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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 林嬋娟(Chan-Jane Lin) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yu-Liang Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳昱良 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T23:28:00Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2022-03-22 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2012-08-16 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2012-07-31 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | References
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/65164 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 先前對於社會連結之研究指出，獨立董事與總經理之社會連結可能影響獨立董事在企業內之職權有效性。本篇研究蒐集2006年至2010年間238家台灣上市及上櫃公司獨立董事與總經理之三種社會連結（同校、同事以及同社），並檢視該社會連結對總經理薪酬之影響。本研究發現當上述三種獨立董事與總經理之社會連結同時存在時，該總經理將獲得較高薪酬，惟本篇研究也發現同時考量上述三種社會連結時才會影響獨立董事之決策過程，三種社會連結個別效果並不顯著。此外，相對於傳統產業，由於高科技產業之總經理職業及領域知識的限制，他們傾向與獨立董事建立更多的社會連結，而高科技產業之總經理亦獲得較高之薪酬。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Prior research suggests that independent director’s social ties with the CEO could undermine the efficacy of a formally independent director in the firm. In this study, I examine the relation between social ties and CEO compensation over the time period of 2006 to 2010 using hand-collecting data from Taiwanese TSE and GTSM companies. My results suggest that CEO compensation is higher when social ties exist between CEO and independent directors. In addition, this study also finds that the impacts of social ties are wholly integrated to affect decisions of independent directors rather than individually affecting them. Moreover, CEO of technology industries might have more social connections with their independent board members and they tend to share social relationships with them through social networks because of limitations of professional knowledge. Consequently, CEO of technology industries would receive higher compensation than other industries. Thus, my findings would be useful in better informing regulators and investors faced with questions related to the possible consequences of CEO-board social ties for business decisions and other concerning economic outcomes. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T23:28:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-R99722008-1.pdf: 400493 bytes, checksum: 03be3cc49620f50916c65c3b2fdaa0a3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Index
1. Introduction 1 2. Literature and Hypothesis Development 6 2.1. Literature Review 6 2.1.1. Board Independence and Social Ties 6 2.1.2. Social Ties and CEO Compensation 16 2.2. Hypothesis Development 21 3. Research Design 23 3.1. Sources and Sample 23 3.2. Identification/Measurement of Social Ties 25 3.3. Research Design and Empirical Model 28 3.4. Variables Measurement 29 3.4.1. CEO Compensation 29 3.4.2. Independent Director-CEO Social Ties 30 3.4.3. Control Variables 30 4. Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results 34 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses 34 4.2. Empirical Results 38 5. Additional Analysis 41 6. Conclusions, Contribution, and Limitations 43 6.1. Conclusions 43 6.2. Contribution 44 6.3. Limitations 46 References 48 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 總經理薪酬 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 社會連結 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 董事會獨立性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 獨立董事 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | social ties | en |
| dc.subject | CEO compensation | en |
| dc.subject | board independence | en |
| dc.subject | independent directors | en |
| dc.title | 總經理薪酬、董事會獨立性及社會連結：以台灣上市櫃企業之實證為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | CEO Compensation, Board Independence and Social Ties: Evidence form Taiwan TSE and GTSM Companies | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 100-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王泓達(Hong-Da Wang),廖芝嫻(Chih-Hsien, Liao) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 社會連結,總經理薪酬,董事會獨立性,獨立董事, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | social ties,CEO compensation,board independence,independent directors, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 72 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2012-07-31 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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