探討Google圖書搜尋之反托拉斯法爭議

Abstract

從2004年開始，Google就開始進行數位化圖書館的計畫，它試圖創造一個包含數百萬數位化圖書的資料庫，由於著作權人並未授權Google掃描和線上展示其著作，因此作家協會、美國出版協會先後對Google提起訴訟，雙方於2008年達成和解協議，「假設和解協議被法院批准」，公眾將可以透過Google圖書搜尋，線上近用數百萬的圖書，特別是孤兒著作。然而，美國聯邦司法部和其他反對者認為和解協議具有一些反托拉斯法上的疑慮，會傷害消費者福祉。本案法院於2010年裁定駁回和解案。在第貳章中，本文分析和解協議的架構內容，並整理司法部的利益聲明與法院裁定的內容，以釐清和解協議可能產生的反托拉斯法爭議。在第參章中，本文分析和解協議可能涉及的第一個爭議：和解協議將構成圖書著作權人間的水平聯合訂價，本文研究發現，和解協議中的相關條款並沒有限制圖書的價格競爭，且能有效地降低孤兒著作的數量，在合理原則下，這些條款應該屬於合理的附屬性限制。 在第肆章中，本文分析和解協議可能涉及的第二個爭議：和解協議會賦予Google對孤兒著作的事實上排他性。本文研究發現，似乎無法將孤兒著作界定為相關產品市場，消費者仍可以找到其他合理替代品。若將市場界定為孤兒著作市場，由於有意進入此市場的「潛在進入者」將面對一個「法律上限制」，此市場將具有一個進入障礙，因此Google會具有獨占力量；再者，根據目前的法律，信託人事實上無法授權孤兒著作給「潛在進入者」，因此會形成單方拒絕交易的效果，Google將具有事實上排他性權利。然而，本文認為，此種事實上排他性權利附屬於合法的目的，且沒有可以達到相同效果的限制較少之替代手段，因此不違反Sherman Act §2。最後，本文分析和解協議可能涉及的第三個爭議：Google網頁搜尋引擎與Google圖書搜尋間的搭售協議。本文研究發現，和解協議中的條款並不會構成搭售協議，因為Google並不能透過網頁搜尋的結果來強制使用者購買Google圖書搜尋的商品。

From 2004, Google has been undertaking digital library project. Google is trying to build a database including millions of digital books. But the Authors Guild and the Association of American Publishers sued Google in 2005, because copyright owners didn’t license Google to scan and online display their works. After negotiations, the parties reached a settlement agreement in 2008. If the settlement agreement had been approved by court, people could online access to millions of books, especially to Orphan Works, through Google book search (GBS). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and some objectors, however, concern that the settlement agreement raises some antitrust issues, resulting in some anti-competitive effects and harm consumer welfares. The court rejected the settlement agreement in March. 22, 2011. In chapter II, in order to make sure the antitrust issues relating to the settlement agreement, this article analyzes the structure and characteristics of settlement agreement, and summaries the Statement of Interest and the court’s ruling.In chapter III, this article discusses the first issue regarding horizontal price fixing among copyright owners. Chapter III shows that the terms wouldn’t restrict price competition, and could reduce effectively the quantity of orphan works. Under the rule of reason, these terms are reasonable ancillary restraints. In chapter IV, this article discusses the second issue regarding de facto exclusivity over orphan works that the settlement agreement would grant Google. Chapter IV shows that orphan works couldn’t define as the relevant product market, consumers could find some reasonable substitutions. Even if define the orphan works as the relevant product market. Potential competitors who want to enter this market face a legal restriction, so there is a barrier to entry in this market. Google would have monopoly power. Current copyright law doesn’t permit the fiduciary to license orphan works to potential competitors. The settlement agreement would have the effect of unilateral refusals to deal, and would grant Google de facto exclusive rights over orphan works. But this article shows that it is a reasonable restraint. There isn’t a less restrictive alternative for achieving the same goal. So the settlement agreement wouldn’t violate Sherman Act §2. Finally, this article discusses the third issue regarding a tying arrangement between Google Web Search engine and Google Book Search. This article shows that there isn’t a tying arrangement because Google couldn’t coerce users into buying any products of GBS.