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標題: | 併購交易保護措施與強化司法審查—美國法之啟示 M&A Deal Protections and Heightened Scrutiny Over Them: What the U.S. Practice May Offer Taiwan |
作者: | Chi-Ying Lee 李佶穎 |
指導教授: | 王文宇(Wen-Yeu Wang) |
關鍵字: | 企業併購,受託義務,交易保護措施,強化審查標準,Omnicare, Merger and Acquisition,Fiduciary Duty,Deal Protection,Enhanced Scrutiny,Omnicare, |
出版年 : | 2020 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 因法定程序之要求,企業併購之時程有時十分漫長,從做成合併契約到合併基準日正式生效,可能已間隔數月,對交易雙方徒增不確定性。尤其在董事會決議併購之消息揭露後,市場上人人皆知目標公司待價而沽,有心的併購者即可乘此機會,藉已揭露之消息,以遠低於原併購者之成本,取得目標公司之估價,進而參與競價。
故併購公司可能與目標公司簽定所謂「交易保護措施」,以限制目標公司與其他潛在併購者締約的機會。例如約定目標公司不得在一定期間內與他公司就併購事項另為協商,或約定交易失敗時,目標公司需向併購公司支付約定之現金、股票或財產。 此類約款固有鞏固交易、促進雙方積極履約之效,惟目標公司董事亦可藉此種措施排除其不歡迎的併購邀約,或藉此向股東會施壓要求通過董事會偏好之交易,而有違背受託義務之疑慮。 交易保護措施在美國相當興盛,公司法重鎮德拉瓦州更在相關爭議累積了豐富的案例,故本文先從比較法的角度整理、分析德拉瓦州在此一議題上的重要案例與發展脈絡,而後對併購活動中董事的利益狀態與行為傾向進行分析,指出交易保護措施會提升不當決策風險,故有特別規範之需要,並對德拉瓦州的案例法提出一些反思。最後討論在我國法下,藉由實務上已獲得一定承認之表見證明,建構類似於德拉瓦州受託義務多重審查標準之可能性。 The need for shareholder and regulatory approval of M&A creates a window between the date of announcement and the date of closing, causing the possibility for another bidder to jump in with less transaction cost and “steal” the deal with a higher offer. Thus, the first bidder often asks the target to agree on special contractual terms called “deal protections” to reduce the risk of losing the deal to subsequent bidders. Common deal protections include termination fee, no-shop clause and matching rights. On the one hand, deal protections encourage a first bidder to bid by compensating their bidding cost or limiting the target’s ability to negotiate with other potential bidders. On the other hand, inherent conflict of interest between directors and the company (or the shareholders) could induce the directors to use deal protections as a means to secure deals that suit their personal interest but are not in the best interest of the company. Over the past decades, the Delaware court has established a non-deferential standard of review to analyze deal protection measures and directors’ decision-making in M&A. This thesis first examines the development of “enhanced scrutiny” in Delaware case law. Second, it analyzes directors’ behavioral tendencies in M&A transactions and elaborates on why heightened scrutiny is needed. Based on previous discussion, it then provides some reflections on the enhanced scrutiny currently adopted by the Delaware court. Finally, it discusses the meaning of different standards of review for fiduciary conduct and the possibility of adopting such standards in Taiwan. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/65460 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202000514 |
全文授權: | 有償授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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