以經濟學實驗方法研究報酬特異點在地點選擇賽局中所扮演的角色

Abstract

在多重解的純粹協調賽局之中，受試者只能在所有選擇中隨機選擇，採用混和策略，而不存在優勢策略均衡。我們削減其中一組報酬使其成為報酬特異點(並非柏拉圖最適解)。即使報酬低於一般策略均衡，受試者仍然會選擇報酬特異點。我們認為報酬特異點扮演兩種角色，其一是特異點的存在會吸引受試者選擇，隨著報酬特異點上的報酬提高，受試者雙方協調成功的機率也會隨之上升；另一個功能則是受試者可藉由特異點，而達成更佳的結果。因為特異點可吸引受試者目光，即使報酬較小，受試者會在特異點周圍進行選取，以獲得更高報酬。我們認為報酬特異點雖然成為次佳選擇，但實驗結果觀察到受試者仍會選擇報酬特異點，是由於採取混和策略的結果，而不是非均衡解的結果。

In a pure coordination game with multiple NE, subjects can only randomly make their decision when there is no focal point. When a payoff focal point exists, the focal point itself can attract subjects to choose, and hence, subjects can coordinate more often when focal points are present even if the payoff of the focal point is lower. As the payoff of the focal point increases, the chance of achieving coordination also increases. In contrast, when the payoff of the focal point is low, subjects would attempt to coordinate on locations around the focal point. We construct a mixed strategy equilibrium that involves choosing focal points as part of the mixed strategy and present some experimental support for the roles of focal points.