yuan could first think about how to reduce the controversy of financial resources to avoid postponing the budget approval process.