雙重股權與經理人能力對企業創新的影響

Abstract

本研究旨在探討雙重股權結構、經理人能力與企業創新間之關係。首先，研究結果發現，在採用雙重股權結構的企業較少進行創新活動，顯示代理成本讓掌握控制權的經理人較不願意投資需要較長時間才有成果及風險較高的創新活動；其次，經營人能力會正向促進企業創新，顯示經營人能力愈高會傾向提升企業長期價值及創新發展；最後，在經理人能力作為雙重股權結構與創新活動間調節變相方面，本研究進一步發現，一旦能力較高的企業經營者在雙重股權下，會弱化雙重股權特性(代理成本等)對創新活動的負面影響，而提高創新活動，產生正向調節效果。此外，研究結果也發現經營者會傾向於進行探索性創新相較於開發性創新，顯示經營者能力較高時，在雙重股權結構下，經營者能夠不須擔心失去對企業的控制權而偏好高風險的創新投資計劃。

This study exams the relationship among dual class structure, managerial ability and corporate innovation. The results show that dual class structure is negatively associated with innovative activities, suggesting that dual class firms are less likely than single class firms to engage in corporate innovation. The risk aversion and the control of private benefit that characterize the dual class structure can lead to weak long-term and risky innovative projects. In addition, I find that managerial ability affects positively corporate innovation. It is suggested that the higher level of managerial ability promotes higher level of corporate innovation and long-term value. Finally, investigation shows that when a better skilled manager in the context of dual class structure, his/her managerial ability will have a positive moderating effect that enhances corporate innovation, especially in the firms with relatively little deviations from control rights an ownership. Furthermore, the results show that managerial ability is positively associated with more exploratory innovations, which are outside of the firm’s knowledge base, suggesting that managers at dual class firms are not afraid of losing their controlling positions for pursuing challenging innovation activities.