顏色的形上學

Abstract

物體有顏色嗎？顏色存在嗎？顏色作為一種性質的本質為何？顏色性質和顏色知覺之間有什麼樣的關係？雖然哲學家對這些問題的探討已久，但對於顏色的形上學地位還是爭論不休。反實在論者認為外在物體沒有顏色，顏色知覺是錯覺。物理論則主張顏色和形狀一樣都是物體的物理性質，顏色就是物體表面的光譜反射。而關係論主張，顏色是由物體、知覺者和觀看條件所組成的關係性質。在本論文的第一部分，我論證(1)如果世界上沒有任何東西有顏色這個性質，反實在論無法說明我們的色彩知覺的對象為何。(2)物理論者無法解決棘手的本色難題。(3)知覺變異性論證無法用來支持顏色關係論。論文的第二部分，我提供一個新版本的顏色實在論：生物物理論。我認為顏色是真實的、客觀的、依賴知覺系統的性質。生物物理論最能和視覺科學相容，也讓我們更能掌握顏色的形上學地位。

Do objects have colors? Are colors real? What is the nature of color properties? What is the relation between color property and color perception? Philosophers have studied these questions for centuries, but a lot of disputes remain. According to anti-realism, color properties are not instantiated by external objects. All color perceptions are illusions. Physicalism holds the view that color, like shape, is a physical property of object. It identifies color with surface spectral reflectance. Relationalists claim that color is a relational property standing between object, subject and viewing condition. In the first part of this dissertation, I examine the arguments of these theories of color. I argue that 1) anti-realism is implausible. It cannot explain why visual systems would have evolved to represent properties that nothing has. 2) Physicalism has failed to answer ‘the puzzle of true color’. 3) The argument from perceptual variation does not support relationalism. In the second part, I introduce the biophysicalism, a novel form of color realism. It maintains that colors are real, objective, and perceptual system-dependent properties. I argue that a biophysicalist position best accommodates scientific theories of vision and provides us with a better understanding of the metaphysical status of color.