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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 李瑞庭 | |
dc.contributor.author | Chien-I Lee | en |
dc.contributor.author | 李建逸 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T04:24:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2028-08-15 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2018-08-16 | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2018-08-15 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Abhishek, V., Jerath, K., & Zhang, Z. J. (2015). Agency selling or reselling? Channel structures in electronic retailing. Management Science, 62(8), 22592280.
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/70254 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 食物外送服務在世界各大城市蓬勃發展,食物外送平台通常向餐廳分潤並向使用者收費作為利潤來源。因此,在本篇論文中,我們提出四個模型探討平台向使用者收費與不收費的差異,並討論最佳的補貼條件。在模型中,我們考慮消費者對外送平台的接受程度、消費者到餐廳消費的負面效益、餐廳準備外送餐點的成本以及餐廳與平台的忠實顧客對於決策的影響。分析結果顯示,當消費者對外送平台的接受程度夠大時,平台才會採取補貼吸引消費者;平台可以透過收費或補貼消費者提升本身的利潤,亦可以透過適量收費或補貼提高餐廳利潤,但只有在餐廳準備外送餐點的成本夠大時,才可以創造平台與餐廳的雙贏局面;而當忠實顧客存在,平台更傾向以收費方式最大化其利潤。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Food delivery services have become increasingly popular in many cities over the world, food delivery platforms usually charge commission from restaurants and service fee for consumers. Therefore, in this thesis, we propose four game-theoretical models to discuss the interaction between a restaurant and a food delivery platform, where the proposed models consider the effects of consumer acceptance of ordering a meal from platform, disutility of buying a meal from restaurant, cost of preparing a meal for delivery, and loyal consumers of platform and restaurant. Our analysis shows that platform tends to subsidize service fee for consumers when the consumer acceptance of ordering a meal from platform is high enough. Next, platform can not only earn more profit but also help restaurant increase its profit by either charging or subsidizing service fee. However, the strategy of charging or subsidizing service fee can lead to a win-win situation only when the cost of preparing a meal for delivery is high enough. Finally, when both platform and restaurant have loyal consumers, platform tends to charge service fee from consumers to maximize its profit. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T04:24:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-107-R05725032-1.pdf: 1505289 bytes, checksum: 4a1400ccf3eb061a9dd93219ba6421ab (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | Table of Contents i
List of Figures ii List of Tables iii Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 Literature Review 7 2.1 Competition between direct channel and retail channel 7 2.2 Two-sided platform 9 2.3 The effect of loyal consumers. 11 Chapter 3 The Basic Model 13 Chapter 4 Analysis of the Basic Model 17 4.1 Stage 3 of the basic model 17 4.2 Stage 1 of the basic model 22 Chapter 5 The Extended Model 26 5.1 Stage 3 of the extended model 26 5.2 Stage 1 of the extended model 30 5.3 Analyses of all the models 33 Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Work 40 References 45 Appendix A 48 Appendix B 57 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 食物外送平台之補貼策略 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Optimal Subsidy Strategies for Food Delivery Platforms | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 106-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 洪一薰,孔令傑 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 食物外送服務,雙邊平台,補貼策略,忠實顧客,賽局理論, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | food delivery service,two-sided platform,subsidy strategy,loyal consumers,game theory, | en |
dc.relation.page | 67 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201803553 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2018-08-15 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 資訊管理學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 資訊管理學系 |
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