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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 廖咸興 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Wen-Hsuan Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳玟璇 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T23:28:16Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2012-10-01 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2012-08-10 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2012-07-30 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Baik, Bok, David B. Farber, Sam (Sunghan) Lee, 2011, 'CEO Ability and
Management Earnings Forecasts', Contemporary Accounting Research 28, 1645-1668. Baysinger, B., Hoskisson, R., 1990 'The Composition of Boards of Directors and StrategicControl: Effects on Corporate Strategy', Academy of Management Review 15, 78-87. Bebchuk, A., Lucian, Martijn, Cremers, Urs, Peyer, 2011 'The CEO Pay Slice', Journal of Financial Economics 102, 199-221. Chang, Yuk-Ying, Sudipto, Dasgupta, Gilles, Hilary, 2010 'CEO Ability, Pay and Firm Performance', Management Science 56, 1633-1652. Collin-Dufresne, Pierre , Robert S. Goldstein, J. S. Martin, 2001, 'The Determinants of Credit Spread Changes', Journal of Finance 56, 2177-2207. Cornelli Francesca, Zbigniew, Kominek, Alexander, Ljungqvist, Forthcoming 'Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?' Journal of Finance Elton, E. J., M. K. Gruber, D. Agrawal, C. Mann, 2001 'Explaining the Rate Spreads on Corporate Bonds' Journal of Finance 56, 247-277. Fich, Eliezer M., Anil Shivdasani, 2006, 'Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?' Journal of Finance 61, 689-724. Helwege, J., C. M. Turner, 1999, 'The Slope of the Credit Yield Curve for Speculative-Grade Issuer', Journal of Finance 54, 1869-1884. Hermalin, Benjamin E., Michael S. Weisbach, 1998 'Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO' American Economic Review 88, 96-118. Huddart, Steven, 1993, 'The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value', Management Science 39, 1407-1421. Jostarndt, Philipp, Z. Sautner, 2008, 'Financial Distress, Corporate Control, and Management Turnover', Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 2188-2204. Kesner, F., Idalene, 1987 'Directors' Stock Ownership and Organizational Performance: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies', Journal of Management 13, 499-507. Merton, R. C., 1974, 'On the Pricing of Corporate Debt：the Risk Structure of Interest Rate' Journal of Finance 29, 449-470. Rajgopal, Shivaram, Terry, Shevlin, Valentina, Zamora, 2006 'CEOs' outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts', Journal of Finance 61, 1813-1844. Rutherford, A., Matthew, Ann K. Buchholtz, 2007 'Investigating the Relationship Between Board Characteristics and Board Information', Corporate Governance 15, 576-584. Taylor, Lucian A., 2010 'Why are CEO Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation', Journal of Finance 65, 2051-2087. Weisbach, S., Michael, 1988 'Outside Directors And CEO Turnover', Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431-460. Yu, F., 2005, 'Accounting Transparency and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads' Journal of Financial Economics 75, 53-84. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/65170 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Taylor (2010) 指出執行長能力差異及公司對執行長的了解程度會影響公司替換執行長的時機早晚，本研究則將此影響延伸至公司信用風險。本文以2001年至2010年北美地區公司的資料，研究企業的違約風險與執行長的能力差異之關聯，並探討公司了解執行長能力與否是否同樣影響公司的違約風險。我們發現，此兩項因素都會影響企業的信用風險。實證結果顯示同產業執行長的能力差異越大，公司的違約機率越小。而公司識才能力越好對公司越有利，除了可淘汰不適任的執行長外，也有利於尋找更有才能的人選來經營公司。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Taylor (2010) displays that CEO ability and the capability of the board in understanding CEO ability affect the timing of replacing CEO. This study investigates their effects on firm credit risk. We use North America bond data to investigate the relationship between firm credit risk, CEO ability and the board capability in understanding management ability. We find that both affect a firm’s credit risk. The higher CEO ability heterogeneity of a firm’s industry is, the lower is the firm’s credit risk. Higher recruiting ability also enhances firm credit quality. The results are robust when controlling well known yield spread determinant variables and firm credit ratings. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T23:28:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-R99723011-1.pdf: 377398 bytes, checksum: e6828a788074ba689f299aa0de960cf3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Contents
口試委員會審定書 i 致謝 ii 摘要 iii Abstract iv Contents v I. Introduction 1 II. Hypotheses 5 II.1. Credit risk and CEO ability heterogeneity 5 II.1. Hypothesis 1 5 II.2. Credit risk and Firm’s recruiting ability 6 II.2. Hypothesis 2 6 III. Data and Methodology 7 III.1. Sample selection 7 III.1.1 The tenure of CEO is above 3 years 7 III.1.2. Firms are not the only company in the industry 7 III.1.3. Firms are with board information 8 III.1.4. Firms are publicly traded 8 III.2. Ability of CEO 8 III.3. Firm’s recruiting ability 9 III.3.1. Inside board 9 III.3.2. Busy board 10 III.3.3. Directors’ stock ownership 10 III.3.4. Same industry director ratio 10 III.4. Credit risk and control variables 11 III.4.1. Financial leverage (LEV) 12 III.4.2. Equity volatility (VOL) 12 III.4.3. Life to Final Date (LFFL) 12 III.4.4. Amount Issued (Lnamt) and bond age (Bage) 13 III.4.5. Coupon rate (Coupon) 13 III.4.6. Credit rating (RAT) 13 III.4.7. Firm Size (Firm size) 14 III.4.8. Firm Age (Firm age) 14 III.4.9. Firm-specific profit volatility (Firm Vol) 14 III.5. Summary statistics 15 IV. Empirical Results 18 IV.1.1. CEO Ability Heterogeneity and Credit Risk 18 IV.1.2. Firm’s Recruiting Ability and Credit Risk 19 IV.2. Robustness 20 V. Conclusions 21 References 22 Table 1. Sample Distribution of Bond 24 Table 2. Summary Statistics of Major Variables 25 Table 3. Summary Statistics of Major Variables 2001-2006 26 Table 4. Summary Statistics of Major Variables 2007-2010 27 Table 5. Correlation Coefficient Matrix among CEO ability heterogeneity, Firm’s recruiting ability, Credit Risk and Other Control Variables 28 Table 6. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on CEO Ability Heterogeneity 29 Table 7-1. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on Firm’s Recruiting Ability 30 Table 7-2. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on Firm’s Recruiting Ability 31 Appendix 32 Table A1. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on CEO Ability Heterogeneity before Financial Tsunami (2001-2006) 32 Table A2-1. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on Firm’s Recruiting Ability before Financial Tsunami (2001-2006) 33 Table A2-2. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on Firm’s Recruiting Ability before Financial Tsunami (2001-2006) 34 Table A3. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on CEO Ability Heterogeneity after Financial Tsunami (2007-2010) 35 Table A4-1. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on Firm’s Recruiting Ability after Financial Tsunami (2007-2010) 36 Table A4-2. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on Firm’s Recruiting Ability after Financial Tsunami (2007-2010) 37 Table A5-1. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on CEO Ability Heterogeneity (2001-2010) 38 Table A5-2. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on CEO Ability Heterogeneity before Financial Tsunami (2001-2006) 39 Table A5-3. Regressions of Bond Yield Spread on CEO Ability Heterogeneity after Financial Tsunami (2007-2010) 40 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 公司信用風險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 執行長能力差異 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 高階經理人人力市場 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 董事會資訊 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司識才能力 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Board information | en |
| dc.subject | CEO ability heterogeneity | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate credit risk | en |
| dc.subject | Managerial labor market | en |
| dc.subject | Firm’s recruiting ability | en |
| dc.title | 從結構型模型觀點探討執行長人力市場異質性、公司識才能力與公司信用風險之關係 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | CEO Market Heterogeneity, Firm’s Recruiting Ability and Credit Risk—Structured-form model perspective | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 100-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 胡星陽,陳聖賢,陳宗岡 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公司信用風險,執行長能力差異,高階經理人人力市場,董事會資訊,公司識才能力, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Corporate credit risk,CEO ability heterogeneity,Managerial labor market,Board information,Firm’s recruiting ability, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 40 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2012-07-31 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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