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標題: | 論強制累積投票制之迷思 The Myth of Mandatory Cumulative Voting System |
作者: | Pei-chi Chiang 江沛其 |
指導教授: | 黃銘傑(Ming-Jie Huang) |
關鍵字: | 累積投票制,成交周轉率,理性冷漠,假設性契約,章程自治, Cumulative voting,Turnover Rate,Rational apathy,Hypothetical Contract,Anatomy of Articles, |
出版年 : | 2018 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 關於累積投票制之立法,世界各國莫不積極放寬強制管控,尤以歐美為最,相較於此,我國持續堅守強制累積投票制四十載有餘,其背後必有可資探究之價值。對此,我國學者曾於任意性累積投票制時期提及,雖強制累積投票制非現行世界公司法制之主流,但是否有必要跟隨美國法任意規範之潮流,尚應比較兩國主流持股型態、企業經營文化及國情差異而定,況且我國並無美國法強制累積投票制之衰退背景,不得逕將兩國法治比附援引。對此,拙見表示贊同,但或許應先檢討並分析國外法制變動之成因後,再針對其背後意涵進行審慎考量,以作為我國法制改革之參考。
是以,本文先自累積投票制成本效益進行分析,發現事實上累積投票制守護之「少數股東」,遠非係想像中少數,而是一個接近「特羅普數額(Droop Quota)」之相對少數;此外,累積投票制不僅犧牲公司經營效率,亦過度膨脹協商成本,使各派系股東動輒發生僵局。 職是,本文亦嘗試找尋除效益層面外,我國如此堅守累積投票制之背後成因,發現股權結構差異扮演了相當關鍵之角色,蓋在少數控制結構中,不論係外部控制或內部監控均無法有效制衡,唯有藉由強制干涉董事會組成,引進利益關係相反之其他利益代表人,方能遏止,因此或許基於這個原因,導致東亞學者多持肯定強制累積投票制之立場。此外,本文認為我國投資人以高散戶投資比重及高度成交周轉率現象,亦應為我國堅守強制累積投票制之原因,此二種現象讓控制股東變更章程並非想像中困難,因此立法者始終不敢輕易放任公司章程自治。 然而,此種「家長式」保護思維,卻使我國長期陷入了「唯有犧牲企業經營和諧,方能保障少數股東權益之迷思」。事實上,即便是強制累積投票幾乎絕跡之美國,當年也曾同樣面臨強制與任意間選擇困境,但如同國外學者所言,美國立法變動之真正原因在於現代公司型態已非當年單純之股權結構,且少數股東保障之模式已經改變。事實上,美國法對於少數股東之保護,已改由透過強調公司資訊公開,並建立適當之退場機制,使得少數股東之保障相比傳統累積投票制來的更加有效且直接,因此當年立法者考量強制性累積投票制之功能,已經足以被其他制度取代,進而解放公司自治空間,容許企業視具體需要由章程自決,由公司全體股東決定是否應在董事會中實現比例代表精神,這正是美國法產生變革之背後意涵,應值我國法制參考借鏡。 With regard to the legislation on the cumulative voting system, all countries in the world are not actively relaxing their restraint and control, especially in Europe and the United States. In contrast, Taiwan has consistently adhered to the mandatory cumulative voting system for 40 years and has the potential to explore the value behind this. In this regard, scholars in our country mentioned that although the mandatory cumulative voting system is not the mainstream of the corporate legal system in the world at present, it does not need to follow the trend of the countries in Europe and the United States. Moreover, there is no recessionary backdrop in the United States for the compulsory cumulative voting system. In this regard, this article agrees, but after reviewing and analyzing the causes of the changes in the legal system abroad, we should carefully consider the meaning behind them as a reference for the legal reform in our country. Therefore, based on the analysis of the cost-effectiveness of cumulative voting, we find that the 'minority shareholders' that have accumulated their voting system in fact are not the imaginary minority. It is so close to the minority shareholder of Droop Quota. In addition, the cumulative voting system not only sacrifices the operating efficiency of the company, but also overextensively negotiates the cost of negotiations, causing frequent stalemate among the shareholders of all factions. Therefore, this paper tries to find out the reason behind our sticking to the cumulative voting system and finds that the ownership structure difference plays a crucial role. Because in the minority control structure, neither the external control nor the internal control can effectively check and balance, but only intervenes the composition of the board of directors, East Asian scholars hold the position of affirming the mandatory cumulative voting system only through monitoring of other interest representatives with opposite interests. In addition, the article thinks that the phenomenon of high retail investment and high transaction turnover in our country is also the reason why Taiwan sticks to the compulsory cumulative voting system. These two phenomena make it difficult for the controlling shareholder to change the charter, so the legislator has never let it easily company charter autonomy. However, this kind of 'paternalistic' thinking of protection has caused Taiwan to plunge into a long-term myth. Only by sacrificing the harmonious operation of enterprises can the interests of minority shareholders be protected. In fact, even the compulsory cumulative vote almost disappeared in the United States faced with the choice between mandatory and permissive cumulative voting, as foreign scholars said, because of the consideration of the modern large-scale companies is not a simple shareholder structure, and minority shareholders to protect the model has changed before the legislator choose to use permissive cumulative voting system. By emphasizing the openness of corporate information and establishing a proper exit mechanism, the United States law has made it more effective and direct that the protection of minority shareholders be more effective than the cumulative voting system. Therefore, the mandatory cumulative voting system has been replaced by other systems. This is exactly what the United States the law behind the meaning of change should be a mirror for our country's legal system. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/69596 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU201801025 |
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顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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