最有利標選商採序位法決標之模擬研究

Abstract

摘 要 目前政府各機關辦理採購均依據民國87頒布之政府採購法，於眾多政府採購案中之公共工程建設採購為最重要，因公共工程建設為國家現代化之指標，並可推動國家整體經濟發展。公共工程建設品質關係人民生命財產安全，應慎選廠商否則未蒙其利先受其害。正如採購法第一條開宗明義「依公平、公開之採購程序，提升採購效率與功能，確保採購品質」所揭示，工程採購必須透過公平合理之招標決標程序，方能選出優良廠商進而確保工程品質。其中工程技術服務採購之最有利標採購，因免於價格標低價搶標之缺點，可擇取最適當廠商辦理工程，原為立意良善之規定，但其評選廠商之公平性屢遭質疑，特別是採序位法決標案件。查閱歷史文獻，諸多論述研究最有利標評選衍生之不合理現象並謀求改善方法。其中討論到「偏激給分」所引發的「獨裁現象」，甚至直言「產生一人決定評選結果之獨裁情事最為人所詬病」；歸納以上文獻論述，大部分以研究最有利標選商之防弊與改善措施為主流，其隱含最有利標存有公平問題之前題不言而喻。唯尚未有研究深入探討不合理決標情形之真相，是否確實存在、普遍存在或容易發生？本研究針對序位法授予最有利標之情況，採取蒙地卡羅均勻亂數模擬各種投標評比之情境並予以歸納分析，結果發現目前各機關普遍採行之序位法決標方式，在某些情況下期望有公平合理決標之機率確實不高，並且本研究亦提出幾種改善公平合理機率的評選及決標方式，提供工程主管機關及主辦單位作為修訂法令與辦理工程採購之參考。 關鍵詞：最有利標、序位法、公平、合理、投標廠商、評選委員會

Abstract All government procurements today are required by law to follow Government Procurement Act of 1998. As an index to the modernization of a country and a major force in boosting economic development, public infrastructure construction procurement is categorically the most important among all government procurements. As the quality of public infrastructure construction influences civil life, wealth, and safety, contractors must be selected carefully; otherwise, adversities may dwarf benefits. As stated in Article 1 of Government Procurement Act, “according to fair and open procurement procedures, enhancing procurement efficiency and effectiveness, and ensuring procurement quality,” in engineering procurement, quality is ensured only through the awarding of quality contractors based on fair and reasonable tender invitation and contract awarding procedures. In the procurement of engineering technical service, the most-advantageous-tender awarding method is good-faith based to award the most suitable contractor while guarding against malicious “low bids.” However, its fairness has been frequently questioned, especially when ranking is involved. A perusal of related literatures reveals an abundance of articles studying the fairness and rationality of the most-advantageous-tender awarding method and 'dictatorship' resulting from 'extreme grading'. One criticism even goes as far as saying 'most to be criticized is the one-person-decides-it-all dictatorship.' Among these literatures, the majority involves fault prevention and remedies of the most-advantageous-tender awarding method, clearly implying the existence of such fairness issue. However, albeit the fairness concerns by engineering societies and academic circles induced from the observations of numerous engineering procurements, there is yet an in-depth discussion regarding its existence or details. This is due to the complexity of multiplicities in both bidders and evaluation committee members and difficulties in obtaining sufficient historical data for analysis. Furthermore, it is impossible to judge based on historical data who the best contractor is or whether an evaluation committee member is fair and reasonable. This study distances itself from the dilemma associated with historical data by applying Monte Carlo simulation to uniformly distributed tender evaluation scenarios. It reveals, when ranking is used, various possible effects related to evaluation fairness and rationality and, based on simulation results, seeks remedies to provide references to engineering supervising organizations and procurement agencies in amending relevant regulations and managing engineering procurements. Keywords: the Most Advantageous Tender, Ranking method, Fairness, Rationality, Bidder, the Evaluation Committee