執行長相對報酬、獨立董事與價格資訊

Abstract

Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyre (2011) 的研究指出執行長的相對報酬與公司的代理問題有關。本文驗證執行長相對報酬與公司董事會結構或股票價格資訊性之間的關係。我們發現執行長相對報酬和獨立董事的比例呈現正相關而和價格資訊性呈負相關。與本文假說一致，侵害公司利益的執行長會因為保留資訊的行為而減少私有資訊流入股票市場並且減弱董事會監督的效率，因此價格資訊較差的狀況下，即使公司有較高的獨立董事監督，相對報酬較高的執行長仍會侵害公司的價值。

Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyre (2011) display that CEO Pay Silce (CPS), the ratio of the CEO's total compensation to the aggregate compensation of the firm's top-five executive team, is related to agency problems. This study investigate the relationship between CEO Pay Slice (CPS) and board monitoring－board independence or stock market monitoring－price informativeness. We find that, controlling for well known variables, CPS is positively related to board independence and negatively associated with price informativeness. The empirical results also reveal that CEOs with higher CPS are more able to extract rents at the expense of shareholders' wealth when price informativeness is lower even under an internal monitoring of a high ratio of independent directors. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the information-holding behaviors of entrenched CEOs reduce private information flow to the stock market and erode effectiveness of boards' monitoring.