請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/71986
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 梁益堉(Caleb Liang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Hsu-Chia Huang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 黃旭家 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T06:17:53Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-09-04 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2018-09-04 | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2018-08-20 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Alsmith, A. (2015). Perspectival Structure and Vestibular Processing. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.) Open MIND. Frankfurt a. M., GER: MIND Group.
Alsmith, A. J., and Longo, M. R. (2014). Where exactly am I? Self-location judgements distribute between head and torso. Conscious. Cogn. 24, 70–74. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.12.005 Aspell, J. E., Lenggenhager, B., and Blanke, O. (2009). Keeping in touch with one’s self: multisensory mechanisms of self-consciousness. PLoS ONE 4:e6488. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0006488 Barry, C., and Burgess, N. (2014). Neural mechanisms of self-location. Curr. Biol. 24, R330–R339. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2014.02.049 Bertossa, F., Besa, M., Ferrari, R., and Ferri, F. (2008). Point zero: a phenomenological inquiry into the seat of consciousness. Percept. Mot. Skills 107, 323–335. doi: 10.2466/pms.107.6. 323-335 Blanke, O. (2012). Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 13, 556–571. doi: 10.1038/nrn3292 Blanke, O., and Arzy, S. (2005). The out-of-body experience: disturbed self-processing at the temporo-parietal junction. Neuroscientist 11, 16–24. Blanke, O., and Metzinger, T. (2009). Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 7–13. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008. 10.003 Blanke, O., and Mohr, C. (2005). Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self-consciousness. Brain Res. Rev. 50, 184–199. doi: 10.1016/j.brainresrev.2005.05.008 Brewer, B. (1992). Self-location and agency. Mind, 101(401), 17-34. C.E. Green, Out-of-Body Experiences, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1968. Dawson, M., Schell, A., and Filion, D. (2007). “The electrodermal system,” in The Handbook of Psychophysiology, eds J. Cacioppo, L. Tassinary, and G. Berntson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 152–191. DeAngelis, G. C., and Angelaki, D. E. (2012). “Visual-vestibular integration for self- motion perception,” in The Neural Bases of Multisensory Processes, eds M. M. Murray and M. T. Wallace (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis LLC.), 629–650. De Ridder, D., Van Laere, K., Dupont, P., Menovsky, T., and Van de Heyning, P. (2007). Visualizing out-of-body experience in the brain. N. Engl. J. Med. 357, 1829–1833. doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa070010 Ehrsson, H. H. (2007). The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences. Science 317, 1048. doi: 10.1126/science.1142175 Ehrsson, H. H. (2008). H. H. Ehrsson and V. Petkova’s Response to Kaspar Meyer’s E-Letter. Science E-letters. Available online at: http://science.sciencemag.org/ content/317/5841/1048.e-letters Gibson, J. J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Greyson, B., Fountain, N. B., Derr, L. L., and Broshek, D. K. (2014). Out-of-body experiences associated with seizures. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:65. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00065 Guterstam, A., Björnsdotter, M., Gentile, G., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2015). Posterior cingulate cortex integrates the senses of self-location and body ownership. Curr. Biol. 25, 1416–1425. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2015.03.059 Guterstam, A., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2012). Disowning one’s seen real body during an out-of-body illusion. Consciousn. Cogn. 21, 1037–1042. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.01.018 Heydrich, L., Dodds, T. J., Aspell, J. E., Herbelin, B., Bülthoff, H. H., Mohler, B. J., et al. (2013). Visual capture and the experience of having two bodies - Evidence from two different virtual reality techniques. Front. Psychol. 4:946. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00946 Ionta, S., Heydrich, L., Lenggenhager, B., Mouthon, M., Fornari, E., Chapuis, D., et al. (2011). Multisensory mechanisms in temporo-parietal cortex support self-location and first-person perspective. Neuron 70, 363–374. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.009 Kalckert, A., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2012). Moving a rubber hand that feels like your own: a dissociation of ownership and agency. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:40. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00040 Lenggenhager, B., and Lopez, C. (2015). “Vestibular contributions to the sense of body, self, and others,” in OpenMIND: 23(T), eds T.Metzinger and J.M.Windt (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group), 1–38. Lenggenhager, B., Mouthon, M., and Blanke, O. (2009). Spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Conscious. Cogn. 18, 110–117. doi: 10.1016/j.concog. 2008.11.003 Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., Metzinger, T., and Blanke, O. (2007). Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science 317, 1096–1099. doi: 10.1126/science.1143439 Liang, C., Chang, S. Y., Chen, W. Y., Huang, H. C., and Lee, Y. T. (2015). Body ownership and experiential ownership in the self-touching illusion. Front. Psychol. 5:1591. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014. 01591 Lopez, C., Falconer, C. J., and Mast, F. W. (2013). Being moved by the self and others: influence of empathy on self-motion perception. PLoS ONE 8:e48293. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0048293 MacNeilage, P. R., Zhang, Z., DeAngelis, G. C., and Angelaki, D. E. (2012). Vestibular facilitation of optic flow parsing. PLoS ONE 7:e40264. doi: 10.1371/ journal.pone.0040264 Maillard, L., Vignal, J. P., Anxionnat, R., and Taillandiervespignani, L. (2004). Semiologic value of ictal autoscopy. Epilepsia 45, 391–394. doi: 10.1111/j.0013- 9580.2004.39103.x Martin, M.G.F., 1993, “Sense modalities and spatial properties”, in N. Eilan, R. McCarty and B. Brewer (eds.), Spatial representations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maselli, A. (2015). Allocentric and egocentric manipulations of the sense of self-location in full-body illusions and their relation with the sense of body ownership. Cogn. Process. 16(Suppl. 1), 309–312. doi: 10.1007/s10339- 015-0667-z Maselli, A., and Slater,M. (2014). Sliding perspectives: dissociating ownership from self-location during full body illusions in virtual reality. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:693. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00693 Metzinger, T. (2005) Out-of-body experiences as the origin of the concept of a ‘‘soul’’. Mind and Matter 3, 57–84 Noel, J.-P., Pfeiffer, C., Blanke, O., and Serino, A. (2015). Peripersonal space as the space of the bodily self. Cognition 144, 49–57. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition. 2015.07.012 Peacocke, C. 2000. Being Known. New York: Oxford University Press. Perry, J. 1993. Thought without representation. In his The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays, 205-26. New York: Oxford University Press. Petkova, V. I., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2008). If I were you: perceptual illusion of body swapping. PLoS ONE 3:e3832. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone. 0003832 Petkova, V. I., Khoshnevis,M., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2011). The perspective matters! Multisensory integration in ego-centric reference frames determines full-body ownership. Front. Psychol. 2:35. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00035 Pfeiffer, C., Serino, A., and Blanke, O. (2014). The vestibular system: a spatial reference for bodily self-consciousness. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 8:31. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2014.00031 Rosch, E. (2000). The brain between two paradigms: can biofunctionalism join wisdom intuitions to analytic science? J. Mind Behav. 21, 189–204. Schwenkler, J. (2014). Vision, self-location, and the phenomenology of the “point of view.” Nous, 48, 137– 155 Serino, A., Alsmith, A., Costantini, M., Mandrigin, A., Tajadura-Jimenez, A., and Lopez, C. (2013). Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily self- consciousness. Consciousn. Cogn. 22, 1239–1252. doi: 10.1016/j.concog. 2013.08.013 Starmans, C., and Bloom, P. (2012). Windows to the soul: children and adults see the eyes as the location of the self. Cognition 123, 313–318. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.02.002 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/71986 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 自我位置感為身體性的自我意識中 (bodily self-consciousness) 的一個重要的構件 (component),尤其是在錯覺的實驗中,常常被討論到。自我位置感一詞指的是,在主觀經驗中感覺上我相對於環境所在的位置。在本論文中,我探討了兩種理解自我位置感的方式。第一種是在主觀經驗中,我身體的位置感 (the sense of body-location):感覺上我的身體在哪裡。第二種是在主觀經驗中,我第一人稱觀點的位置感 (the sense of 1PP-location):感覺上我第一人稱觀點的位置在哪裡。本論文藉由這兩種區分討論自我位置感的意涵,及這兩者之間的關係。
在neurophilosophy lab,我們團隊藉由虛擬實境技術 (virtual-reality) 的實驗證明這兩種區分,將受試者的頭戴上頭戴式立體顯示器 (head-mounted display, HMD),受試者藉由觀看HMD裡所呈現的視覺內容,看見自己站在自己的前面。實驗設置分成三種情況:第一個是Basic condition,受試者站立不動,並從HMD 中看見自己的身體站在前面兩公尺處。第二個是Walking condition,受試者藉由HMD看見自己的身體位於視角前三十公分,並被要求從原本在鏡頭前三十公分處的位置往前移動兩公尺。第三個是Visual condition,鏡頭從原本靠近身體後方三十公分處,快速地向後移動兩公尺。實驗總共分成四個,前三個實驗分別為Basic condition的同步與不同步條件、Walking condition的同步與不同步條件Visual condition的同步與不同步條件,三個實驗採用問卷和膚電位的量測方式。在實驗一〜實驗三的結果,分別證明在Basic condition、Walking condition和Visual condition三種實驗設置中,在同步觸刷的情況下,相較於不同步觸刷,皆引發了全身的身體錯覺 (full-body illusion),受試者覺得眼前的身體是自己的。在實驗四中,我們收集了另一批受試者,比較Basic condition、Walking condition和Visual condition的設置下的同步條件比較。問卷分析顯示在這三種設置下,第一人稱觀點的位置感及身體位置感之間有顯著性差異,我們認為這代表了第一人稱觀點的位置感和身體位置感可以在主觀經驗中被區分,這兩者在主觀經驗上為不同的經驗。另外,我們還觀察到雙重身體效應 (double-body effect),此現象顯示,雖然第一人稱觀點位置感在經驗上能與身體位置感區分,但仍然是一種有身體的體現經驗 (embodied experience)。 我們的實驗結果,支持視覺經驗在自我位置感中扮演了重要角色,視覺經驗中的第一人稱觀點位置感與身體位置感,為兩種不同的主觀經驗,支持自我位置感,因此第一人稱位置感和身體位置感共同形塑了自我位置感。另外我們也回應了這兩者的區分是否會遇到二元區分的疑慮?我認為第一人稱觀點位置感和身體位置感都是體現的身體經驗 (embodied experience),因此不是二元區分 。 在全身的身體錯覺研究探討腦神經科學的部分,顳頂葉交界區是整合第一人稱觀點位置感和身體位置感的皮質區,這兩種的位置感共同形塑了自我位置感,顳頂葉交界區的活化顯示了自我位置感中,第一人稱觀點位置感和身體位置感整合的腦神經科學證據。在精神病理學部分,第一人稱觀點位置感和自我位置感在主觀經驗中是否有空間重疊整合,可以解釋autoscopic phenonmena的複雜現象。 綜合上述,本論文以經驗科學的方式研究自我位置感,自我位置感區分成第一人稱觀點位置感和身體位置感做為理論想法的初步釐清。另一方面也嘗試回應了傳統本體論的二元式區分的質疑。在腦神經科學和精神病理現象,這兩種區分得到支持。最後,為雙重位置和雙重身體效應做出可能的解釋。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The sense of self-location has been regarded as a key component of bodily self-consciousness, especially in the research of full-body illusions. Self-location—the sense of where I am in space—provides an experiential anchor for one’s interaction with the environment. In the studies of full-body illusions, many researchers have defined self-location solely in terms of body-location—the subjective feeling of where my body is. Although this view is useful, there is an issue regarding whether it can fully accommodate the role of 1PP-location—the sense of where my first-person perspective is located in space. In this study, I investigate self-location by comparing body-location and 1PP-location: using a head-mounted display (HMD) and a stereo camera, the subjects watched their own body standing in front of them and received tactile stimulations. In neurophilosophy lab, we manipulated their senses of body-location and 1PP-location in three different conditions: the participants standing still (Basic condition), asking them to move forward (Walking condition), and swiftly moving the stereo camera away from their body (Visual condition). In the Walking condition, the participants watched their body moving away from their 1PP. In the Visual condition, the scene seen via the HMD was systematically receding. Our data show that, under different manipulations of movement, the spatial unity between 1PP-location and body-location can be temporarily interrupted (p < 0.01). Interestingly, we also observed a “double-body effect” (p = 0.045). Our group further suggest that it is better to consider body-location and 1PP-location as interrelated but distinct factors that jointly support the sense of self-location.
In addition, visual experience plays an important role in the sense of self-location. According to our results, visual experience has its locating contents including the sense of 1PP-location and the sense of body-location which contribute to shaping the sense of self-location. This idea could be also applied in explaining the higher self-location accompanied with the activation of temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) and in explaining autoscopic phenomena. Finally, I proposed bi-location is an ambiguous word, it has two meanings: double body-location and double 1PP-location, and both could be considered as ground for double-body effect. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T06:17:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-107-R03454013-1.pdf: 1938445 bytes, checksum: 97211f3cd6975e3129ad9046cba356a3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
附圖目次 III 誌謝 i 中文摘要 iii (Abstract) v 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 引言 1 第二節 全身的身體錯覺相關實證經驗研究 4 1.2.1 3PP設置之背面觸刷的實證研究 6 1.2.2 3PP設置之正面觸刷的實證研究 8 1.2.3 1PP設置之正面觸刷的實證研究 10 第三節 自我位置感的相關理論討論 13 第四節 理解自我位置感的兩種方式 16 第二章 第一人稱位置感和身體位置感共同塑造自我位置感 19 第一節 前言 19 第二節 實驗材料與方法 20 第三節 實驗一、Basic condition 22 2.3.1- 實驗假設 22 2.3.2- 實驗步驟 24 2.3.3- 實驗結果 27 第四節 實驗二、Walking condition 30 2.4.1- 實驗假設 30 2.4.2- 實驗步驟 30 2.4.3- 實驗結果 31 第五節 實驗三、Visual condition 33 2.5.1- 實驗假設 33 2.5.2- 實驗步驟 33 2.5.3- 實驗結果 34 第六節 實驗四、Basic, Walking and Visual condition (Sync.) 36 2.6.1- 實驗假設 36 2.6.2- 實驗步驟 36 2.6.3- 實驗結果 36 第三章 關於自我位置感的議題討論 41 第一節 本研究對於二元論的回應 41 第二節 本研究的視覺經驗在自我位置感中所扮演的角色 44 第三節 本研究對於自我中心參考框架的延伸討論 49 第四章 神經科學及精神病理學對於自我位置感的討論 51 第一節 自我位置感相對應的腦區 51 第二節 本研究第一人稱觀點的位置感及身體的位置感對於Autoscopic hallucination的初探 53 第三節 回應Blanke對於第一人稱觀點和自我位置感的區分 56 第五章 結論 58 參考文獻 61 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 自我位置感的經驗研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | An Empirical Study of Self-location | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 106-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳恩賜(JOSHUA OON SOO GOH),黃從仁(Tsung-Ren Huang) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 自我位置感,第一人稱觀點位置感,身體位置感,身體歸屬感,雙重位置,雙重身體效應, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | the sense of self-location,the sense of 1PP-location,the sense of body-location,the sense of body-ownership,bi-location,double-body effect, | en |
dc.relation.page | 66 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201804037 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2018-08-20 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 醫學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 腦與心智科學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 腦與心智科學研究所 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-107-1.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 1.89 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。